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THE CHINA QUARTERLY

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THE FIRST DECADE

APPRAISAL: Howard L. Boorman, C. P. Fitzgerald,
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Steiner, Guy Wint, Karl A. Wittfogel.

ANALYSIS: Economic Development Choh-ming Li
The Sino-Soviet Alliance

Robert C. North

China and Asia

Guy Wint

DEBATE: PART I The Legend of "Maoism"
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
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EDITORIAL

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(The first issue is somewhat larger than those we plan for the future due to our special survey of Communist China's first decade.)

Editorial

The first issue of this Journal coincides with the tenth anniversary of the establishment of a Communist régime in China. During the past decade, China has emerged from a century of imperial decline, civil war and foreign invasion to become a major Power. The centralised, bureaucratic Chinese state has been re-created; but the new Communist version is far more efficient and all-embracing than any of its Confucian antecedents and correspondingly more powerful.

The outside world has already been able to gauge the strength of this régime in Korea and Indo-China, in the Formosa Strait and on the Indian frontier. As China's industrial base grows in the years to come, her influence will be felt far beyond these immediately contiguous areas. Only recently Chou En-lai staked out China's claim to world power status in his declaration that his country must have its say on "all major international questions which concern the interests of world peace."

The present fact of Chinese power is sufficient justification for launching this Journal. We cannot afford to wait for the Chinese to send a sputnik into orbit before realising that China would repay closer study. Peking's current propaganda indicates that Chinese power is aimed far more implacably against the West than that of the Soviet Union. This only increases the need for rigorous and objective analysis of Chinese developments.

We will attempt to provide such comment by publishing articles by specialists on all aspects of contemporary Chinese developments. We hope to provoke controversy, and print in this issue the first part of a debate on an important aspect of Chinese Communist history. In our Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation we will give a continuing narrative of major events. In forthcoming issues, book reviews will perform the customary function of separating the wheat from the chaff among more extended surveys of modern China.

But first it is necessary to know from where we start. We have

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used the occasion of the Communist régime's tenth anniversary to offer a group of distinguished scholars and directors of Chinese studies from various parts of the world some 1,000 words in which to present their appraisals of the past decade—to set down what they think are the most important things to be said at this point in Communist China's history. In the second part of our survey of this period we publish detailed analyses of three fields in which the policies of Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues have been of particular significance.

This Journal is written for both specialist and lay readers. We would welcome comment from both so that we may better achieve the aim of tracing the evolution of contemporary China.

THE FIRST DECADE Part I

HOWARD L. BOORMAN

China and the Global Revolution

THE man who faces his typewriter to set down a thousand words of coherent comment on the Communist revolution in China confronts not only a massive experiment in social engineering but also the fact that his interpretation of that experiment will expose as much of the author as it does of the revolution. Some observers, moved by a deep attachment to the distinctive cultural unity of China and by an antiquarian admiration for the achievements of her traditional élite, seek, as if by public subscription, the preservation of China's relics. Others, more concerned with Communism than with China, see in Mao Tse-tung's progress only the relentless efforts of a new, technological despotism to mould man to the purposes of the totalitarian state. In this revolution, as in others before, the contemporary observer is prone to apply his own measure and thus to fall victim to his own distortion.

The developments of the past decade have made Communist China the most formidable political and military power of Asia. These developments have emerged from a particular stream of historical circumstances in China. They have now radically altered the course of that stream. And these developments have, perversely, committed contemporary China to the pursuit of goals substantially similar to those pursued by the non-Chinese, non-Communist world: a sort of Missouri joining at last a broader Mississippi.

The People's Republic of China, through the intention of its present rulers, forms a part of the Communist world. Yet it is at the same time much more than a sector of the Soviet *bloc*, and any approach which views contemporary China primarily as a subdivision of the field of Russian or Slavic or Communist studies is doomed to deformity. The Communist revolution in China must be initially assessed in relation to the traditional institutions of China, to the durable patterns of thought and action which have moulded these institutional forms, and to the sinewy but subtle Chinese psychology—slowly tempered through the centuries—which has undergirded the whole.

Preoccupation with the contemporary scene should not blur perspective. China is a very old civilisation, indeed the only culture which has

come in unbroken line from ancient times to the twentieth century. And traditional China was essentially a backward-looking civilisation, suspicious of change and sceptical of the concept of progress in history. For the Chinese, antiquity has been the Golden Age without peer, and all since the ancient sages has been only the downspiralling of disintegration and degeneration. This was a view of life and of history which consistently esteemed the past over the present, age over youth, established authority over impatient innovation.

The Communist impact at mid-twentieth century has drastically changed the contours of life in China. This explosion has affected not only the external aspects of the culture but also many of its internal assumptions and aspirations. The Communists, while still utilising and manipulating the Chinese tradition for their own purposes, have abruptly changed the national point of view. They look to the present and to the future rather than to the past. They condemn the classical Chinese emphasis upon the past as a mood which—if mellow at best—was at worst indicative of stagnation: material inertia rationalised as spiritual superiority. Through dedication, discipline, and indoctrination, the Communists are now attempting to turn the giant body of China to look forward to tomorrow rather than backward to yesterday.

The vision of social change is not novel in modern China. But the implementation of radical change on a national scale and under determined central control is new. For millions, the Communists have transformed uncertainty into conviction and converted discontent into decision. With their aid, Peking has mobilised China's enormous population to concerted, compulsive activity. Activity is the obvious pattern. Yet Communist China is more significant for *what it is* than for *what it does*. It is the very quiddity of Chinese Communism, divorced from the distractions of Communist ways and means, which we must ponder with dispassion and discrimination. More than the manners of the Chinese Communists, the spirit inspiring these manners is the force which will, in the long run, have lasting effect upon China, upon Asia, and upon the world.

Paradoxically, the spirit motivating Communist China is in many ways aligned with the general spirit of the contemporary non-Communist world—witness Peking's present preoccupation with material and technological advance, its commitment to industrialisation and modernisation, its addiction to "science" and rational "organisation." However insulated in the folds of "proletarian internationalism" the authorities in Peking may believe themselves to be, they are as bound to the wheel of the twentieth century as are those whose "bourgeois materialism" they decry.

This modern temper, ignoring political boundaries, is increasingly

committed to technological endeavour and group activity, increasingly intolerant of individual enterprise and individual expression. The trends are global in scope: the general assimilation of private into public activity; the growing domination of large-scale enterprise over individual craftsmanship; the universal organisation of society; the levelling effects of the mass media; the emphasis upon size rather than quality; the creeping spread of administration and bureaucracy into all spheres of life; and the widespread distrust of heterodox views, idiosyncratic behaviour, curious intellect . . . and the solitary dissident.

The institutional forms accompanying this shift in emphasis from individual to group activity vary in different parts of the world. But, whether the productive activity of a nation is dominated by the apparatus of the "socialist" state or by the apparatus of large private stock corporations, often organised internationally into cartels, the trend is similar. The root causes underlying this shift may probably be sought as far back as the Industrial Revolution. But, whatever the causes, whatever the tempo, the collective course is unmistakable throughout the world.

During the decade since 1949, Peking has attached highest priority to the organisation and expansion of the national capabilities of mainland China. Progress toward these goals depends primarily upon nationalised collective activity, not upon individual imagination or intuition. The entire organisation of the Communist social system constitutes a frontal attack upon the contemplative, critical, humanistic elements in the traditional civilisation of China. The lingering Chinese suspicion—latterly expressed in England in the nineteenth century—that "the world is too much with us, late and soon"—has never been more relevant than in the People's Republic of China today. Yet the educated Chinese gentleman who might still harbour such nonconformist distrust of the world and its experiments in political and social reform is himself a superfluous man in China, ignored if he has not already been imprisoned or executed as an unreconstructed "counter-revolutionary."

Actually, the civilised Chinese gentleman—accustomed to leisure, to continuity and to standards of judgment—would appreciate the crucial issues in the world revolution of our time far better than the hasty aggressive Communist (or non-Communist) cadre, paralysed through participation. He would recognise the revolt of the masses, would comprehend its complexity and its cant, and would distinguish both the therapeutic and the fraudulent aspects of the development. And he would conclude that the net effect of this world revolution, whether labelled as egalitarian or as totalitarian, is likely to be the sacrifice of the individual, his inherent dignity, and his personal potentialities.

C. P. FITZGERALD

Order, Power and Modernisation

A FEW days after the Japanese occupied Peking in the early days of July 1937, the correspondent of a leading British newspaper wrote his verdict on these events. "With the Japanese occupation," he said, "the fate of Peking and China has been settled for at least a hundred years." At that time many would have agreed. China had been drifting to disaster for forty years, and few believed that the Chinese people had the energy, courage or ability to reverse the course of events. Today, more than twenty years later, and after ten years of the Communist régime, the question is no longer what some outside power may do to China, but what China may do to her neighbours. The disorderly aftermath of the Chinese Empire has been settled, the state is once more all too powerful; enormous changes have taken place in the economy and social system. These changes have been initiated and carried through by the Communist régime, in the name of the Chinese people, but in accordance with the theory and practice of Marxist-Leninism. The Chinese Communists will be the first to claim that this is so, even if, here and there, the facts do not always support such a claim.

The achievements of the past ten years can be judged from many points of view, but it is first necessary to consider what has been attained, and what is still lacking. The long series of civil wars has ceased; banditry has been suppressed, order and internal peace prevail. China is a country in which one may now travel in perfect security. This has not been the case, at least for more than a century, perhaps never before. Yet in the course of achieving this internal tranquillity the Chinese Government has had to use force, and when imposing its own form of order in the border regions, became involved in the Tibetan revolt. Moreover, the control of the government is effected by the apparatus of the Communist Party which reaches down to the village level and permits no organised opposition or fundamental criticism. National unity has been achieved, regional differences are no longer allowed to affect policy, and racial minorities have been organised on a strictly limited basis of local autonomy. But the Nationalist régime still holds out in Formosa, and still occupies a few strategic islands off the Chinese coast. The Chinese themselves, of both parties, must admit the practical existence of two Chinas, however much this situation may be resented.

The present government has adopted a policy for the age-old problem

of land tenure and peasant poverty which involves the most sweeping changes. It is probably much too soon to say whether this policy, the organisation of People's Communes, will prove successful in the economic sphere, even if so far it has yielded massive results, for it does not necessarily meet the overwhelming problem of the rapid and immense increase in the population, a process to which the restoration of peace, prevention of flood and famine and measures of public health contribute substantially. Industrial progress has been phenomenal and is hailed as the solution to the growing population and the low standard of living. But the industrialisation of China started ten years ago from a very low base: what has been done so far is still mainly what with more normal conditions would have been achieved twenty years earlier. China is still far behind Japan, the communication system is still very inadequate; the target so loudly proclaimed, to overtake Britain in steel production within another ten years, is a modest expectation if the size of the two countries is compared, even if it would have been regarded as fantastic a few years back.

The conquest of illiteracy has made very great progress; technical education has advanced even faster but universal popular education is not yet a reality. Education is provided exclusively by the state, and follows the course which policy determines. The supply of literates for administration and of technically qualified personnel for the rapidly expanding industry is admittedly still inadequate. There is consequently strict direction of education and only a restricted freedom of career and expression.

China has become at least a potential Great Power. The long history of decline and weakness has been reversed. China's power is now respected, but also feared. Her influence in international affairs has become real instead of negligible, but the régime has made as many enemies as friends. The government has not received recognition from a number of the most important countries, and has been excluded from the United Nations. Whether the policies followed by some foreign Powers are wise or mistaken, they have to a great extent been a response to policies proclaimed and implemented by the Peking Government.

Large questions remain, to which the answers usually given are all subjective. Do the Chinese people as a whole support and admire their government? Do the satisfactions of economic progress, opportunity for education, some rise in living standards, internal security, outweigh the restrictions which are imposed on all classes, and the lack of freedom to oppose the government of the day? No certainty exists, but it must at least be remembered that the Chinese are not making these comparisons from the standpoint of liberties lost but still remembered, of a functioning society which was violently replaced. They remember

chaos and oppression, a society tottering to decay, a state on the point of extinction. Seen from the Chinese point of view it is likely that what seems most significant is not that the government is Communist, but that it is strong and effective, that China is rapidly becoming a modern state, thus fulfilling the hopes of all Chinese. Throughout Asia there is this significant ambivalence in the attitude of educated Asians toward Communism, and towards China. Dislike of the system is not so conspicuous as respect for the achievement; there is doubt whether the means are not also necessary if the ends are to be gained.

Elsewhere, it may be, men will see that the Communist revolution provided the power necessary to sweep away the decaying vestiges of a broken down society and liberate the energies of a great people. But it is not so certain that the forces thus brought into action will in the long run be confined within the framework of Marxist dogma, unless this doctrine becomes flexible as well as dynamic and able to meet and move with the continuing transformation of Chinese society.

The Bitter Years

IN the original doctrine of Marx, the proletarian Socialist revolution was to be the climax of the process of industrialisation through private capitalist enterprise and was therefore to be expected to begin in the most highly industrialised region of the world. It would occur when capitalist relations of production were no longer adequate to contain the forces of production which they had developed, when the ownership of the means of production had been concentrated in the hands of a small minority and when the great majority of the population had been transformed into propertyless wage earners. That the Socialist revolution should take place first in predominantly agrarian societies and that it should be, not the effect of a fully achieved industrialisation, but the means of bringing it about, was not a possibility contemplated by the early Marxists. But so it has happened, and in Asia and Africa today Communism makes its appeal less as a creed of social justice and welfare than as a system providing a short cut to industrialisation—and its corollary, national power—for weak and underdeveloped countries. The main task of the revolution is no longer to carry out a redistribution of surplus value from an economy already highly productive, but to promote a rapid growth of productivity from low, and largely pre-industrial, economic levels. The Soviet Union, after more than four decades of Communist Party rule, presents itself to the world not as a land where people have equal incomes—which Bernard Shaw regarded as the essence of Socialism, but which are as remote from actuality in Russia as in any bourgeois society—but as a country which by intensive efforts of planned production has overcome an initial economic backwardness and emerged as an industrial and military power of the first rank. In its ten years of history, Communist China has been striving to follow the same path, but the effort required has been even greater because of the very small margin available at the outset for capital formation from the national income and the vast leeway to be made up for “overtaking and outstripping” the most highly industrialised nations of the world.

There have been a number of important differences between the courses of the Communist revolutions in Russia and in China, and analogies must be employed with caution. But there is a striking resemblance between Chinese economic policy of the last two years—the era of the “great leap forward”—and Soviet policy from the

beginning of 1929 onwards, when Stalin, who had but recently derided Trotsky's proposals for economic expansion as "absurd super-industrialisation," embarked on a drive for increases of production far exceeding anything that his opponents had ever imagined. In reading Chinese Communist propaganda for the "great leap" with its notes of frantic enthusiasm and overstrained nerves, anyone at all familiar with the language of earlier times in Russia cannot fail to recall precedents for almost everything that is said. "Each step we take marks an epoch; every two or three years is an era; prudence is the gospel of dried-up brains, of cowards, of the impotent, the aged, the philistines." Such were the exhortations addressed to the Russian people in 1931; they might just as well occur in the homilies by which the Chinese people have been urged on to ever greater efforts since the middle of 1957.

The parallel between the present phase in China and the early thirties in Russia is not a fortuitous one. It appears to reflect a tendency inherent in the process of industrialisation as projected and carried out under a Communist Party dictatorship. A point is reached at which the initial advance begins to slow down, when serious bottlenecks in production frustrate the plans that have been made, and when bureaucratic inertia on the one hand and pressures for improved living standards on the other obstruct the party's will for a rapid increase of industrial capacity. At this point the need is for an economic break-through, a decisive all-out effort to be sustained not by the kind of rational calculations or incentives appropriate to peacetime economic life, but by the evocation of emotional fervours such as those which possess a nation in the critical period of a great war. The "great leap forward" is also the time of the "bitter years" when China must create modern industry by investment out of income, to the sacrifice of current consumption, as in the days when it was said that Stalin's Russia was "starving herself great."

The social and political tensions of the break-through phase of industrialisation tend to be much greater than those of the initial revolutionary period of a Communist régime, because it is a matter of imposing strains and sacrifices on the population as a whole, and not merely of crushing or dispossessing certain classes. In Russia the extreme tensions of the early thirties were followed by the extraordinary political phenomenon of the Great Purge; China will not necessarily pass through a similar phase, but unpleasant psychological consequences are always liable to ensue from the attempt to drive a nation too hard over too long a time, and there is reason to believe that the pace which has been set in China has been intolerably arduous. The continuity of leadership has certainly been greater than it was in Russia, for there has been no event corresponding to the death of Lenin; Mao Tse-tung

was Lenin, and is now Stalin, without any succession struggle having yet taken place. But there has been plenty of evidence recently of serious dissensions within the party, even though there is still a supreme arbiter to resolve them.

During the last few years in Russia, the growth of industry has reached a stage at which it has been possible to improve living standards without unduly interfering with the priorities of heavy industry. This stage has not yet been reached in China, nor is it likely to be for some time to come. If Communist China is to attain the economic goals it has set itself, it cannot afford the degree of relaxation Russia has enjoyed since the death of Stalin. Nor at the present would a removal of external tensions be to the advantage of a government which has made the "great leap forward" a part of the national struggle against imperialism and boasts that it has produced thirty million soldiers through the militarisation of the communes. Fortunately the régime has succeeded in finding the ideal external conflict for its purposes. Fighting in the Formosa Straits was altogether too hazardous and was quickly dropped, but in India Communist China has an adversary which is big enough to appear formidable, but can be relied on never to hit back. In November, meetings were held throughout China to denounce the invasions of Chinese territory by the "Indian expansionists." No Chinese can now fail to work even harder than before when he thinks of the wicked aggressions of Mr. Nehru.

STUART KIRBY

Russia's Largest Satellite

CHINA is credited with having "got on her feet." But the metaphors must be mixed—like the feelings of the Chinese themselves. China also leans on Russia, and is "riding a tiger" (or the modern equivalent, a tank or a rocket). In 1949, Chinese Communism was apparently the only decisive component in the "China Problem"; not now. The decade saw swift and brutal intensification of Communist purposes, internally on the mainland and externally in outward thrusts, leading to great stresses, much loss of the initial support and toleration enjoyed by the régime, and increasing opposition.

Meanwhile the other components of China have greatly gained in specific weight. Not merely "Two Chinas," but five, have to be considered: (1) the Mainland China of the Communists, of Communist successes and support for Communism; (2) the Mainland China of the anti-Communists and non-Communists, of Communist failures and persecutions, of resistance; (3) Taiwan, an important non-Communist model, with good living standards (by Asian canons) and practical progress on a reasonable basis; (4) the Overseas Chinese, and (5) Hong Kong, the last three being main witnesses of development, by and for Chinese under capitalism. The last four are all against, or "not with," the first; so the basic polarisation is into two powerful groups, of which the anti-Communist alignment is greatly underestimated by world opinion.

The Chinese people have been heavily disillusioned of Communism. In 1949, the latter appeared as closing the age-long disruption of China, promising sound general reform and the peaceful evolution of the newly unified nation. The prospect of external peace was soon afterwards shattered, by Chinese intervention in Korea. Any comfort from auto-suggestion that China then "defeated America" is chilled by fear and anxiety about being in conflict with the United States in particular and the United Nations in general. Since then the war drums have been beaten continuously, especially on the wave-lengths of America and Taiwan, but also on those of Tibet, India, Vietnam and of trouble spots even farther afield.

The most often-repeated slogan, "We shall certainly liberate Taiwan," now rings especially hollow—through non-performance, reduced ultimately to such face-losing tactics as shelling Quemoy on alternate days. But more broadly, the whole "line" of promoting peace by being an armed camp is both alarming and ridiculous to the

Chinese mind. And, recently, new foes have been designated, some important friends becoming villains or enemies overnight: the Dalai Lama, Nasser, Nehru. The bogey of Japanese aggression has been raised again, in internal propaganda.

Equally flagrantly broken were the promises of internal peace, of "soft transition." Successive "purges," incessant "drives" and pressures, the phenomenally rapid socialisation, expropriation, regimentation and intensification of labour and all social activities have made a mockery of the initial assurances of a conciliatory, solidarist, patriotic, evolutionary future development. This culminated in the recent commune movement which went far beyond any collectivisation drive ever attempted in Russia, drawing deprecatory comments from Mr. Khrushchev himself, raising great bitterness, and resulting in the flow of refugees into Hong Kong again rising to the level of 1,000 per week.

These refugees are largely workers and peasants, among which classes most directly affected by the intensification, there is much overt or tacit antipathy to Communism. Among the middle classes and the intellectuals there was formerly considerable support for the Communists; these classes hoped that Communist industrialisation meant a "technocratic" future with full employment for themselves, until disabused by various purges and the full development of the *apparatchik* system in China (*i.e.*, full control of all activities by the centralised bureaucracy, run by the Party).

The material and practical dependence on Russia is obvious; actual defence of the Chinese Communist state depends absolutely on the Soviet "umbrella," and its industrialisation programme depends equally on material and technical assistance from the Soviet *bloc*, while over 80 per cent. of China's trade is with the Communist world. Equally obvious is the "whip-hand" manner in which the Elder Brother has used these holds; Manchuria (still 80 per cent. of China's industrial capacity) was saved from United Nations action in 1950 only by the threat of Soviet counter-action. The Soviet Union has also used China's need for loans and industrial equipment as a means of exerting pressure. Each successive economic agreement has been preceded by protracted negotiations nearly always at Moscow, not Peking; and followed by some specific reassertion of China's sincere adherence to the Russian cause. The agreements are cast in U.S. dollars, including substantial interest and charges.

The essentially satellite position of China is hardly veiled. Any illusions of 1949 as to China being, or likely to become, a deviant or special model of Communism are largely dispelled. In its internal mechanics too, the Chinese Communist State appears *ex post* (what many did not expect *ex ante*) to be of strict Communist form—the

Russian and Czechoslovakian, not the Polish, let alone the Yugoslavian. It shows the characteristic pattern of advance, by successive "drives," in zigzag swings of policy under extremely centralised control. Only a few of these major alternations have been mentioned here; but micro-cosmically also, from the point of view of the 650 million individuals and 100 million families of China, from day to day and week to week, extreme interference, violent change and acute uncertainty are unceasing, superimposed on a background of unremitting toil and austerity.

Some of this uncertainty has been "exported" by Communist China, in peripheral incidents, in far-flung propaganda, and in its recent trade drive in Asia on marginal markets, as a price-cutting and dumping policy. In all this, the excessive emphasis on material power has brought some revulsion in Chinese and Asian minds. Certainly strong elements of subjectivity underlie Chinese Communist policy: for example, the breach with Japan in the face of China's real and objective interests, centred on a flag incident and coupled with much attitudinising about alleged Japanese aggressive intentions.

At this juncture, the Peking Government has itself admitted that its claims of material progress were grossly exaggerated. Altogether, the Chinese Communists have dissipated the illusions that they are supreme realists, or superhumanly clever, or abnormally successful, and understand or respect any point of view but their own. Big changes will have to come, before long, in China; internally, and on the perimeter, the pressure and stresses are as great as any in history. Russia has control over the Chinese Communists and will steer the outcome in the direction it desires (not excluding, possibly, sacrificing something of Peking's for the sake of an understanding with the U.S.A.). But the Chinese people may yet have the last word.

MICHAEL LINDSAY

Agrarian Policy and Communist Motivation

WHAT is the best hypothesis to explain the development of the Chinese People's Republic since 1949? Perhaps that, in the view which has dominated the Chinese Communist leadership, the policies of the Yen'an period (1935-45) were a deviation from the preferred line of development; the true road was that along which the Party had started in the period of the Chinese Soviet Republic (1931-34) and to which it returned as soon as its power was sufficiently consolidated. This can explain both the considerable practical differences between Chinese-style and Russian-style Communism during the Yen'an period and also the failure of predictions based on the assumption that the trends of the Yen'an period would continue.

The best illustration of this is agrarian policy which has been important in all periods, and which shows a very clear continuity between policy after 1949 and policy during the Chinese Soviet Republic.¹

Agrarian policy also offers very interesting evidence for an analysis of Chinese Communist motivations. By extrapolating the results of the policies followed during the Yen'an period, and by considering the working of similar policies in Taiwan, one can make a reasonable estimate of the practical alternative which the Chinese Communist Party rejected. The result seems to show that the Communist choice of policy cannot be explained by economic motives.

The reformist agrarian policy [officially limited to the reduction of rent and interest rates: Editorial note] followed during the Yen'an period was very successful economically. It produced a considerable increase in productivity and a considerable rise in the general standard of living in areas where war damage was not too serious. And the taxation system was able to divert enough resources to the government to support large military forces even in poor mountain areas and so could, presumably, have diverted large resources for industrialisation in peace time.

Actual Communist agrarian policy after 1949 started with the programme of violent class struggle, based on categories worked out in the Chinese Soviet Republic period, went over in a few years to

¹ This statement is based on studies by Professor Chao Tso-liang of Taiwan University who has been working on the very large collection of Communist publications obtained during the campaigns against the Chinese Soviet Republic.

collectivisation, which had figured as the next stage in the pre-1935 programme, and finally went on to the communes in 1958. This policy has secured economic results but it seems likely that greater results, both in agriculture and industry, could have been secured by a continuation of reformist policies without collectivisation except in so far as it spread voluntarily in areas where there are important technical advantages in large units, *i.e.*, on the plains as opposed to terraced hillsides. As late as the end of 1957, official statements admitted that agricultural production could be increased by 20 per cent. or 30 per cent. if the collectives could raise their yield per acre to the level attained by the remaining individual peasants.² With higher agricultural productivity, the same or even more resources could have been devoted to industrialisation with less burden on the peasant.

The explanation of the actual Communist choice is almost certainly that "Socialism," defined in Communist terms, is a more important objective than productivity or raising the standard of living. It is possible that this priority for "Socialism" comes partly from a deeper motivation of securing power for the Communist Party, but the evidence can be best explained by assuming that there is also a deep-seated belief in the value of "Socialism" as an end in itself—that motivation comes from a desire to realise the vision of an ideal human society for the construction of which Communist theory is believed to offer infallible guidance. There is evidence suggesting that even the most unrealistic parts of this vision of "Socialist" society have an influence which sometimes worries the Communist leadership. For instance, people who argue that a Socialist society should have a moneyless economy and say that, "Economic accounting is the legal right of the bourgeoisie," were criticised in a fairly recent article which suggests that they were numerous enough to have appreciable influence in the Party.³ And similar influences at the very top levels of the Party—Mao's hope to see a Communist society before he died—may have been important in producing the communes programme.

The Communist Party's reaction to disagreement from a more left-wing standpoint is usually much less violent than its reaction to disagreement from the right. During the past few years there has been

² *Jen-min Jih-pao* (*People's Daily*) editorial, October 11, 1957 (translated in Survey of China Mainland Press No. 1635, published by the U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong). Again a survey of farming in Hopei province stated that only 16.35 per cent. of collectives had reached or surpassed the productivity of well-to-do middle peasants (SCMP 1626). And later Teng Tzu-hui, Director of the Communist Party's Rural Work Department, called on collectives to catch up with the productivity of middle peasants within five years (*Jen-min Jih-pao*, November 14, 1957, SCMP No. 1659).

³ Article in *Ts'ai-cheng* (Finance), No. 10, May 24, 1959. (Translated in Extracts from China Mainland Magazines, No. 176, published by U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong.)

evidence of widespread disagreement with current policy from people who would seem to have preferred policies more empirically rational in "serving the interests of the masses," an objective which everyone in the Party would claim to accept. An interesting question is why such people had so little influence.

Part at least of the explanation is probably that they have been in a weak position because they could not develop their case without challenging some basic Communist beliefs. For instance, a Communist who sincerely wanted to improve the conditions of the peasants could hardly avoid challenging the authority of Soviet experience as showing the correct road to the building of Socialism, a challenge with serious implications for the whole structure of Communist authority. And the desire to maintain authority is a very powerful motive. Even in non-Communist organisations where authority does not command the same quasi-religious aspect, one can find cases in which people have abandoned the standards they claim to maintain rather than admit that authority in the organisation has made a mistake. (Of course the communes are a divergence from Soviet policy but, in this case, the implied criticism is only that the Soviet Union has not gone far enough along the correct road towards Communist society. To raise doubts about the correctness of collectivisation would imply that the Soviet Union had taken the wrong road on a major issue and open the door to all sorts of dangerous heresies about "multi-linear development.") In these circumstances, it is understandable that most right-wing criticism of current policy should have been half-hearted and easily repressed.

This discussion has concentrated on agrarian policy as providing the clearest test case, but evidence from other fields would probably support the same general conclusion: that the motivation of the Chinese Communist leadership can be understood in terms of giving first priority to the "building of Socialism" and only lower priorities to economic or even power objectives.

BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ

Totalitarian Consolidation and the Chinese Model

WHAT facts stand out in bold relief when one surveys the turbulent history of Communist China during the last ten years? It is by no means easy to answer this question. Ten is a good round number, but there are few indications that the tenth year of Chinese Communism marks a terminal point in any sense. The shifts and fluctuations of the last three years have been, if anything, more violent than those of the previous period. It is as difficult as ever to distinguish relatively enduring facts from sensational, transitory facts.

In the following remarks I shall focus my attention on two facts (and I take them to be such) of internal development which seem to me of overriding importance: (1) the achievement of totalitarian consolidation, (2) the unique characteristics of Chinese totalitarianism. Within the ten-year period under review, these facts strike me as most significant, whatever may be their significance for the future.

The phrase "totalitarian consolidation" refers to factors such as the following: the ability of the régime to involve the total population in its organisational network and to control every area of life through this network; the ability to make the pressure of its decisions felt in every area (even if they are not always fully implemented) and down to the grass roots level; the unremitting pressure of ideological indoctrination in its peculiar Chinese form which has, at the very least, conditioned the population to make all the proper verbal responses, and finally the ability to harness the energies of a vast population to a programme of forced draft industrialisation and to the immediate, overriding goal of state power. It is interesting to note that in China totalitarian consolidation preceded (*ca.* 1949-53) the full-scale economic effort. Far from being a "by-product" of forced draft industrialisation, it made the industrialisation effort possible.

In using the phrase "totalitarian consolidation" I do not mean to imply that any of us (including visiting pundits) are in any position to know what is going on in the hearts and minds of six hundred million Chinese. The fact that the régime has been able to organise and harness energies to serve its purposes does not prove that it enjoys the fanatical support of all the masses. With an organised population of this size much can be accomplished regardless of the amount of energy invested by given individuals. On the other hand neither demonic pressures

from above nor acute economic hardship will necessarily lead to any revolt from below. Among these millions one can safely assume that the whole gamut of feeling from fanatical devotion to the utmost loathing can be found. It is possible that some accept wholeheartedly certain separate accomplishments of the régime while being driven to despair by the totalitarian framework as a whole. The "Chinese peasants" are as silent as ever and we have no way of getting through to them. They may already be the "blue ants" which the ruling class desires or they may not. We certainly cannot tell simply by looking at their garments. We cannot venture to guess what the "Chinese people" will be like if the high tide of totalitarianism ever recedes. It will certainly not be the people of the pre-1949 period. It may also be quite different from the people which the régime is trying to fashion.

While the main model of totalitarianism has been the Soviet Union, certain characteristic Chinese features have become, if anything, more pronounced in the course of time. These features reflect both the "peculiarities" of China's objective situation and the evolving subjective outlook of the leading group in the C.C.P.—perhaps of Mao Tse-tung in particular. In terms of objective factors, the attempt to apply the Stalinist model of industrialisation mechanically in a Chinese environment has forced the régime to confront certain intractable facts. In the Soviet Union the population problem was not a factor of any importance. In China it is a factor of overwhelming importance. The pre-Stalinist industrial base of the Soviet Union was much more considerable than the industrial base of China before 1950. The reservoir of available industrial skills and probably of natural resources was much larger in the Soviet Union. The Chinese effort to make a maximum use of labour power as a substitute for limited capital, the recent effort to develop a whole sector of medium and small enterprise in rural areas, and to some extent the whole "commune" experiment reflect this quite different objective situation.

The subjective outlook of Mao Tse-tung and his entourage are equally important. Not everything can be explained in terms of that lazy man's universal tool of explanation, the "industrialisation process." It must be remembered that the present Chinese Communist leadership had become Communist long before the Stalinist model of industrialisation had emerged, and the latter has formed only one component in Mao's evolving image of the world. What is happening in China is a resultant both of an objective situation and the specific evolving outlook of a determinate group of people which is responding to that situation.

One of the peculiar features of Chinese Communism is the whole

area of phenomena known as "thought reform" and "remoulding." Underlying it is the assumption that totalitarian collectivism can be internalised as it were into the very soul of a whole people by prescribed techniques of psychological "persuasion" and that specific therapy is available for the cure of all ideological "sickness" (the therapy may, of course, involve physical labour). The Soviet "confessional" is undoubtedly one ingredient in this notion but the Chinese Communist experience of the Yen'an period is probably more decisive as a background factor.

Arresting as the whole experiment may be, it is still doubtful whether some of the more extravagant claims concerning its success have been proven. The "hundred flowers" experience demonstrated that many of the best minds of China came through the whole "thought reform" experience relatively unscathed, much to the chagrin of the leaders. Whatever may be the case, the effort to remould continues unabated.

The notion that in China whole classes of people such as the "national bourgeoisie" and "rich peasantry" may be "persuaded" into "Socialism" and "Communism" remains a persistent and peculiar theme of Chinese Communism. It may be considered, in fact, a corollary of the whole "thought reform" philosophy. The notion that in China the "whole people" will display those qualities reserved by Marx to the proletariat harmonises nicely with the mood of strident nationalism which now prevails. It also indicates to Asia that Chinese Communism has its own unique message over and above the message of the October Revolution.

Finally, the last two years have been marked by a new access of apocalyptic fervour. Even though the initial pressures behind the "commune" were probably economic, the ideological framework into which it has been set has a significance of its own. In China, it was proclaimed in 1958, Communism is not far off. Individual, family and group interests will be totally extinguished in the mystic body of the Great Collective. Because of Chinese conditions this will be accomplished at a relatively early point of industrial development. In China, necessity itself will create Communist virtue. While there has, of course, been some retreat in the actual operation of communes since 1958, this new vision has only been partially muted in Communist propaganda and may soon be actively revived. This ultra-totalitarian utopianism may represent a response to both success and failure. The previous success of the régime in controlling the masses may have led Mao and his entourage to the view that there are no limits to the régime's ability to manipulate the human factor at least among the masses. On the other hand, the unreliability of the intelligentsia and the persistence of formidable objective difficulties may have encouraged

the view that bolder and more drastic experiments were called for all along the line.

It has been common to refer to the present period of Chinese Communism as its "Stalinist phase" with the implications that the totalitarian tide will eventually recede. I tend to share the view that totalitarianism in its more extreme forms is not an eternally viable system anywhere. All analogies are, however, specious. It is precisely in its "Stalinist phase" that China is departing most significantly from many features of the Stalinist model. It may also be assumed that if the totalitarian tide ever begins to recede the "post-Stalinist" development of China may be radically different from the post-Stalinist development in the Soviet Union (a development which until now has been highly amorphous and inconclusive in any event).

H. ARTHUR STEINER

China's New Role in World Affairs

WITHIN her first decade under Communist leadership, China has been transformed from a virtual nonentity into a major world Power. International decisions which ignore her interests are unenforceable against her. Her status as one of the Big Five can in practice no longer be challenged, and must be taken into account even by countries that refrain from acknowledging the changed situation diplomatically.

World power came to Communist China concomitantly with the end of civil war in China, with the establishment of a unified, powerful government exercising authority throughout the country, with the attainment of production levels that are claimed to give promise of "surpassing Britain" by 1968 and with rapid expansion of capital goods industries and war potential. The historian of the future will doubtless see this transformation more clearly than we who stand so close to it, and he will know better than we the answer to the basic questions arising from the change in China's international position: Will China use her power for good or ill? Will China's chauvinistic upsurge be contained within her historical frontiers or will it drive her to conquer new worlds? Will China's influence on her neighbours in revolutionary Asia produce salutary and beneficial effects, or will China become the common destroyers and enemy? It is unnecessary to answer such questions now; it is enough to realise that they could not even have been asked significantly in 1948-49!

The foreign policy of the Chinese People's Republic has been inseparably linked to domestic policy. When Chinese forces were at grips with the United Nations in Korea early in 1951, the régime employed the policy of "suppressing counter-revolutionaries" to liquidate "unpatriotic," antagonistic social elements more rapidly than would have been otherwise possible. During the period before the First Five Year Plan, China seemed committed to a kind of revolutionary adventurism in foreign affairs, and other Asian Communist parties were urged to adopt in their respective countries "the path of Mao Tse-tung" that had brought victory in China to the Chinese Communist Party. But as the First Five Year Plan (1953-57) gathered momentum, necessitating the allocation of all resources to the creation of a Socialist society, adventurism in foreign affairs yielded to the more

conservative, less risky policy of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, support of the "Bandung spirit," demands for peaceful coexistence between emergent Socialist societies and societies not irrevocably committed to capitalism. It became essential to end the hostilities in Korea. In 1959, the Tibetan crisis produced, as its international counterpart, a strong Chinese Communist policy towards India which could possibly render the Five Principles irrelevant as a basis for foreign policy. But the adoption of such an aggressive position in foreign policy in a matter entailing known risks would have been inconceivable had the Chinese régime not considered that it had already won substantial victories in completing the domestic Socialist revolution. Clearly, then, when we lay stress on changes in the international position of Communist China we must keep in mind causally related developments in domestic policy.

While Marxism-Leninism provides the basic ideological rationale for Chinese action towards the external world, the varied content of that doctrine allowed Chinese Communist foreign policy a high degree of flexibility and mobility. Marxism-Leninism renders it impossible for the Chinese Communist leadership to see the validity of the several questions raised in the first paragraph above for the same reasons as led the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of India to resolve on September 27, 1959, that "Socialist China can never commit aggression against India"! Marxism-Leninism provides a scheme as a guide for adopting attitudes towards different categories of states: the "Socialist camp of the Soviet Union and the fraternal people's democracies," the "revisionist" and pseudo-Socialist state, Yugoslavia, the former "colonies and semi-colonies" whose national aspirations cause them to reject "imperialism" and to accept "peaceful co-existence" as a basis for policy, and the irrevocably hostile "capitalistic" states whose anti-Communist bias is principally reflected in military arrangements with the United States. Yet the same Marxism-Leninism permits the adoption of different attitudes towards these various types of states according to the exigencies of situations.

Generally, however, the Chinese Communist leadership has also interpreted Marxism-Leninism to support certain concepts of Chinese *national* interest. As Mr. Nehru, speaking of China, told his Parliament on September 12, 1959, "What we have to face today is a great and powerful nation which is aggressive. It might be aggressive *minus* Communism or *plus* Communism. Either way it might be there." In the present divided world of heterogeneous states, societies and economies, Peking sees no inconsistency in working for certain basic objectives which would be held by any strong and powerful Chinese Government: to eliminate from positions of influence in the country

any people, whether they be Roman Catholics, capitalist entrepreneurs, or "imperialist spies, saboteurs and traitors," with ties of loyalty to some foreign organisations; to reassert full national sovereignty over parts of the national territory that might have been lost due to foreign pressures during a time of weakness, currently areas of the North-East Frontier Agency in India south of the MacMahon line, possibly at a future time Britain's Kowloon Leased Territory and the Crown Colony of Hong Kong; to denounce every form of external action, such as the United Nations condemnation of Communist policy in Tibet, that would appear to derogate from full national sovereignty; to eliminate potentially hostile forces from territories adjacent to her own frontiers, as in Korea and Viet-Nam; and to build up a strong military potential, on the basis of modernised weapons and techniques in order to consolidate national power, guarantee defence against possible hostile attack and reinforce the other objectives of a nationalistic policy.

The emergence of a strong Communist China has also profoundly affected the structure and operational methods of "international Communism," which is no longer the Soviet-centred monolith it was before 1949. The Moscow Declaration of the Communist and Workers' Parties of November 1957 established, principally under Chinese urging, that the foreign policy of one Communist state, the Soviet Union for example, must always consider the interests of other Communist states, China for example. Such a principle, superficially resembling the principle of foreign policy consultation that underlies whatever political unity the British Commonwealth of Nations may have, introduces a complex variety of national policy objectives into all present considerations of Communist world policy. That it has a reciprocal application is suggested by the fact that the Mao-Khrushchev communiqué issued in Peking on August 3, 1958, preceded by less than three weeks the Chinese shelling of Quemoy; it is difficult to escape the conclusion that that action was related to the Middle East crisis and to a common interest in nullifying the Anglo-American military presence in Jordan and Lebanon. Mr. Khrushchev must have intended in his visit to Peking in September-October 1959 to assure Mao Tse-tung that his conversations with President Eisenhower had not jeopardised any essential Chinese interest; and it is not difficult to imagine that any future Summit Conference held in the absence of a Chinese representation would be subject, as far as the Soviet Union's freedom of action is concerned, to the implicit veto of Peking. Such developments as these may have even greater significance than Communist China's autonomous leadership of the Communist movement in the Far East and East Asia—where North Korea, once a Soviet satellite, and North Viet-Nam, act more closely with China than with the Soviet Union, and where leaders

of Communist parties in many other Asian countries are strongly pre-occupied with Peking's policies and attitudes. After all, their closer neighbour is the strong resurgent China, not the remote Soviet Union whose present equivocations may well be seen in Peking as exhibiting less than the desired dedication to the early, complete transformation of Socialist into Communist societies. We cannot now evaluate these trends and tendencies definitively, but we must note their presence as a totally new circumstance arising out of the first decade of Chinese Communist experience.

A formerly weak, decadent China has been supplanted by a strong, powerful new force whose presence, interests and attitudes must be taken into full account—whether in Moscow, London, Washington, New Delhi or at the United Nations—before there can be any reconstruction of international society along viable lines.

GUY WINT

The Creation of State Power

IN my judgment the most striking fact in the new China is the creation of state power. Traditionally, in the agrarian empires of Asia, the government has had relatively little power: at least power of a fundamental kind. It might take arbitrary and startling action; but the total result of such deeds was small. A government, however impressive its trappings, could seldom carry through a sustained reforming policy. In China, custom or Confucius was sovereign, not the emperor.

The theme of Chinese history for the past sixty years has been the attempt to build up a state power which could mobilise China's resources and enable it to compete with the countries of the West. The period opens with K'ang Yu-wei. His failure makes more vivid the success of the Communists in our time. The imperial government, even when in the hands of a reformer, could not get its edicts acted upon. The Communists can.

The experiences of China immediately after the overthrow of the Manchus illustrated again the inadequacies of the old system. China under the emperors was administered as a federation of viceroyalties. The connection between them was their common obedience to the emperor. With the emperor gone, the union dissolved and China fell into separate parts.

The bitter lesson of Sun Yat-sen's life was that the first task of the reformer was to build a tough instrument of executive authority. Sun tried to do this by copying for non-Communist purposes the machinery of the Russian Communist state. But the Kuomintang failed because it was all organisation and no spirit. It had not got an ideology in whose name its members could be effectively disciplined, which would enforce sacrifice, and supply the fortitude needed in the great crises which the new Chinese state had to encounter.

Mao Tse-tung said that the Communist revolution consisted of the union of peasant revolt and ideology. Without ideology, the revolt would have petered out; without the peasant armies, the ideology would have been little more than academic. The surprising thing, once the Communists had taken power at the centre, was the speed with which they created a state machine able to act in large matters and small, in the neighbourhood of Peking or in the remotest parts of China.

The machine worked chiefly because of the discipline of the cadres of the Communist Party. Their reliability is ensured by periodic purges.

So to a remarkable degree is their probity. Their homogeneity is ensured by an indoctrination with Marxism, even if of a crude kind. Cadres exist in every department of government, every regiment of the army, every office of local government, every university and high school, every village, every police post. The cadres carried out the land reform. The cadres disseminate propaganda. Chinese Communist government is really a dictatorship of cadres acting under discipline.

One of the inventions of the Chinese system is the device by which the central government and central organisation of the Communist Party keep in touch with these indispensable cadres. The link is the official newspaper, both central and local. Such papers convey the general instructions about party policy. Cadres are expected to read them diligently. This is the political semaphore by which the Communist system is kept in action.

In its organisation the Communist Party has certain resemblances to the old secret societies of China. These were an essential element of the old social structure. Whatever their demerits they were apt to have remarkable cohesiveness. It is very unlikely that the Communist leaders consciously imitated the secret societies; the Kuomintang had much closer connections with them, and was reprobated for this by liberal China; the Communist state has broken up the old societies. But though the parallel was not intended, it exists nevertheless. The service of the cadre to the Party is much more complete than that of the member of even the most fanatical secret society. The discipline of the Party is even more stringent.

By means of the Communist machine, China during the past ten years has been made to undergo the most rapid transition in the whole of its history. Industrialisation, the building of a strong army, the creation of the communes, the creation of the new towns, the regimenting of the intelligentsia, even the harrying of flies and mosquitoes—all have been made possible because of the vigour of the central government, and because the government has dependable hands everywhere.

The concentration of power is unprecedented and terrifying. Even in the brief days of achievement of the Ch'in dynasty, there was nothing comparable to it. The same power which has acted constructively in economic development can also act disruptively. Families are divided; husbands or wives are moved off to work in distant provinces. The power has begun to be used for transporting Han people *en masse* into the more or less empty valleys of Tibet.

The power has had rather less success in suppressing thought. It speaks a great deal for the stamina of the Chinese intelligentsia that it has been able to retain the independence of mind which the "Hundred-Flowers" period of 1956-57 revealed. Brain-washing seems often to

fail because the Chinese use poor techniques. When they take more advice from psychiatrists they may do better.

The constitution of this state power is not to be condemned, even though the power is often abused. Many countries need a new kind of executive—one which is much more efficient. The Chinese model may usefully be copied in some respects. The task is to maintain the increased state power, and at the same time to restrict its use so that it does not crush the individual. "Tis good to have a giant's strength but tyrannous to use it." Even a liberal country like India may in the end take over parts of the Chinese system, and it should be possible to do so without creating a tyranny or importing Communism.

KARL A. WITTFOGEL

A Stronger Oriental Despotism

COMMUNIST China is not an "Asiatic" ("hydraulic") society; nor is Mao's government a replica of the power system called "Oriental despotism." Comparative analysis reveals basic similarities as well as important dissimilarities between Communist totalitarianism and the absolutist régimes that prevailed in traditional Asia, North Africa and certain parts of pre-Columbian America.

In both cases we find a state stronger than society, a ruling managerial bureaucracy, and a politically pulverised population. In both cases we are faced, not with a multi-centred, but a single-centred societal order. But just as the multi-centred order comprises several institutional sub-types, so does the single-centred. Oriental despotism and Communist totalitarianism are separated by significant differences in the range of their managerial operations and in the completeness of their social and ideological control. "The agrarian despotism of the old society, which, at most, was semi-managerial, combines total political power with limited social and intellectual control. The industrial despotism of the fully developed and totally managerial apparatus society combines total political power with total social and intellectual control."¹

The agrodespotic masters were at most semi-managerial. They administered the large productive and protective water works; but they permitted the peasants to cultivate their land privately; and where circumstances recommended it, they tolerated private handicraft and commerce. They granted politically inconsequential forms of self-government to clans, village communities, guilds and secondary religions.² And while they kept the dominant religion attached to the state and supervised the politically relevant elements of secular thought, they were not ideocrats. Even when the rulers were qualified priests, they did not manipulate the religious core of the dominant creed, nor did they force all secular thought into a single mould determined by an all-pervasive political doctrine. To repeat: in the political sphere Oriental despotism exerted total power; it demanded total submission and could impose

¹ Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 440. (Hereafter cited as Wittfogel, 1957.)

² Nehru mentions these freedoms in his account of India's history, but he also notes that there was no "urge for popular freedom" (Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimpses of World History*. New York: John Day Co., 1942, p. 302). In his opinion "the static nature of Indian society" was due largely to the fact that the Indian middle class did not fight for political leadership as was done "in some Western countries." (*Idem*, *The Discovery of India*. New York: John Day Co., 1946, p. 284.)

total loneliness.³ But beyond this sphere—which was operationally restricted—there existed numerous areas with little or no government interference.

In China these areas of freedom were more extensive than in most other Oriental countries.⁴ Among the several reasons for this phenomenon one seems particularly noteworthy. A private economy had evolved not only in handicraft and commerce, but also, and very widely, in agriculture. It provided a maximal incentive to intensive farming, and it everywhere encouraged a spirit of competitive individualism.

These developments probably explain why in important spheres of public work the imperial government for centuries replaced commandeered corvée labour by hired ("free") wage labour.⁵ They probably explain why the non-officiating notables (the bureaucratic "gentry" who lived on revenue from privately owned lands) had unusual opportunities for literary study and creative activity. Few other Oriental civilisations inculcated in their population so deep a respect for intellectual achievement as did China; and no other Oriental civilisation produced so vast and diverse a literature.

Remembering these facts, we can now identify certain crucial dissimilarities between Communist and traditional China.

Like the Soviet Union, the Peking régime spread its operational authority over the major sectors of production and distribution. Thus the Communist masters developed a *total managerialism* and a degree of economic and personal control never equalled by any hydraulic society. On the basis of a total state doctrine and assisted by a modern system of communications, they developed a *total ideocratic control* never equalled by any earlier despotism, Oriental or other. In outlying areas of conquest and domination they developed a pattern of *total colonialism* incomparably more repressive than China's imperial administration of the south-western tribes, Turkestan or Tibet, not to speak of the increasingly liberal rule that England maintained in India from the middle of the nineteenth century to 1947. No national revolutionist can openly plead his cause in the colonial domains of Communist China. No national revolutionist can study and write in Mao's jails as did Gandhi and Nehru under the British *raj*.

³ Wittfogel, 1957, pp. 149-160.

⁴ Dr. Sun Yat-sen held that under China's traditional absolutism the people, after the fulfilment of their government obligations, were much left to themselves like "loose sand" (Sun Yat-sen, *Sun Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People*, trans. by Frank W. Price, Chungking, 1943, pp. 198, 203 *et seq.*).

⁵ See Karl A. Wittfogel, "Forced Labor," in *Handbook on China*, edited by Hellmut Wilhelm for the Human Relations Area Files and the U.S. Army (ms.). (Hereafter cited as "Forced Labor.")

Communist China shares these and other basic features—which cannot be discussed here—with the Soviet Union. For reasons of space we must also be brief in discussing significant traits that mark off Mao's régime from the Soviet Union—not fundamentally, but in significant detail. Some of these traits reflect the fact that traditional China was a full-fledged Oriental society, whereas Tsarist Russia was a marginal variant of this institutional conformation.⁶ Others reflect specific aspects of the Chinese Communist movement, and still others the experience and personality of the autocratic leader.

Despite conspicuous restrictions, commandeered labour persisted throughout the dynastic period and also under the Republic.⁷ The Chinese Communists therefore were perpetuating an institution which was traditionally accepted—though often resented—when, immediately after the conquest of the mainland, they organised gigantic corvée teams of nominally free persons especially for hydraulic purposes. And they were perpetuating another time-honoured feature—and one that has a strong positive appeal—when they emphasised “study” throughout the nation.

The Chinese Communists set up work teams for agricultural purposes in the Central Chinese Soviets as early as 1930⁸ and in the Yen-an area in 1936.⁹ This was not done spottily, as happened in Russia after the October revolution,¹⁰ but generally, the starting point being the collective care for the land of soldiers in the Red Army.¹¹ Again different from the Soviet Communists who waited ten years before they began to collectivise the countryside, the Chinese Communists initiated this policy in the winter of 1953–54, that is, half a year after the completion of their “land reform.”¹²

In all these cases the Chinese Communists probably dared to act

⁶ Russia lacked the large government-managed public works characteristic of hydraulic core areas, but since the days of Mongol rule the Russian state employed Oriental despotic means of organisation and acquisition. For the concept of a marginal Oriental (“hydraulic”) society and its application to Tsarist Russia, see Wittfogel, 1957, p. 173 *et seq.*

⁷ See “Forced Labor,” parts I and II. The present account stresses the contrast between the Communist régime and China's traditional “Oriental” order. It cannot depict the significant attempts at transforming this order that were made prior to the Communist victory, particularly after the establishment of the Republic in 1912.

⁸ Mao Tse-tung, *Nung-ts'un tiao-ch'a* (Village Investigations) (no place: Hsin-hua Shu-tien, 1947), p. 246.

⁹ Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*. (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 213 (hereafter cited as Snow 1938); cf. Mao Tse-tung, “Ching-chi wen-t'i yü ts'ai-cheng wen-t'i” (Economic and Financial Problems) in Mao Tse-tung, *Hsuan-chi* (Selected Works) (Ta-lien: Ta-chung Shu-tien, 1947), pp. 559, 564, 580.

¹⁰ See Naum Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR. Plans and Performance*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1948), p. 300 *et seq.*

¹¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Nung-ts'un tiao-ch'a*, 1947, pp. 93, 99, 115 *et seq.*

¹² See Karl A. Wittfogel, “The Peasants,” Chap. XI, *Handbook of World Communism*, ed. by Joseph Bochenski and Gerhart Niemeyer. (German edition: München 1958. American edition to be published soon by Frederick A. Praeger, New York.)

so quickly and so comprehensively because the Chinese Government traditionally mobilised peasants for collective work (in Russia government-enforced labour, which was employed mainly in heavy industry, ceased after the emancipation of the serfs in 1861). However, specific circumstances in the recent Chinese development no doubt also played a role in determining the timetable and character of the Chinese collectivisation. In contrast to the Bolshevik leaders who, before the October revolution, had lived largely in urban and civilian settings, the Chinese Communists maintained rural power bases for two decades prior to the national victory; and during this period they learned to organise the villages militarily as well as economically.

Thus the quick introduction of collectivisation—and the commune policy—was made by Communist officials who, in large degree, had participated in an unusual rural and military experience; and it was made under a supreme leader whose exposure to this experience was particularly long and intense. Mao Tse-tung was early familiar with military ways of thinking. His father had been a professional soldier; and during the final agony of the Manchu dynasty Mao for a short time joined the regular army.¹³ From 1927 to 1949 he was prominent in military as well as civil affairs.

This special conditioning, which certainly coloured Mao's mentality, was further influenced by several other factors. Important among them were the relative independence of his régime, the seniority status he attained in international Communism after Stalin's death,¹⁴ and his protracted exercise of total power. Recognition of all these factors helps us to understand the quasi-military and extreme aspects of the original commune policy (September to December 1958). It helps us to understand Peking's initial defiance of Moscow's warning against certain unfeasible features of this policy, a defiance that may largely be laid to the growing megalomania of the ageing autocrat.¹⁵

Obviously then, a knowledge of the workings of Oriental despotism facilitates our appraisal of the old and new elements in the Communist order. In Imperial China the ruler's decisions did not affect the lives of his subjects as comprehensively as do the decrees of the Peking

¹³ Snow 1938, pp. 113 and 124.

¹⁴ Considerations of status have profoundly affected Chinese thinking in the past. Under the Communists and in a new form they have again become extremely significant. Without doubt they have influenced Mao's attitude toward Khrushchev who achieved national and international prominence much later than he. But however status-conscious Mao may be, his sentiment does not imply a denial of the pioneering role of the Bolshevik revolution. Nor does it negate the view that the Soviet Union because of its "advanced" industrial and Socialist development is institutionally pre-eminent among the countries of the Communist orbit.

¹⁵ Wittfogel 1957, pp. 107, 345. Despite the Stalin precedent, Western social scientists find it difficult to recognise that, under conditions of total power, the personality of the autocratic leader assumes major political importance.

Government and "Chairman Mao." Now commandeered labour is employed not only in certain segments of water-control and communication, but throughout the entire economic order, and particularly in agriculture. In consequence the Chinese peasants—previously the world's most industrious farmers—have had to be put under a quasi-military discipline to assure the execution of the most elementary agricultural tasks. The workers and peasants, who certainly want to learn to read and write (techniques which in Communist China, as elsewhere, are a concomitant of the industrial revolution), are irked by the constant political indoctrination that goes by the name of "study." The intellectuals, as we know from the explosions in the Hundred-Flower period, hate the perverted Marxist-Leninist training that is being imposed upon them.

On the domestic scene the modification of traditional methods has engendered more hostility to the régime than is generally realised. On the international scene, Mao's recent commune policy manifestly incurred Moscow's disapproval. But while noting the domestic tension, we should not forget that the Communist government controls the situation by keeping the population politically pulverised. And while noting the international tension, we should not forget that the conflicts that separate Peking and Moscow are much less consequential than the interests that unite the two régimes.

These unifying interests are based on an identity of position and perspective which is obscured rather than clarified when it is called an identity of ideology—ideology, according to prevailing Western usage, connoting a set of dogmas that need not be taken too seriously by those who invoke them. Whatever the rationality coefficient of the Communist doctrine may be,¹⁶ it reflects real conditions of monopolistic class privilege. And far from being a useless bit of baggage, it serves as a guide for power-oriented action. This action involves (1) the original accumulation of power: the seizure of power and the destruction of all institutional and social bulwarks of a multi-centred society; (2) the consolidation and development of dictatorial power in the totalitarian orbit; and (3) a global strategy aimed at liquidating the centres of non-Communist power everywhere. In the course of this intricate process the leading Communist countries may have grave differences of opinion on details of economic co-operation and domestic and foreign policy. But any analyst who, because of such secondary differences, disregards

¹⁶ See Michael Lindsay, *China and the Cold War* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1955), *passim*; Gerhart Niemeyer and John S. Reshetar, Jr., *An Inquiry into Soviet Mentality* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), *passim*; J. M. Bochenski, "Critique of Communism," Chap. XV in the forthcoming *Handbook of World Communism* (see above, note 12).

the primary ties between Moscow and Peking appraises the Communist power system with the standards of a Babbitt or a Colonel Blimp.

When Mao Tse-tung declared that after the First World War the Communists controlled 200 million people, that after the Second World War they controlled 900 million, and that the next major holocaust would probably destroy all remaining non-Communist power centres,¹⁷ he was expressing his belief in an historical perspective that makes any idea of a break between Peking and Moscow palpably absurd. The purposeful way in which the Communists subordinate their subsistence economy to their power economy—and the easy way in which we handle these matters—hardens them in their conviction that, in the crucial spheres of economy, armaments, and diplomacy, their power-directed strategy will necessarily—and soon—overwhelm the free world.

A Western strategy can, and must, frustrate this development. But only a victim of illusion will expect Mao, or whoever succeeds him, to desert what today the Chinese, like the Soviet, leaders hold to be the bandwagon of an historically unavoidable global victory.

¹⁷ See *Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom*, The Complete Text of "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People," by Mao Tse-tung, with notes and an introduction by G. F. Hudson (New York: *New Leader*, Supplement 2, September 9, 1957), p. 54.

THE FIRST DECADE Part II

Economic Development

By CHO-H-MING LI

In the ten years of Communist rule since late 1949 a thoroughgoing revolution has taken place on the Chinese mainland in economic organisation, savings and investment, and distribution, with profound effects on the daily lives of the people. Peking has claimed that immense progress has been made on all economic fronts, including the real income of industrial and agricultural workers. It has felt confident enough to shorten from fifteen to ten years (beginning 1958) the target period at the end of which its output of electric power and certain major industrial goods would match or exceed that of Britain. In the non-Communist world, commentators vary greatly in their judgments; they range from those who reject all the official statistics and consider no important progress to have been made during the period, to those who not only accept the claims *in toto* but have advanced all sorts of arguments to defend even those claims that Peking has later had to repudiate.

There are, indeed, serious problems connected with the official statistics, and the early claim of a 105 per cent. increase in food output for 1958 over 1957 was so unreasonable as to cast grave doubt on the reliability of all official data in the minds of objective investigators. But, despite the domestic and international fanfare given to these "Great Leap Forward" achievements, Peking later saw fit to announce a drastic downward revision of them as well as of the targets for 1959. This lends strong support to the view that the régime has not been operating with two different sets of statistics, one for confidential use and the other for public consumption; that in the need of reliable data for planning purposes it demands accurate information from junior officials whose psychological bias and incompetence are the major source of error; and that provisional data must be sharply distinguished from final figures, which, however, particularly in respect of agricultural statistics, represent at best the considered judgment of the State Statistical Bureau and therefore have to be used with care.¹

Statistical differences notwithstanding, there can be no doubt that the economy was able to sustain continuous growth in national product during the period under review at an annual rate much higher than the rate of population increase. This performance has greatly impressed many of the underdeveloped countries and has caused India, for example, to shift its emphasis from agriculture in its First Five-Year Plan

¹ For further comment on 1958 statistics, see below.

to heavy industry in the Second, and more recently, to introduce "co-operative farming" on the Chinese model. To the West, the crucial question is whether this growth will continue and China will thus become a World Power. It is important, therefore, to examine the record carefully: to evaluate the overall rate of growth, to find out how it was achieved, to understand the background that led to the "Great Leap Forward" and the people's communes and their current status, and to realise the sacrifices the people have been called upon to make.

THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN

The ten-year period falls into three phases, namely, rehabilitation (1950-52), the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), and the "Great Leap Forward" (1958-59). The first phase saw the rehabilitation of the war-torn, inflation-infested economy, the completion of the land redistribution programme, and the beginning of socialisation of private trade and industry—a process which was destined to be consummated, together with that of agriculture, in 1956. The cessation of civil strife, Soviet aid towards restoring the industrial base in Manchuria, and the Korean War all contributed to the rapid economic recovery. Deliberate economic development began in 1953 when the First Five-Year Plan was launched. Evaluation of Peking's performance must start from this point. The third phase, covering the first two years of the Second Five-Year Plan, witnessed such a radical change in economic organisation and in the nature of data that it is best treated separately.

How fast did the economy grow from 1953 to 1957? According to official calculations, the net domestic material product (that is, the total values added by all the materially productive sectors minus depreciation) increased from 61.1 billion *yuan* in 1952, 70 billion in 1953, to 93.8 billion in 1957, all at 1952 market prices.² This gives an annual rate of 8.9 per cent. with 1952 as the base and 7.6 per cent. with 1953 as the base. It is interesting to note that a recent Western estimate of China's gross national product for the seven-year period from 1950 to 1957, made by William W. Hollister, who made use of official raw data together with independent calculations, gives an annual growth rate of 8.6 per cent. with 1952 as the base and 7.4 per cent. with 1953 as the base.³ Thus, the choice of the base year makes a great deal of difference to the growth

² The annual figures for 1952-56 are given by the State Statistical Bureau, Research Department, "A Preliminary Study of China's National Income Produced and Distributed," *T'ung-chi yen-chiu (Statistical Research)* 1.11-15, January 1958. The figure for 1957, being provisional, is given by Po I-po, "The Tasks and Functions of Statistical Work in China's Socialist Construction," *ibid.* 4-10. (The exchange rate between *yuan* and £ sterling is 6.9-£, and between *yuan* and \$ U.S. is 2.5-\$.)

³ William W. Hollister, *China's Gross National Product and Social Accounts 1950-1957*. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), p. 2. The rates are computed from the data given in his Table 1.

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rate. It is important to realise that 1952 is not a representative base, because for a good part of the year trade and industry were at a low ebb due to the dislocation caused by the "three anti" and "five anti" movements. For this reason, 1953 is a much better choice as the base year.

Taking 1953 as the base, the 7.6 per cent. annual rate as obtained from official statistics is still an exaggeration. Among the factors contributing to the exaggeration are the pricing of new products in industry, the low pricing of agricultural products on the constant price list, and above all, the understatement of the gross agricultural value product from 1952 to 1954 and overstatement in the subsequent three years.⁴ What the actual growth rate was during this period has not yet been satisfactorily determined. Professor Ta-chung Liu of Cornell University has recently published the summary results of his estimation of China's net domestic product (that is, the net domestic material product plus the values added by government administration and other service sectors).⁵ They show an annual growth rate of 6.8 per cent. with 1953 as the base.⁶ The details of his calculation have not been published, but when computed in 1952 prices, a growth rate of this magnitude is probably closer to reality than any of the others.

Be it 7, 6.5, 6 or thereabouts, China's rate of growth during this period was quite high—more than double, if not three times, the average annual rate of natural increase of the population, officially estimated at 2.2 per cent. One is tempted to compare it with those of other countries which were or are at a similar stage of development. But such a comparison is fraught with difficulties; for example, methods of estimation, bases of calculation, length of period, and degrees of accuracy, all vary a great deal among different national estimates. For general interest, however, the following annual growth rates (all computed in constant prices) may be cited: for the Soviet Union, about 7 per cent. during the period 1928–37; for Japan, 4.6 per cent. during the period 1898–1914 and 4.9 per cent. from 1914 to 1936; and for India, 3.3 per cent. during its First Five-Year Plan period from 1950–51 to 1955–56.⁷

⁴ See Choh-ming Li, *Economic Development of Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, and London: Cambridge University Press, 1959), pp. 53–74.

⁵ See his "Structural Changes in the Economy of the Chinese Mainland, 1933 to 1952–57," *Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic Association*, xlix: 84–93, May 1959; particularly p. 93.

⁶ Interestingly, his figures yield a rate of 6.9 per cent. if 1952 is taken as the base.

⁷ For the Soviet Union, see Gregory Grossman, chapter on "National Income," in A. Bergson, ed., *Soviet Economic Growth* (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson & Co., 1953), pp. 1–23, especially p. 8. For Japan, see K. Ohkawa and others, *The Growth Rate of the Japanese Economy since 1878* (Tokyo: Kinokuniya Bookstore, 1957), p. 248. For India, see Government of India, Planning Commission, *Review of the First Five Year Plan* (New Delhi, 1957), pp. 7–8.

SOVIET AID AND THE RATE OF INVESTMENT

What made this growth possible was a massive investment programme which was financed almost completely through compulsory savings in the form of taxes, profits and depreciation reserves of state-controlled enterprises and reserve funds of the farm units. In Peking's national income accounting, the total savings (net of current replacement costs) of the economy are designated as "accumulation" and may be regarded also as that part of net national material product (that is, net domestic material product, adjusted to international balances) devoted to increasing fixed capital assets in the entire economy, working capital of the materially productive sectors, commercial inventories, and stock-piles of the state. According to the latest official data, the rate of accumulation at 1952 prices had increased from 19.7 per cent. of the net national material product in 1952 to 23.7 per cent. in 1957, with an average rate of 23 per cent. for the five-year period.⁸

Although the underlying concepts are different, it may be pertinent to mention three other estimates, all based on 1952 prices. Hollister found the rate of gross domestic investment to gross national product to be 18.5 per cent. for the five years; and Liu gave the rate of net domestic investment to net domestic expenditures to be 21.8 per cent.⁹ Taking only fixed capital investment and working capital for industry and agriculture into account, I have estimated that for the same period the rate of capital formation to net capital product averaged 11 per cent.¹⁰

Whatever the precise rate of investment was, it is certain that virtually all investments were made with internal savings. Financial assistance from abroad was not substantial. Since 1950, only two Soviet loans for economic development purposes have been announced; one, contracted in 1950, was for 1,200 million roubles, and the other, in 1954, was for 520 million. Together they were only enough to pay for 31 per cent. of the necessary equipment and supplies for the original 156 industrial and other projects which the Soviet Union agreed to help China construct, or to cover but 11 per cent. of China's total imports for the eight years from 1950 to 1957. During the First Five-Year Plan, the amount of Soviet credit available for new investment (1.57 billion yuan) constituted merely 3 per cent. of the total state investment (49.3 billion yuan). By the end of 1957, all outstanding Soviet credit was

⁸ Yang Po, "The Relationship between Accumulation and Consumption in China's National Income Account," *Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily)*, October 13, 1958.

⁹ Hollister, *op. cit.* pp. 128-129; Liu, *op. cit.* p. 93. Again it may not be amiss to cite here Professor Henry Rosovsky's recent findings on Japan's rates of capital formation: the rate of gross investment to net national product at current prices averaged 10 per cent. from 1889 to 1914 and 18 per cent. from 1914 to 1936. See his "Japanese Capital Formation: The Role of the Public Sector," *Journal of Economic History*, XIX: 350-375, September 1959; the average rates cited are computed from Table 2, pp. 354-355.

¹⁰ Li, *ibid.* p. 138.

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exhausted, and since then no new loan has been announced. Meanwhile, amortisation payments have been mounting since 1954.

Of course, the Soviet contribution cannot be evaluated in terms of financial assistance alone. In respect of the Soviet-aid projects, not only the supply of machinery and equipment is assured, but all ancillary services are made available, including installation and operation of the plants and training of personnel. At the end of 1957 the total number of these projects already agreed upon came to 211, a figure which was subsequently increased by 125 through the agreements of August 1958 and February 1959. Equally important, if not more so, is the Soviet supply, virtually gratis, of whole sets of blueprints and related technical materials giving direction for the layout of a plant, its construction, and pilot manufacturing in various heavy and light industries. From 1954 to 1957, over 3,000 items of such information were provided. In the field of training, during the period from 1951 to 1957, some 6,500 Chinese students were sent to the Soviet Union for higher education and 7,100 workers for acquiring experience in Soviet factories. For basic research, significant Soviet assistance has been given in both personnel and equipment, the latter including such facilities as electronic computers and a 6,500 kw. atomic reactor pile and rotating accelerator.¹¹ Indeed, Soviet experience and experts were made readily available to Peking in perhaps all state endeavours. Premier Chou En-lai revealed in a tenth anniversary article in the *People's Daily* on October 6, 1959, that the Soviet Union had sent over 10,800 experts and the East European satellites over 1,500 to China during the previous decade.

Technical assistance of this scope must have contributed greatly to the efficiency of investment—which probably meant as much to the country as capital supply, especially in view of the shortage of engineering and management personnel. But the fact remains that for the five-year period, 97 per cent. of the investment for basic development came from the Chinese people themselves.

PHENOMENAL INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

The investment programme centred around 156 Soviet-aid engineering projects. In the words of the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, the underlying objective of economic development is "the marshalling of all efforts and resources for the development of heavy industry so as to lay down a foundation for an industrialised state and a modernised national defence."¹² It is anticipated that by the end of

¹¹ The research plant, located in the outskirts of Peking, has been in operation since September 1958.

¹² Li Fu-ch'un, "The First Five Year Plan," *Ta Kung Pao (Impartial Daily)*, Tientsin, September 16, 1953.

the Third Five-Year Plan the country will be capable of producing all machinery and equipment needed for further economic development. This objective gives overall guidance to the allocation of state investments. From 1953 to 1957 the total amount of realised state investment for basic development came to 49.3 billion *yuan*, of which three-quarters went to industry (56 per cent.) and transportation and communications (18.7 per cent.), and only 8.2 per cent. to agriculture, forestry and water conservation.¹³ And out of the 27.6 billion *yuan* of investment in industry 87 per cent. was for heavy industry, leaving 13 per cent. for light industry.

As a result, heavy industry grew at a phenomenal and sustained rate. To cite a few examples: rolled steel output increased from 1.1 million metric tons in 1952 to 4.5 million in 1957, coal from 64.7 million tons to 130 million, electric power from 7.3 billion kilowatt hours to 19.3 billion, and cement from 2.9 million tons to 6.9 million. For the first time and in quantity, the country was able to produce trucks and automobiles, merchant ships, tractors and jet aeroplanes, and to export whole sets of cotton textile machinery, sugar-refining machinery and paper-making machinery. By the end of 1957, expansion of the iron and steel complex in Manchuria was virtually accomplished, and new centres of comparable size were being built at Wuhan in central China and Paotow in Inner Mongolia. In light industry, production capacity was also rapidly enlarged, especially in the paper, textile and sugar industries, but production was repeatedly held back by shortages of raw materials.

To support this development, the educational system was completely revamped to give primary emphasis to technical subjects. Polytechnical schools and short courses for industrial and agricultural techniques were introduced everywhere. On-the-job training and apprenticeship were introduced on a national scale. It is reported that the engineering and technical personnel in industry had increased 200 per cent. from 58,000 in 1952 to 175,000 in 1957, while industrial employment (including mining and construction) grew 66 per cent. from 6.15 million to 10.19 million.¹⁴

The development of agriculture presents a different picture. It is true that in addition to state investment, the independent peasants, the agricultural co-operatives and collectives did set aside, as required, a small percentage of their annual output for expansion. But this amount, together with the state investment, was, at best, equal to about one-half of the state funds spent for industry. During this period, mobilisation

¹³ State Statistical Bureau, "Communiqué on the Results of the First Five Year Plan for National Economic Development," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily), April 14, 1959.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

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of the masses for construction was practised every year, but never on such a gigantic scale as in the spring of 1958. This neglect of agricultural development was reflected in agricultural output.

According to official statistics, the output of food grains (not including soyabeans) increased from 154.4 million to 185 million tons over the five years, at an annual rate of increase of 3.7 per cent. If this rate of increase were correct, there would have been an ample supply of food for various purposes. But by the beginning of 1956, the number of draught animals, essential for farm work, had been drastically reduced, owing, among other reasons, to the lack of feed. It is certain that the rate of increase in food production was exaggerated in official data, due to underestimates of output from 1952 to 1954 and overestimates from 1955 to 1957. One cannot help drawing the conclusion that "the average annual rate of increase in food production during the First Five-Year Plan was very close to but perhaps somewhat higher than the natural rate of population increase."¹⁵ In this connection, it is of interest to note that Hollister, in his estimate of the output of basic food crops and animal products, came out with an annual rate increase of 2.65 per cent.—which is much closer than the official rate of 3.7 per cent. to the natural rate of population increase (2.2 per cent.).¹⁶

Thus, as one might expect from the shape of the investment programme, it was "the marshalling of all efforts and resources for the development of heavy industry" that accounted mainly for the economic growth of this period.

PROBLEMS OF COLLECTIVISATION

The "high tide" of collectivisation of agriculture and socialisation of all other sectors of the economy came after the autumn harvest of 1955, when a nation-wide movement for the "liquidation of counter-revolutionaries" had just concluded with huge numbers of people either executed or put in labour camps. The change in economic organisation was so sweeping that although the changeover was successfully completed by the end of 1956 as the authorities claimed, it would have been logical for them to devote the next few years to consolidating these new gains in the interest, at least, of economic development. How then can one explain the "Great Leap Forward" movement that began in the winter of 1957 and the people's commune system which was introduced in the summer of 1958? Could it be that the changeover had not been

¹⁵ Li, *op. cit.* p. 73.

¹⁶ Hollister, *op. cit.* pp. 23-24. The rate is computed from his production index, adjusted "for probable overstatements in trend for 1950, 1951 and 1953-54 resulting from changes in statistical coverage." He did not make any adjustment for the subsequent years.

as successful as claimed and that it was felt that if the resultant difficulties were not promptly corrected, economic growth and perhaps political stability would be jeopardised?

What were these difficulties? I believe the key to this question lies in the agricultural situation, which, contrary to Peking's expectations, deteriorated rapidly because of collectivisation. Slaughter of farm animals and destruction of farm implements were widespread.¹⁷ Many collectives existed only in name because the members were attracted to trading in the "free markets." As a result, even though the cultivated area affected by natural calamities was only 14.7 million hectares in 1957 against 15.3 million in 1956, the total cropping area was reduced by 2 million hectares, and the cropping area for food by 3.4 million hectares. The multiple cropping index also fell from 141 to 139; the amount of fertilisers collected was smaller; and the rate of increase in irrigated areas stood lower than that of 1956.¹⁸ What was even more alarming was that food output increased only 1.3 per cent., from 182.5 million to 185 million tons, over the year, a rate which was far below the natural rate of population increase. Collectivisation thus turned out to be a great failure—more so than the provisional statistics had led one to believe. When collectivisation was first introduced nationally, there was already strong opposition to it within the Chinese Communist Party on the ground that the step was too hastily taken. Now the architects of the plan had to find an immediate solution for both political and economic reasons.

The situation was all the more serious because agricultural development could no longer be neglected in favour of concentrated development of heavy industry. By the end of 1956 it had become increasingly clear that economic growth was closely tied to agricultural output. The amount of savings from which all industrial and other investments are made depends heavily on the harvests of the preceding year. A good crop permits large capital investments in the subsequent twelve months while a poor crop reduces them. In fact, the whole economy follows closely the fluctuations in agricultural output with about a one-year time lag.¹⁹ But this was not appreciated by the leaders in Peking until the latter half of 1957 when the summer and winter harvests fell far short of what the proponents of collectivisation insisted that they should be.

Recognition of the basic importance of agriculture immediately raised the issue of whether the state investment programme for the Second

¹⁷ Yueh Wei, "The Problem of Accumulation in Agricultural Co-operatives," *Hsueh-hsi (Study)*, 7:23-24, April 1958.

¹⁸ Liao Lu-yen, "Strive to Realise the Goals of the National Agricultural Development Programme," *Hsueh-hsi (Study)*, 3:2-8, February 1958.

¹⁹ See Li, *op. cit.* pp. 135-136 and 219-220.

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Five-Year Plan be changed to favour agriculture at the expense of heavy industry. Such a change would, of course, have run completely counter to Peking's primary objective in economic development and also to the ideological tenets of the Communist world. What could Peking do?

To deal with the situation, a series of directives were issued in the name of the Central Committee of the Party.²⁰ Two stood out as the most significant. One, dated September 14, 1957, concerned improving the management of agricultural collectives. It said, in part (Article 6):

The size of collectives and production teams is crucial to the success of management. Because of the various characteristics of agricultural production at the present and because the technological and managerial levels of the present collectives are not high, experiences in different localities during the last few years have proved that large collectives and large teams are generally not adaptable to the present production conditions. . . . Therefore, except the few that have been well managed, all those that are too big and not well managed should be divided into smaller units in accordance with the wishes of members. Henceforth, a collective should generally be of the size of a village with over 100 households. . . . A much larger village may become one collective or be organised into several collectives. . . . As to the size of production teams, twenty neighbouring households is the proper number. . . .

After the size of the collectives and production teams has been decided upon, it should be publicly announced that this organisation will remain unchanged in the next ten years.

Thus, one of the immediate steps taken was to reorganise the collectives and production teams by reducing their size. The ten-year period of no further change was obviously intended as a device to appease the peasants and to give the régime a chance to consolidate its position in the rural areas. The reasons given for the reorganisation were based on practical experiences. All this seems to indicate strongly that the later development of "people's communes" was not a preconceived, ideological move on the part of the Party leadership, although as early as 1955 Mao did remark on the operational superiority of large co-operatives on the basis of actual observation.

The second was the revised draft of the national agricultural development programme from 1956 to 1967, released on October 25, 1957. This, together with an earlier directive of September 24, seemed to have given rise to the slogan "Great Leap Forward." Moreover, it sparked a national movement to mobilise the farming population to repair and build irrigation works of various sizes (chiefly small) and to collect all sorts of organic fertilisers throughout the countryside and in the hills.

²⁰ They are conveniently collected in *Jen-min Shou-ts'e 1958 (People's Handbook for 1958)*, Peking, 1958, pp. 502-507, 514-525 and 533-539.

It was reported that from November 1957 to well into the spring of 1958 tens of millions of peasants were mobilised every day, often working long hours at places far away from home. This started the establishment of common mess halls. When the time for spring planting arrived, a labour shortage began to be felt. Utilisation of idle labour time as a form of capital formation had reached a limit. Additional manpower had to be found if full advantage was to be taken of the investment. The dispatch of people to the villages from overcrowded cities and overstaffed offices and factories was one expedient. More important was the other—the induction of women into the labour force by freeing them from housework through further development of mess halls and the introduction of tailoring teams, nurseries, old folks' homes, etc. Since peasants working in large groups needed discipline to ensure punctuality and a good work pace, something akin to military organisation was needed. In sum, it was against this background that the communes were developed—with Mao's personal blessings and encouragement.

Although this development was diametrically opposed to the Party's directive issued a few months previously, the chain of events that led up to it seemed to the leadership a justification for taking a bold step which would not only wipe out responsibility for the failure of collectivisation but offer a new and rational solution to the baffling agricultural problem. To them, low man-hour productivity was not so important as high unit-area productivity which was the crucial factor for accelerating industrialisation.

Thus, in 1958, out of a total basic development investment (not including investment by the communes for their own purposes) of 26.7 billion *yuan*, 78 per cent. went into industry (65 per cent.) and transportation and communication (13 per cent.), and only 10 per cent. into agriculture, forestry and water conservation. In the original plan for 1959, which called for a total investment of 27 billion *yuan*, only 7 per cent. was allocated for the latter three related fields.²¹

THE "GREAT LEAP FORWARD"

Just as collectivisation produced a strong psychological bias on the part of the rank and file to overreport the agricultural output of 1956 and 1957, so the harvests of 1958 were grossly exaggerated as a result of the "Great Leap Forward" and the formation of the communes. Whether food output actually increased from 185 million tons in 1957 to 250 million (instead of 375 million) in 1958, as the officially revised statistics show, remains a question to which perhaps even the State Statistical

²¹ The revised plan for 1959 scaled the total investment down to 24.8 billion *yuan*, with no details given.

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Bureau itself is not in a position to give a definite answer. Admittedly, such measures as the building of irrigation facilities and the introduction of various labour-intensification methods (deep ploughing, close cropping, etc.) might have increased unit-area productivity and therefore total output. Moreover, the area devastated by flood and drought—only 6 million hectares as compared to 14.7 million in 1957—was the smallest in five years. It was naturally a bumper crop year. But the reasons officially given for the overreporting in the first instance refer to the methods of estimating which are still being used and in which a high margin of error is always present, regardless of how carefully the results are checked.

If the 35 per cent. increase were accepted, it would be difficult to understand the severe food shortage in both rural and urban areas during 1958 and 1959. Perhaps part of the explanation is to be found in the 1 per cent. increase in food output in 1957, which affected the supply situation the following year. Then there is the question of the composition of the 35 per cent. increase in 1958. According to the original, unrevised claim, a 103 per cent. increase had taken place in food output, reflecting an increase of 70 per cent. in wheat, 73 per cent. in rice, 76 per cent. in coarse grains, and 320 per cent. in sweet potatoes. No such breakdown has yet been given for the revised figures.

Is it possible that sweet potatoes accounted for so much of the 35 per cent. increase in food output that the other food crops did not register any significant improvement? That the population on the mainland have been forced to accept the unwelcome sweet potatoes as their regular diet lends plausibility to this speculation.

Toward the end of autumn harvest in 1958 and at the height of the commune movement, there was another nation-wide mobilisation of the masses, especially in the countryside, for producing pig iron and steel. With the great majority of women drawn into the labour force, the end of the agricultural season brought in its train the pressing problem of how to keep the working population fully occupied without the state having to make any investment. The "backyard furnace" scheme seemed to be the answer. As usual, the cadres carried it too far with a resulting disruption of regular transportation and the neglect of irrigation and other field work. In the meanwhile, a large majority of the so-called furnaces were not able to produce, and most of those that could came up with products so poor in quality that for modern mills raw materials were of more use. Both manpower and materials were misused. The project was finally abandoned in the spring of 1959 as a movement, although industrial production by indigenous methods was allowed to continue to grow in localities where limited success with good prospects had obtained.

For 1958, the régime thus claimed a great leap in industrial output, pointing especially to an increase in the output of steel by 101 per cent., coal by 107 per cent., and pig iron by 130 per cent. Only in August 1959 was it made clear that these output figures for 1957 and 1958 were not comparable and that when production from indigenous sources was omitted, the increase in each case was reduced to about one-half of the original claim—a still quite impressive record. It is not clear if the modern factory output and the production by indigenous methods had been properly segregated and if the quality of factory output was as uniform as it was before. However, a substantial increase in factory output was credible because some of the major projects built under the first Five-Year Plan were now bearing fruit.

The downward revision of the official claims for 1958 was accompanied by a scaling down of the plan for 1959. To cite a few examples, the planned increase in the production of food was reduced from 40 to 10 per cent., raw cotton from 50 to 10 per cent., coal from 40 to 24 per cent., metal-cutting lathes from 40–50 to 20 per cent. In each of these cases, the planned increase was far less than the increase in 1958 over 1957. According to the definition given by Chou En-lai, the “Great Leap Forward” had now petered off to a “Leap Forward.” It was reported that floods and drought had occurred over a large area of the country in the late spring and summer of the year. The drastic reduction in the goals for food and cotton output, made public in August, must have taken their effects into account. Nevertheless, if the innovations, plus excellent weather, had accounted for the 35 per cent. increase in food in 1958, thus advancing the level of output to a new plateau, and if the experience of other countries is any guide, one may legitimately express doubt whether the 10 per cent. planned increase in the output of food as well as cotton in 1959 could be realised—without mechanisation and large-scale use of chemical fertilisers. Perhaps a 10 per cent. increase or a higher rate will be reported, but the 1958 episode should teach us to be extremely cautious in respect of such claims.

DEVELOPMENT AND THE CONSUMER

At the end of the decade of Communist rule, the economy would seem so well launched on the path of development that further growth would be easier. This would have been the case if the process had been carried through under a leadership that inspired popular support or at least consent. But the development programme, calling for heavier and heavier sacrifices, was determinedly imposed upon the people from above. Discontent was growing and widespread. The régime may

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indeed face an internal situation far more serious than at any other time since 1949.

To be sure, Peking has long instituted certain socio-economic measures designed to gain the support of the workers. As early as 1951, a system of social security was inaugurated by which state enterprises were required to contribute annually an amount equivalent to about 15 per cent. of the wage bill to various welfare purposes such as workmen's compensation, medical assistance, cost-of-living subsidies and trade union activities. Private enterprises, when still in existence, were required to enter into contract with their employees to provide similar obligations. For workers in governmental and educational institutions, a system of free medical benefits was established in addition to welfare and educational benefits. It was reported that from 1953 to 1957 the actual outlay for all these purposes equalled about one-quarter of the national wage bill. Then in 1958 a system of retirement was put into effect for workers in industrial and business enterprises and governmental and civil institutions. All these measures were innovations introduced into the country for the first time on such a large scale.

As against these benefits, however, the workers have completely lost their freedom of choice of jobs. They are subject to deployment from factory to factory and from locality to locality. Direction of labour is practised extensively to support the growth of new industrial cities in the hinterland. Moreover, workers are not secure in their jobs, because especially after 1957 they are liable to be assigned to the countryside to become a part of the agricultural labour force, thus losing a great deal of the benefits accruing to them in the cities. While technical skill enhances security in industrial employment, the determining factor is political attitude and "socialist consciousness."

As was foreseeable, social security benefits have not been extended to the peasants. The early official justification that their position had already improved as a result of land redistribution no longer held true under collectivisation and the communes. They have been required to take care of their welfare collectively out of their own annual output, and even primary education in the countryside is financed out of agricultural taxes. Mass mobilisation projects often take them far away from home. And during the "Great Leap Forward" movement they were driven to labour such long hours that the Party at the end of 1958 had to reaffirm the principle of giving them eight hours of sleep and four hours of mealtime and rest every day except in the busy agricultural seasons. As compared with the urban workers who were also pressed into emulative and overfulfilment-of-the-plan drives, the peasants are the worse off by far because their work is all physical exertion unmitigated by mechanical assistance.

Changes in the real income of workers and peasants are among the subjects yet to be carefully investigated. During the period from 1952 to 1957, "per capita consumption of food, cloth and housing services had declined in absolute terms, with the exception of staple food grains, the total consumption of which probably had increased a little for the country as a whole, owing primarily to the growing need for energy work by those not used to work on the farm and to the levelling process of collectivisation."²² The slight increase in staple food consumption, however, was in terms of weight, and there was strong evidence that the composition of staple food had been rapidly changing in favour of sweet potatoes and coarse grains. In 1958 and 1959, per capita consumption as a whole took a deep dive. The severe shortage of staple (rice and wheat) and subsidiary food and cloth was nation-wide.

The situation was particularly bad in the rural areas. According to the many instances reported in the mainland newspapers, in 1958 the communes were generally required to set aside, as "accumulation," 50 to 70 per cent. of their total output, net of production and management costs. Now a survey made by Peking's State Statistical Bureau of 228 collectives in the country reveals that in 1957 consumption accounted for 89 per cent. of the net output, with only 11 per cent. for accumulation. The collectives investigated were better than the average, so that the share of consumption must have been higher for the country as a whole.²³ Assume conservatively that consumption took 90 per cent. in 1957 and that accumulation was raised to 50 per cent. in 1958. It does not take much calculation to see that the net agricultural output must increase 80 per cent. if consumption in 1958 was to be maintained on the same level as in 1957. Obviously the 50-70 per cent. accumulation rate was decided upon in accordance with an expected increase in gross agricultural output of about 80 per cent. However, since the gross agricultural output in fact increased only 25 per cent. (according to officially revised data), if one assumes that the net output had grown at the same pace consumption must have declined by about one-third when one-half of the net output went into accumulation. It is not surprising that the peasants became restive.

The causes of discontent were not confined to economic factors. Many of the national movements, coming on each other's heels, were in the nature of purges. Countless numbers of people were executed, imprisoned, or placed in labour camps. The threat to personal safety was ever present, and the atmosphere of insecurity must have been tense and oppressive. This was enough to generate unrest. A further major

²² Li, *op. cit.* p. 215.

²³ "A survey of the Gross Income and its Distribution of 228 Agricultural Collectives in 1957," *T'ung-chi yen-chiu (Statistical Research)*, 8:8-12, August 1958.

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blow was the disintegration of the family system in the communes. It may well be true, as the document issued by the Party in December 1958 stated, that husband and wife had not been forcibly separated in different quarters. But when people had to eat in common mess halls and both husband and wife had to work long hours outside and the children were in nurseries, the family ceased to have any common bond or unity of interest and purpose. It was no longer the place where material rewards were shared together or occasionally with friends; nor was it a place for enriching personal cultural heritage. Even the Soviet Union had never gone this far.

Thus discontent had been growing and widespread. One needs only to read Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing's report of September 1957 on the "Rectification Movement" to realise the extent of it among intellectuals, peasants, industrial workers, minority nationalities, armed forces and Party members. The situation deteriorated even further after that date, not only because of the further decline in *per capita* consumption, but because of the "Great Leap Forward" and the people's communes. Resentment was particularly strong among the peasants, as attested by the official acknowledgment that the bumper crop of 1958 suffered heavy losses from poor reaping, threshing, collecting and storing. This feeling was quickly communicated to the armed forces, whose recruits came chiefly from the rural areas. Therefore, it was not unexpected that opposition to the present leadership stiffened within the Chinese Communist Party, as clearly revealed in the *People's Daily* editorial of August 27, 1959.

Peking, of course, had already taken steps to cope with the situation. Since March 1959, many of the radical features of the commune system had been gradually altered. Accumulation in the communes was generally scaled down from 50-70 per cent. to about 30 per cent. for 1959; participation in common mess halls became voluntary; ownership of most of the means of production was reverted back from the commune to the "production brigades"—the old collectives; small plots of land were returned to individual households for private cultivation; "free markets" were partially reopened. Thus by the end of 1959 the people's communes existed very much in name only, although each still retained a share of accumulation funds for developing local industries. On the political scene, perhaps the most important move was the strengthening of the present leadership through an extensive reshuffle of Party personnel in the government, and the appointment of General Lo Jui-ch'ing, who had long been Minister of Public Security, as Chief of Staff of the Army.

How the future will shape up is, of course, a hazardous guess, for much depends on how well the widespread discontent is contained.

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There is, however, no indication that the present leadership has any desire to give up the commune system—a step that would vindicate the opposition. Perhaps, for some time to come, the commune will continue primarily as an administrative unit, engaging more and more in industrial activities supported by the farming units operating as collectives. But even under *de facto* collectivisation, the agricultural problem still awaits urgent solution. In the economic picture proper, two developments should ease somewhat the régime's effort in this direction—the extensive construction of irrigation works in 1958 and 1959 which, if properly maintained, will raise agricultural productivity to a new level, and the increasing flow of capital goods from the major projects built in the last few years. Thus, barring a violent outburst of general discontent, a change in Party leadership, or war, continuous and rapid industrialisation of the country may be expected.

Berkeley.

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The Sino-Soviet Alliance

By ROBERT C. NORTH

WESTERN visitors to the Soviet Union report a growing Russian anxiety about Communist China and its inclinations and potentialities. The Soviet "man in the street," who recalls what Leningrad and Kiev and Minsk and Odessa experienced during the Second World War, maintains a sober respect for the world's new weapons—whether nuclear, bacteriological or something even more dreadful that is only whispered about. He is increasingly ready to believe, moreover, that Western capitalist peoples share this sober respect, but Communist China gives him cause for deep uneasiness. Is it possible that China might trigger a war which both the Soviet Union and the West would prefer to avoid?

"Mao Tse-tung can lose half his population," a Soviet technician points out, "and there will still be more than 300 million left."

Many Russians seem to have measured possibilities to a nicety. "Suppose nuclear war breaks out between the United States and the Soviet Union," a Russian engineer argues. "Clearly we destroy each other and China wins. Suppose, on the other hand, that a war breaks out between the United States and China—what happens then? You Americans drop nuclear bombs on China and kill a few million people, and the other 500 million or more dig in. Mao calls on us for support, and so again the Russians and the Americans destroy each other—and China still wins."

What does this Russian "man in the street" analysis mean? Are relations between the Soviet Union and China becoming seriously strained? Is there some possibility of a break-up? The pros and cons are being debated around the world, and the answer—if anyone could be sure of it—might have enormous consequences for all of us.

Relationships between the Russian and Chinese Communist movements have never been easy to pin down. Blueprints for the Communist revolution in China and other parts of Asia were first drawn by Lenin and by the Indian revolutionist M. N. Roy at the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920. It was on the basis of the Lenin and Roy theses that Michael Borodin's mission was sent to advise Sun Yat-sen's national revolutionary government in Canton and the infant Chinese Communist Party was induced to collaborate with the Kuomintang.

To draw plans was one thing, however, and to implement them was another. There were inherent contradictions between the Lenin thesis,

emphasising collaboration with revolutionary nationalists, and the Roy thesis, which asserted that the revolutionary movement in Europe was absolutely dependent upon the course of *mass* revolutionary—as contrasted with *nationalist* revolutionary—progress in Asia. In time there were also disagreements among the Chinese comrades themselves, among the various Comintern representatives in China, and between Stalin and Trotsky in Moscow. What must have galled the Chinese throughout these controversies was the fact that it was almost always a Chinese—and seldom a Russian—who was forced to accept responsibility for the many mistakes that were committed.

During the spring and early summer of 1927 Stalin and his advisers miscalculated first the strength and intentions of Chiang Kai-shek, with whom they were then collaborating, and later the strength and intentions of the Left Wing Nationalists under Wang Ching-wei, upon whom they had become critically dependent. By August both wings of the Kuomintang had turned against the Communists, who were dispersed and forced into the hills or into underground hiding.

Although the policy of Communist-Kuomintang collaboration had been made in Moscow, it was the Chinese Communist Party that was forced to accept most of the responsibility for failure. The Chinese comrades had “betrayed” their own revolution, Moscow charged.

Three years later another Moscow-made policy failed—and a Chinese Communist named Li Li-san was forced to admit responsibility. By 1930 Stalin and his advisers had convinced themselves that “a new revolutionary high tide” was imminent and that the situation was propitious for a Communist seizure of power. Under a series of Russian directives Li Li-san led peasant troops against Changsha and other Chinese cities on the assumption that the proletariat would rise up and join the revolt. It turned out, however, that the working class did not constitute the powerful force which Moscow had imagined, and the whole undertaking failed ignominiously.

Li Li-san was called to Moscow in order to answer for his errors, and the Comintern commissioned Pavel Mif, a Stalinist “expert” on China, to instal a group of Soviet-educated “Returned Students” as leaders. “These fellows,” according to a disillusioned Chinese Communist, “were just a group of young students who, needless to say, had done nothing for the Chinese revolution. While we were carrying out the revolution, they were taking milk at their mothers’ breasts. . . .”¹

Before the Far Eastern Commission in Moscow Li Li-san abjectly confessed his errors, levelled damaging accusations against his closest Chinese associates, and admitted that relations between the two

¹ Quoted in Robert C. North, *Moscow and Chinese Communists*, Stanford University Press, 1953, p. 140.

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Communist movements were not always friendly. "... the comrades in China maintain a prejudice towards the comrades in Moscow and do not trust them," Li Li-san asserted. "The comrades in Moscow do not trust the comrades doing practical work in China either." He reported also how the Russian Communists took care of "their own racial interests" to the neglect of the Chinese situation, which they had never really understood.²

The Russians decided that Li Li-san ought to remain in the Soviet Union until he could perceive the depth of his error. "... we want him to attend the Bolshevik school here," the chairman of the Commission said. "We want him to understand the substance of his mistakes."³ Fifteen years were to pass before Li Li-san returned to China.

Until 1933 or 1934 Moscow appears to have been responsible for the making and breaking of most major Chinese Communist leaders and for the shaping of virtually every crucial twist and turn of the Chinese Communist line. Over the next few years, by contrast, Stalin seems to have lost much of his interest in the Chinese revolution. Japan had already emerged as a new threat in Asia, and Hitler was casting a grim shadow across Europe. With major Soviet interest focused elsewhere, the Returned Student leadership found itself challenged by Mao Tse-tung who had been organising peasant Soviets and building his own Red Army and police force. Without direct support from Moscow, Pavel Mif's protégés were no match for the Hunanese peasant.

After the war it appears that the Russians again miscalculated the trend of Chinese events. "... we invited Chinese comrades to come to Moscow," Stalin told Georgi Dimitrov and Edvard Kardelj in 1948, and we discussed the situation in China. We told them bluntly that we considered the development of the uprising in China had no prospects, and that the Chinese comrades should seek a *modus vivendi* with Chiang Kai-shek, that they should join the Chiang Kai-shek government and dissolve their army. The Chinese comrades agreed here with the views of the Soviet comrades, but went back to China and acted otherwise. They mustered their forces, organised their armies, and now, as we see, they are beating the Chiang Kai-shek army. Now, in the case of China, we admit we were wrong. It proved that the Chinese comrades and not the Soviet comrades were right."⁴

Since the Chinese Communist seizure of power in 1949 relations between Peking and Moscow have appeared correct and at least minimally cordial. The Soviet Union recognised the People's Republic

² North, *op. cit.* pp. 143-144.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

⁴ Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito* (New York, 1953), p. 322.

of China the day after the establishment of the new government, and within a week most of the satellite states had fallen in line. On February 14, 1950, Mao Tse-tung and Joseph Stalin concluded a Sino-Soviet Treaty in Moscow, and later the two countries signed a series of trade pacts. During these negotiations many Western observers had predicted that Moscow would take advantage of the situation by stripping China of valuable assets and perhaps of independence. Hopes of a "Titoist" reaction in China were expressed.

The published terms of the Stalin-Mao agreements failed to support such predictions. By providing for the return to China of "war booty" which the Russians had extracted from Manchuria after the Second World War, and by recognising Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria, the agreements appeared to refute charges that the Soviet Union was intent on absorbing Chinese border regions into the Russian sphere. By guaranteeing the return of Port Arthur, Dairen, and the Chinese Changchun Railway freely into Chinese hands—provisions which, in actuality, took several years to carry out—the Soviet Union seemingly renounced a Russian sphere of influence which dated from 1905 and had been formally re-established by treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government in 1945. The agreements thus appeared to nullify various Western insinuations that Moscow was using Communist tactics to achieve Russian goals in China.

The treaty also established a military alliance between the two Communist nations with populations totalling approximately 800,000,000 people which suggested to the West that speculations about Titoism in China were premature, if not baseless. Peking and Moscow pledged mutual assistance not only against future Japanese aggression, but also against "any other state" that might unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, "in any act of aggression." They thus guaranteed the protection of China against an historic enemy, strengthened Soviet Russia's eastern flank against a traditional rival, and achieved a favourable redressing of the power balance in Asia.

In gaining these benefits together with an initial \$300 million in credits, Peking conceded nothing except the independence from China of Outer Mongolia which as the Mongolian People's Republic was already a *de facto* Soviet satellite and inhabited, in any case, by non-Chinese peoples who had frequently rebelled against Chinese rule.

Many Western observers tended to interpret these agreements as strengthening Mao's position in the world balance of power. Through its sweeping victories over Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Red Army had already brought the earth's most populous nation under Communist control—and this at a time when areas adjacent to China were boiling with discontent. At this critical juncture, moreover, when Western

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programmes for the containment of Communism in Asia had not proceeded much beyond the talking stage, Peking had concluded agreements which, from a Chinese viewpoint, were probably more advantageous than any treaty secured from a foreign power by the Nationalists.

On April 20, 1950, the Soviet Union and China concluded further agreements for exchanges of commodities, Soviet loans for the purchase of machinery, and the establishment of joint corporations for the development of mineral resources in Sinkiang and other purposes. To some Western observers these arrangements looked suspiciously advantageous to Moscow. What did they portend?

The entry of Chinese "volunteers" into the Korean conflict in November 1950 made answers extremely difficult. In so far as these troops inflicted heavy casualties upon Western forces, the Chinese Communists tended to achieve a new prestige in many parts of Asia, but the subsequent truce deadlock, on the other hand, seemed to place Mao and his armies—for the time being, at least—in a somewhat equivocal position. It could be argued that Chinese forces were not only damaging their victorious *elan* of a year earlier, but were growing increasingly dependent upon the Soviet Union for supplies and weapons.

Against this background, it is perhaps understandable that the results of a Sino-Soviet conference held in Moscow from August 18 to September 23, 1952, seemed to support some of the more cynical Western predictions. Through a joint announcement the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic declared that steps were being taken toward the promised return of the Changchun Railway, but that Peking had "requested" Moscow to delay withdrawing Russian troops from Port Arthur until treaty relations could be established between the two countries and Japan. Dairen was not mentioned, but presumably this city too, would remain under Russian control.

To an outsider, this agreement looked like a defeat for Peking. The Chinese Communist "request," if genuine, seemed to reveal China's inability to maintain its integrity without Soviet help. On the other hand, if the request were interpreted as a face-saving device, it did not conceal that Peking, in submitting to continued Russian occupation of Port Arthur, was relinquishing a 1950 gain without compensation. There were Western speculations, too, whether China could maintain control over Manchurian railways with Russian troops at both ends and terminals interlocking the system with Russian railways.

Had the Soviet Union achieved appreciable control over the Chinese Communist Party and government? Had a Soviet-style imperialism penetrated and fastened its grip on the Chinese economy? These were sober questions in 1953 when Soviet Russian advisers were pouring into China by the thousands and when large numbers of them, by Chinese

Communist admission, were holding important positions in Chinese government and industry.

In October 1954 Peking and Moscow concluded another treaty, however, and the scales of prestige and influence seemed to tip eastward again. This time the Russians—a top-level delegation including Khrushchev and Bulganin—travelled to Peking for the Communist régime's fifth anniversary celebrations, and this time the concessions seemed to be almost wholly on the Soviet side: the Soviet Union would evacuate Port Arthur by May 31, 1955 (according to Peking radio the last troops left on May 24); the Soviet Union would relinquish its shares in joint Sino-Soviet companies (the shares were reportedly handed back January 1, 1955); the Soviet Union would advance China additional long-term credits of \$100 million; the Soviet Union would assist China in the construction of two new railroads linking the two countries (the trans-Mongolian railroad, opened January 4, 1956).

In the West this treaty was widely cited as evidence of an increased stature and independence and prestige for Mao's régime in relation to the Soviet Union. Western observers also began to note that Soviet economic and technical assistance—however vital it was to Chinese efforts—had not been spectacularly generous. The Soviet Union, as a matter of fact, did not give the People's Republic any financial *grants* during the First Five-Year Plan. And of the claimed total of \$1.31 billion of Soviet *credits* and *loans* of all kinds during the first Plan, according to one observer, only a small part is definitely known to have consisted of long-term loans for economic development. By the end of 1957, moreover, "Peking had used up all past Soviet loans and credits, was paying the Russians large amounts (between \$250 and \$300 million annually) in servicing and repayment of past Soviet loans and credits, and thus had to support increasingly large export surpluses in its trade with the U.S.S.R."⁵ On the one hand, Peking probably could not have implemented its First Five-Year Plan without Soviet assistance. On the other hand, Communist China's contribution to overall Communist bloc economic policies toward the non-Communist world may have outweighed the assistance which the Peking Government received from the Soviet Union and the satellites. It is also possible, Barnett feels, that economic issues may have been—and in the future are perhaps likely to be—much more of a problem in Sino-Soviet relations than is ever apparent.

Chinese Communist progress has had its ups and downs since the power shift—if such it was—that followed Stalin's death, but

⁵ A. Doak Barnett, *Communist Economic Strategy: The Rise of Mainland China* (New York: National Planning Association, 1959), p. 80.

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accumulating evidence suggests that Chinese prestige is still gaining and that the readjustment in Sino-Soviet relations is not yet over.

When Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues achieved power in China, an important change took place within the Party. For at that juncture the Chinese Communists transformed themselves from a rebel movement into a Chinese government, just as Lenin and his Bolsheviks, more than three decades earlier, had assumed the responsibilities of a Russian Government. In each case the Communist leaderships brought powerful new values and procedures with them, but in each case, too, they subordinated themselves to traditional and inescapable *national* demands. Inevitably, as the People's Republic gained strength, there developed a powerful coincidence of Marxist-Leninist and purely Chinese motivations, just as Soviet policy has revealed a merging of ideological with historically indigenous impulses.

Traditionally, the Chinese have tended to look upon all foreigners with a touch of arrogance and even contempt. Until the beginning of the nineteenth century China had maintained itself in proud isolation, the powerful and deeply cultured Middle Kingdom surrounded by tribute-paying "barbarians." Then, with the Opium War of 1839, the gates were sprung and Westerners came trooping in. Because of his vast technological superiority the foreigner insisted upon—and obtained—privilege. Within the span of a few decades the country was laid open to exploitation while the Chinese people found themselves reduced to second-class citizenship in their own land and otherwise humiliated. The circumstances had been reversed: China now became a virtual tributary of the West.

It is almost axiomatic, perhaps, that frustration leads always to some form of aggression. After generations of frustration, the Chinese people have increasingly revealed an intense drive toward national self-restitution and the re-establishment of the uttermost boundaries achieved by the Old Empire. "In defeating China in war," Mao Tse-tung declared in 1939, "the imperialist powers have taken away many Chinese dependent states and a part of her territories. Japan took Korea, Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands, the Pescadores Islands, Port Arthur; England seized Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and Hongkong; France occupied Annam; and even an insignificant country like Portugal . . . took Macao."⁶

In this instance Mao was not speaking solely as a Communist; both Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek had levelled the same charge in almost identical terms. The only significant difference lies in the fact that

⁶ Mao Tse-tung, *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party* (published in Chinese, November 15, 1939; translated into English and mimeographed March 22, 1949), p. 4.

Mao has been able to do something about it whereas the other two were largely ineffectual.

Undoubtedly the death of Stalin gave further impetus to Chinese inclinations. Mao Tse-tung with his own army, his own police, his own party and his own governmental structure had been a formidable figure long before his victory over Chiang Kai-shek. As long as Stalin lived, however, Mao and his colleagues paid careful deference to the Soviet leader as "... teacher of genius ... great scientist of dialectic materialism ... greatest figure in the world. ...". The Chinese Revolution had succeeded, all historical evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, because Mao's views on the nature and tactics of the Chinese Revolution were "identical with those of Stalin."⁷

Unfortunately for Russian stability and prestige, the Soviet system had made no arrangement for orderly succession, and for a time it was not at all clear where actual power lay. Mao's prestige, meanwhile, was as great or even greater than that of the chief contenders for power in Soviet Russia. The Chinese leadership was relatively cohesive and had three and a half decades of hard experience behind it.

From Peking's viewpoint, Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation programme must have looked like the inept breaching of a closet better left dark. The Chinese Communists had their skeletons, too, but Mao and his associates were accustomed to more discreet methods of disposal. Their public statements were deftly cautious: Stalin's mistakes were secondary compared to his achievements, and many of the criticisms from Yugoslavia and elsewhere had been neither well balanced nor objective.

Although the Chinese Communists continued to acknowledge Moscow as the centre of the Communist world, they also made clear that China was not obliged to follow in the footsteps of the Russians. The stature of Mao and his colleague Liu Shao-ch'i steadily increased as it became evident that Khrushchev was much more inclined to think in terms of practicality than in terms of doctrine. One sensed that by maintaining a certain dignified detachment, Mao sought to counterbalance the impression of road show politics left throughout much of South Asia by the antics of Messrs. "B. and K."

The Chinese Communists approved Russian actions in Hungary, and Khrushchev guaranteed support for China's efforts to "liberate" Formosa, but Mao—in a vein which the Russians could not accept—wrote about "contradictions" inherent in even a Communist government's relations with the people, and other Chinese writers began asserting that China, through a series of telescoping processes, could achieve full communism within the span of a few years—with the implication

⁷ Ch'en Po-ta, *Stalin and The Chinese Revolution*, New China News Agency, December 19, 1949.

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that it would be ahead of Russia. There is no evidence that the Chinese Communists were particularly perturbed by Soviet Russian objections to these twists in Communist dogma.

Meanwhile on levels of practical policy, Mao and his colleagues were giving rise to further speculations. At the time of the Middle Eastern crisis in the summer of 1958, Khrushchev, in a letter to President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Macmillan and Premier de Gaulle, called for an extraordinary session of the U.N. General Assembly. After conferring with Mao in Peking, however, the Soviet Premier almost immediately reversed himself, and this led many observers to conclude that Peking had placed an uncompromising veto on Mr. Khrushchev's sitting down at the same table with representatives of the Chinese Nationalist Government.

Over the last year and a half Khrushchev has also been critical of Chinese efforts to force the peasantry into communes. At a time when the Soviet Union has been trying to liberalise the living conditions of its own people somewhat, the Chinese effort looks unpleasantly radical. It is also possible, though not easy to document, that at least some Soviet leaders may consider Chinese Communist policies of aggression and expansion in various border regions entirely too risky at a time when one misstep may lead to an expansion of conflict and even to the outbreak of nuclear war. Certainly there is a Russian "man-in-the-street" tendency to view the Chinese as disagreeably Spartan and disturbingly adventurous.

The crux of the matter may be that the Soviet Union and China are moving through wholly different stages of revolutionary development. In this connection we might argue, in highly oversimplified fashion, that if y represents a people's perception of conditions as they are and x represents their perception of what ought to be, then $x-y=T$, which stands for strain or dissatisfaction or tension. Thus we might conclude that in China the gap between x and y is still painfully wide, whereas in the United States the "is" as perceived by many Americans seems almost good enough to serve as the "ought to be." On this scale we might place the Soviet Union in an intermediate position—but with very real possibilities for steadily closing their $x-y$ gap during the next ten or fifteen years.

If there is any validity in this argument, then we might expect China and the Soviet Union to find it increasingly difficult to co-ordinate their policies over the foreseeable future. For one thing, the Chinese "ought to be" includes acquisition of islands and border regions that look out of reach unless the *status quo* is violently disturbed. Beyond this, Western demographers predict a billion Chinese by 1980, or thereabouts, and unless the People's Republic works a miracle, the régime

will have to maintain a forced march at double quick time if production is going to close the $x-y$ gap substantially. We might predict with some confidence, then, that whereas the Russians have prospects for very tangible satisfactions in the not-too-far-distant future, the Chinese are likely to encounter further frustrations both domestically and in their foreign relations. One need not predict an open Sino-Soviet rupture in foreseeing frictions of very considerable intensity.

Frustration, aggression, interference with aggression, more frustration and further aggression at the risk even of nuclear war—such is the vicious circle that is likely to be repeated for the Chinese unless they and the Russians and the world at large can find some honourable and effective way for them to break out of their very real and humiliating and dangerous dilemmas.

Palo Alto.

November 1959.

China and Asia

By GUY WINT

THE foreign policy of Communist China was born in the loess caves of Yen-an during the period 1935-45. For the first time after years of fighting, the Communists had leisure for reflection. Their government began to be a magnet for the younger members of the intelligentsia who repudiated the Kuomintang because the Kuomintang had proved unable to defend China's national interests; they were willing to try Communism as the cure for Imperialism. Already the Communist leaders were confident that in the long run they would come to power. In Yen-an, in lectures and seminars, they built up concepts and the world picture which, with surprisingly little modification, have governed their foreign policy ever since.¹

The Communists were handicapped by lack of books, lack of first-hand knowledge of the outside world, and predispositions which they could not overcome. Their picture was the orthodox Marxist one—wicked imperialist powers exploiting Asia, distorting its civilisation, preventing its growth.

Even in the earliest time, one other important factor was present though it was one which was usually felt emotionally rather than expressed precisely. Interwoven with Marxism was a purely national complacency, an assumption that China was destined once again to be the Middle Kingdom of Asia (if not of all the world) and that one result of Communism would be to bring this about. The conviction was that if China went Communist, much of the rest of Asia would necessarily be dragged along with it. These double strands of thought were symbolised in the personality of Mao Tse-tung—Marxist but poet, Communist theoretician but romantic, apostle of domestic reform but inflexible nationalist.

The outstanding feature in the Communist world picture was fear and hatred of America, symbolising in itself all the other aggressors against China. The hatred was based mainly on theory, since at this stage the Communists had hardly any contacts with Americans. But an event immediately after the end of the Japanese war was to influence them deeply. When the Japanese collapsed, there was a race between

¹ This formative first period of the Communist régime was described vividly by the first American journalist who made contact with the Communists, Edgar Snow. He is not an academic, and his books are sometimes treated too lightly as impressionistic sketches by a newspaperman. They will remain one of the indispensable documents for the history of that time.

the Kuomintang and the Communists to take delivery of the territory held by Japanese armies. The Communists hoped to gain Peking, Tientsin and other places in North China. But the Americans intervened and provided an air lift for the Kuomintang forces which thus got to these places first. This intensified the Communist conviction that America would always interfere in Asia, that it was the arch enemy of Asia's self-determination, and that it would support puppet Asian governments against the Asian peoples.

When the Communists set up their central government at Peking, the Americans had prudently sailed away from China.² America was weary of the mishaps which it had suffered in trying to prop up the Kuomintang. For a short time it was in the mood to take an indulgent line toward Chinese Communism. If the Communist Government had acted like an accommodating member of the family of nations, it would almost certainly have been recognised before long by America, as it was by Britain.

The Chinese Communists did not believe this. In their eyes, non-Communist Asia was so much territory lying vacant to be possessed by America for installing bases from which America would bring about the fall of Chinese Communism. They had no confidence in nationalist Asia. They did not believe that it was really free. It was at the service of the capitalists and imperialists, even if in a disguised way. Nehru was a running dog of the imperialists, as Gandhi had been before him. The only safety lay in propagating Communism to replace the Asian nationalist governments.

Peking supposed that its fears were confirmed by the Korean war. True, it cannot have believed the Communist propaganda that the war was really started by South Korea. But it certainly thought that America and its allies jumped at the opportunity of the war in order to break Communism in China. When the American forces drove back the North Korean army, and when Russia seemed likely to back out of the war, the Chinese took steps to defend what they construed as a threat to their frontiers. The Chinese military exertions which resulted were an explosion of revolutionary passion, like that of France in 1792 against the coalesced kings of Europe.

The period of the Korean war and the armistice negotiations had a fairly simple theme. China believed itself fighting for its life. Hence the savagery with which its government dealt with all the groups at

² Their going was watched and commented on by an historian of contemporary Asia, the Indian diplomat, Sardar K. M. Panikkar. In the preface to his book, *Asia and Western Dominance*, he says that he saw in the departure of the American warships from Shanghai the end of the period of the harrying of Asia by sea which had begun with the voyage of Vasco da Gama in 1498.

home which its heated imagination led it to suppose might be counter-revolutionary. The irony was that while China believed that there was a remorseless conspiracy against it, very few people in the West, and even fewer in Asia, desired more than to put an end to aggression in Korea itself. It is true that the United Nations forces went northwest beyond the old frontier between North and South at the 38th Parallel, but that was because it was supposed that aggression would occur again unless Korea was unified. There was no serious intention of carrying the war into China. China never realised how well the West had digested the lessons of Japan's military misadventures in China. The country is like a deadly mass of cotton wool, easy to penetrate at first, but in the end suffocating its assailant. The Western countries were going to keep clear of that disaster. Their Korean operation had been intended against Russia; it was the period when everybody was obsessed with the containment of Russia. When Russia did not take up their challenge, they were content. The hornets' nest of China they had stirred up unwittingly. The general desire was that the hornets should be killed, but there was little serious plan of destroying their nest, though special interests and Chiang Kai-shek from Formosa did their best to encourage this.

During the negotiations at the United Nations to prevent the Korean war from widening, China began to discover the sympathies of nationalist Asia. In the eyes of non-Communist Asia, China was less a Communist state than a leading Asian Power which had been long oppressed, and which at last was regaining the power "to quell the mighty of the earth, the oppressor, the proud and boisterous force of sinful men." In this, Communist China played a part curiously similar to that of Japan just after it had defeated Russia in 1905. At least a part of free Asia—and even the most Westernised part—began to regard China as carrying a banner for all Asia.

In particular, China discovered India. India was already practising positive neutralism. Its diplomacy helped to rob the Korean war of many of its dangers. Communist China, watching India at work, became aware that not all the countries outside the Communist *bloc* were necessarily its enemies. It saw that a neutralised *bloc* could be directed against the West. The group of countries in Asia which desired to be left alone, which eschewed alliances, which wished not to be caught up in the power struggle, could in part be turned into an instrument by which means China could play a dominant part on the world stage.

How Chinese foreign policy is made remains a secret. But it is likely that the discovery of the uses of neutralism was made by Chou En-lai and his entourage of American-educated and sophisticated young men. Chou En-lai is a crucial figure in the Chinese revolution, a kind of

Chinese Talleyrand. Westerners feel that they understand him better than they do the other Chinese; they feel that he must therefore understand them, and realise that their intentions are less black than China apparently believes. In fact, he is as determined a revolutionary as the more fanatical members of the Chinese Government. But he is suave, flexible, pliable, imaginative. The skill which he had learned in surviving personally in the faction fights in the Chinese Communist Party and in climbing to the top, he now applied to enabling China to climb to the top in international diplomacy.

Though there is no firm evidence, it looks as if in the five years which followed the armistice in Korea, Chou was able to follow the international policy dictated by his instincts, with less interference than subsequently from party zealots. The method was simple. It was to play down China as a Communist or revolutionary power. It was to play up China as the good neighbour, the Asian patriot, sympathising with all the aspirations of the nation states of free Asia to live unentangled by plots of the Great Powers rising out of the world power struggle. By these means Chou hoped to win as allies of China a group of forces much stronger, at least at the present time, than the Communist Parties of Asia. China as the friend and champion of the neutralised block was more formidable to the West than China as overt revolutionary crusader.

The period was marked by the triumphal appearance of Chou En-lai at two international conferences. At the Geneva conference of 1954 on Korea and Indo-China he seemed to radiate the spirit of statesmanlike accommodation. This was because he came there just after Mr. Dulles had engaged in brinkmanship which had scared America's allies, because the world did not know what to do, and because it was relieved to find that China, which by its supply of arms had made possible the success of Ho Chi Minh, was willing to compromise. As a result of the conference, Viet Nam was partitioned, and Chou En-lai gained the reputation of a man who, though a hard bargainer, could be dealt with as a partner in sustaining the world's peace.

Even more spectacular was his appearance a year later at the Bandung conference of the Afro-Asian countries. Here he was among the neutralist governments whom he had particularly set himself to woo. The conference gave him the opportunity to demonstrate China's friendship dramatically and at the same time to quell the lingering suspicion among the neutralist countries that China was only pretending to be their friend, and that by nature it was imperialist. How much more effective was this platform, which was organised not by China itself but by the neutralist countries, than had been the Peace Conference of Asian and Pacific Peoples in Peking in October 1952, which had

been organised by the Chinese and which was recognised as a convention of stooges. Chou En-lai stole the Bandung conference; he was more prominent than Mr. Nehru, who had been expected to be its chief personality. Chou En-lai dealt with dignity and patience with attacks on China from Pakistan, Ceylon and Turkey; it was conveyed that these countries were being used by America as its intruding pawns. He breathed conciliation. He would not be provoked into recrimination. He was ready to settle with any Asian country the status of overseas Chinese,³ overseas subversion,⁴ and any other matter which caused friction with China. He was affable and approachable. He used the conference as a platform for offering to negotiate with America over Formosa and thus to relieve world tension.

In addition to these spectacular conference performances, Chou published jointly with Nehru the famous Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.⁵ For years these were to be the passport of China for winning the confidence of neutralist countries. They were to ensure that, whatever the West might say about China, its strictures would be regarded by much of the world as propaganda. If the West saw a growing competition between China and India for influence, that was the malevolent West trying to turn Asian brothers against one another. Was not China an apostle of coexistence? And did not the West go in for cold war? The Five Principles put the West in the wrong, China in the right. Whatever the enormities in its domestic affairs, China internationally was given a clean ticket by most of the countries of free Asia.

Peking rammed home its advantage with extensive propaganda in Asian countries and exchanges of visits both at top and "popular" level. The leaders of India, Indonesia, Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Cambodia, Laos, and other countries visited Peking; Chou En-lai returned the compliment during an Asian tour in late 1956 and early 1957. China even granted small doses of aid to Cambodia, Nepal and Ceylon, notwithstanding its own backwardness.

The policy brought success. But the policy was eventually to be changed, and ever since, there has been speculation about the reason for the change. To see clearly the lines of Chinese policy is often

³ A dual nationality treaty dealing with the status of Chinese in Indonesia was signed by Chou during the course of the conference.

⁴ The Chinese Premier rejected the idea that the Thai autonomous area in Yunnan province had been established with ulterior motives and compared it with the Shan states in Burma. He invited the Thai Government to send a delegation to see for themselves.

⁵ These were (1) Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) non-aggression; (3) non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; (5) peaceful coexistence and economic co-operation. These principles were written into the Sino-Indian treaty on Tibet, concluded in April 1954.

hard, because of the murk of propaganda from Peking which overlays it. But from some time in 1957, other countries began to sense a new temper in Peking—first the Western countries, when they were told that the East Wind was prevailing over the West Wind, and then the Asian countries as well.

China's interests had grown wider. It had intervened in Europe. It supported Mr. Khrushchev in the intervention in Hungary. In 1958 it jogged Mr. Khrushchev to take a stiffer line about Yugoslav revisionism. It fears especially the extension of Titoism in Asia and therefore calls on Russia to strangle it in the land of its birth. Revisionism might prove especially attractive to Communist parties in the countries of free Asia. Most of these have known the benefits of liberal institutions, and their Communists might welcome a way of conserving some elements of liberalism in Communism.

The reason for change in Peking may have been also that the less flexible leaders of the government asked fundamental questions about what lay behind China's diplomatic successes. It is guesswork, but it is plausible. China's most immediate aim, they may have argued, was the extinction of Kuomintang government in Formosa—an aim they had pursued using alternately belligerence and blandishments. Formosa was not a danger in itself, but it gave America an entry into the heart of China. The Communist régime was not safe until America was forced far away from China and its links with an organised Chinese political authority were finally cut. The policy of conciliation in Asia in spite of all its opportunist gains had brought China no nearer at all to achieving this supreme aim.

Whether Peking was also mortified by its failure to gain entrance to the United Nations is doubtful. There is an old State Department joke that the three countries which are against China's admission to the United Nations are America, Russia and China: America for obvious reasons, Russia because it does not want its dissensions with China to become apparent in the Security Council, and China because it does not want to give up its grievances against America. The annual black-balling of China at the United Nations meetings has helped China a great deal in keeping the sympathies of India and other Asian countries. But, however this may be, the United Nations issue probably did not weigh like the Formosa issue in causing China to adopt a tougher line.

In February 1958 Chou En-lai ceased to be Foreign Minister. He kept his post as Prime Minister. At the time it was supposed that the change was formal. The Foreign Minister has a great many trivial duties, such as going to the airfield to receive visiting Communist dignitaries and presiding over theatrical and artistic exhibitions brought to Peking by friendly countries. Chou En-lai might well have wished to devolve

these duties while at the same time as first Minister retaining supreme authority over foreign policy. This may have been the correct explanation. The fact that the policy changed does not necessarily mean that Chou was eclipsed. Chou, with his intellectual flexibility, may have decided that the time had come for new methods. But equally well he may have had to give way before a new sense of strength in the Chinese Government. Conciliation may have seemed to be the policy of the weak. China was now strong. It no longer needed to placate lesser countries.

As time has passed, the new China, while remaining Marxist, has fitted more clearly into the rhythmic pattern of Chinese history. A dynasty falls, because of internal social problems. There is a period of anarchy. The frontiers are unmanned, and the barbarians make invasions. Then comes the rise of a new dynasty. The armies are reorganised, the frontiers pushed back. Once again, China is the Middle Kingdom with a row of peripheral countries gladly acknowledging its suzerainty and feeding at the fount of Chinese civilisation.

Probably most of the leaders in Peking would deny that the Communist régime is re-enacting the typical early years of the start of a new and powerful dynasty. The leaders are exponents of double or treble think. Their intelligences ignore what their instincts are dictating. They still believe that the revolution has made all things new and that China has made a complete break with its past. That there is a break with many old traditions is certain; but the break is relative. In foreign policy it is the least complete.

The Chinese believe that it is right that they should occupy their former frontiers at their maximum extent. They believe that it is natural that most other Asian countries should at best be clients of China and should not pretend to equality with it. They believe that Russia, whose philosophy they have borrowed, must recognise China's equality. Over the long run their attitude towards Russia may harden. Before the Chinese revolution, Chinese scholars, quoting Bismarck's observation that all Great Powers had hereditary enemies, used often to say that the really mortal and persevering enemy of China was not Japan or the sea marauders from Europe but the land power in the north, Russia, which had overrun so much of Asian territory which should rightfully be China's. One doubts if Mao Tse-tung has forgotten that the Soviet satellite Outer Mongolia was once part of China. If and when China feels that it no longer needs a Russian alliance, this instinctive belief may once more show itself. When it does so, it will encounter a jumbled mood in Russia which is prepared for it. Travellers to Moscow and Leningrad report that Russians are casting wary eyes at the latest menace that is arising in the East.

These new attitudes in China are really the flowering of the seed sown in Yenan a quarter of a century ago. The intelligentsia took to Communism because, after trying other political ideas of the West, they were willing to try Communism as a means of restoring the greatness to which China was historically accustomed. The time has apparently now come for reaping the harvest. Mr. Nehru has perceived this. China in its new mood, he says, is carried away by the "pride and arrogance of might."

Thus, old China is back again. It suffers from a kind of diplomatic solipsism. Its present leaders lack the modern imagination of a man like Mr. Khrushchev, the quick understanding of an international situation, and the sense of belonging to a world community which Mr. Khrushchev, for all his Marxism, clearly possesses.

This was less apparent in the suppression of Tibetan autonomy last March than in the subsequent attacks on the Indian frontier. Over Tibet, China's hands were forced. The revolt of the Khambas had become slowly more formidable. China could not afford to sit still and "let its beard be shook with danger." To reassert itself may have seemed worth the obloquy which it incurred from its assault on a country which, to China's ill fortune, was regarded by much of Asia as a kind of huge religious shrine.

The quarrel with India over the Tibetan-Indian frontier was taken up at a time of China's own choosing. It was begun deliberately. Peking may have had provocation. It was far angrier than the world realised at Nehru's harbouring of the Dalai Lama, which it regarded, probably sincerely, as a breach of the Five Principles. Moreover, it has a legal case—a better case than most people recognise, since they have not bothered to read the documents. But its decision at the present time to press its case so resolutely was surprising, to say the least.

China's claim is for some thousands of square miles, either (as in Ladakh) impossibly mountainous and hardly inhabited, or else (as near the MacMahon line) mostly jungle. If this territory in the past had great strategic value, today in an age of atomic warfare it has very much less—though it must always be remembered that atomic warfare has not yet come to Asia. If China gained all its demands, it would win prestige, and this might cause the border states on the Indian frontier to switch from being dependent on India to being dependent on China. It would make it easier for China to filter agents into India. These are solid advantages, if China has chosen to regard India as an adversary. But they would be won at a price. All free Asia is alarmed. Peking has forfeited its claims to be the champion of Asian neutralism.

The inference is that the present Chinese leadership is more anachronistic than was supposed. Instead of concentrating on a great

diplomatic design, using the machinery of the Communist parties throughout Asia, and attaching itself to a Communist ideology especially revised to suit Asian peoples, it has allowed its interests to be diverted into quarrels over old frontiers.

Other interpretations are possible. Peking may have decided that Indian pretensions to be its equal and competitor in Asia are no longer tolerable. Nehru himself has suggested that Peking wants to punish India for being "uppish." Peking looks suspiciously at the Delhi-Moscow axis. It does not forgive India for having been proposed by Mr. Khrushchev for a summit conference last year when China was excluded. Peking may have decided that India must be humiliated as the first step to China's open bid for Asian dominance. If so, its diplomacy is almost certainly bad. As a consort of China, India could have continued to be of great usefulness to Peking.

It is possible that Peking wants to bring about the downfall of Nehru. It might well do this. National feeling is very strong in India. If Nehru should seem to be giving way to China, the nationalism which created and sustained him might finally destroy him; Nehru's enemies who have wanted to attack him for his domestic policies, but did not dare do so because public opinion was behind him, would find him easily assailable if he is considered not sufficiently nationalist. Peking might be happy to see him go. By old tradition Communism prefers to be opposed by right-wing governments than by social-democratic ones: they can be more easily subverted by propaganda. But once again, if this is Peking's aim, it is pursuing a lesser advantage and throwing away a very great one. India's friendship was a major asset.

Probably the Chinese Government will moderate its attitude towards India. Its aim may be to stake out its claim, and then to entangle India in negotiation, convinced that it is a more subtle, patient, tenacious negotiator and will win in the end. But by the manner as much as by the substance of its actions, China has already damaged itself, probably irretrievably. Most of free Asia now regards it as imperialist. Peking no longer seems to mind. It may calculate that if its neighbours in Asia now fear it, there is little to be gained in cultivating their love. But here again, it may miscalculate. For if China moves out of the affections of left-wing Asia, Russia will be very willing to move in. And over the long run, Peking certainly does not wish to see a much enhanced Russian influence in Asia.

A country to which China is continuously attentive is Japan. In the eyes of Peking, Japan is a gigantic and much more dangerous Formosa. It is the great base of America in Asia. Somehow America must be forced out. The situation is potentially promising for China. The Japanese, who have reacted sharply against militarism, are anxious

to avoid being used by America in a war against China; they want Chinese trade; there is the ancient and still strong cultural fascination of China.

But the Chinese have played their hand badly. Persistently they have tried to intervene in Japanese domestic politics, throwing their weight against the government. They have tried too openly to barter improved trade against changes in Japan's foreign policy. So far the Chinese have defeated themselves in Japan. For the rest of the world this is an encouraging sign that the Chinese may often fail because of maladroitness, even when conditions are in their favour.

South-east Asia is another sphere of special interest for Peking. It seems to be the destined area for Chinese imperialism. Twenty years ago Professor Toynbee predicted a struggle between China and India to become predominant there when Western empires were wound up. The Chinese have the advantage that in a number of these countries there are sizeable communities of overseas Chinese who may be organised as fifth columnists. While China was pursuing its Bandung policy, it made headway in winning confidence. Even when it sent troops into the Wa states in the summer of 1956, it did so soft-footedly so that the Burmese were lulled and were content when China agreed to negotiate. Opinion in the area condemned the creation of SEATO as wanton provocation of China by America. Since the change of policy, China has forfeited this good will, even in Indonesia where the government has always been particularly friendly. Indeed, Peking's aggressiveness towards Jakarta has been at least as surprising as its attack on India. Because Indonesia introduced regulations to restrict the business of Chinese traders, Chou En-lai upbraided its Foreign Minister in Peking as if he were a Chinese satrap.

In recent years China has become increasingly active in the Middle East. Here again the switch in line is noticeable, for after some years of friendly relations with Egypt, Peking went as far as comparing Colonel Nasser with Chiang Kai-shek for his anti-Communist activities in the spring of 1959. One of its objects may be economic: as China becomes industrialised, it may rely more on Middle East oil. This is a widening of China's interests, outside the traditional concerns of the Chinese empire. How Peking will conduct this adventure, whether it will lead it to collide with its ally Russia, is not yet clear. But it is noticeable that the two Powers already adopt different attitudes towards the Algerian rebels, Mr. Khrushchev's cautious approval of President de Gaulle's policies contrasting oddly with Peking's wholehearted backing for the rebel "government" which it officially recognises.

It is hard to interpret China's foreign policy. It is often conducted

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in peculiar ways. It is accompanied by a barrage of propaganda more vituperative but more imaginative than Russia's. Policy has to be read between the lines of this propaganda and between the lines of newspaper articles. The best guide is at the receiving end: the attitudes and sentiments of the countries with which China has most to do. Delhi's change of mood towards China is more revealing than anything else which has happened. China is now the dangerous aggressor, no longer the standard-bearer for Asia. Nothing at the moment suggests that China is capable of cancelling out its recent complacent self-assertion and of reverting to the role of good neighbour. The fires of the Chinese revolution are still burning unlike those of the Russian revolution; and a revolutionary simply cannot believe in coexistence, even if for a brief time he has managed to wear a mask.

London.

November 1959.

DEBATE

Part 1: The Legend of "Maoism"

By KARL A. WITTFOGEL

How original is Mao Tse-tung? The answer is of interest beyond the bounds of academic studies of Chinese Communism, for it must affect appraisals of the future course of Peking's policies. Prof. Wittfogel contends that Mao's basic strategy can be traced back to Marx and Lenin. In our next issue, in which we will print the second half of "The Legend of 'Maoism'," Prof. Benjamin Schwartz will take a different view. We are grateful to the New Leader for permitting Prof. Wittfogel to elaborate on an article printed in it.

1

A NUMBER of months ago I discussed in an article¹ some conceptual weaknesses in the study of Chinese Communism. To illustrate my point, I briefly reviewed the "Maoist" thesis—the claim that Mao Tse-tung, in 1927 and subsequently, violated basic principles of orthodox Marxist-Leninist Communism.

The response to my article was instructive in several respects. There were relatively few comments on my criticism of our conceptual weaknesses. This strengthened my conviction that the methodological aspect of the matter still arouses little concern. And there were many comments on my criticism of the "Maoist" thesis. Although highly encouraging, these comments strengthened my conviction that the "Maoist" arguments are much more widely known than the reasons for their rejection.²

¹ *New Leader*, issue of July 22/27, 1959, New York. I am indebted to the *New Leader* for permitting me to reproduce parts of this article here.

² See, for instance, Peter S. H. Tang, "Stalin's Role in the Communist Victory in China," *American Slavic and East European Review* XIII, No. 3 (October 1954), pp. 375-388; *idem*, *Communist China Today* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 74 *et seq.*; Richard L. Walker, *China Under Communism: The First Five Years* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), pp. 20, 153; *ibid.*, *The Continuing Struggle. Communist China and the Free World* (New York: Athene Press, Inc.), 1958, p. 110; Franz H. Michael and George E. Taylor, *The Far East in the Modern World* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1956), p. 414 *et seq.*; Karl A. Wittfogel, "The Influence of Leninism-Stalinism on China," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (September 1951), p. 28 *et seq.* (hereafter cited as Wittfogel 1951); *ibid.*, "The Communist Strategy in Asia," the *New Leader*, February 15, 1954 (hereafter cited as Wittfogel 1954); *ibid.*, "Short History of Chinese Communism," in *Handbook on China*, edited by Hellmut Wilhelm under

It is not necessary here to demonstrate how the "Maoist" thesis derived, and differed from, the earlier proposition that since 1927 the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) became essentially a peasant party.³ Suffice it to say that in substance the "Maoist" thesis was first outlined in 1947 by John K. Fairbank; that Prof. Fairbank was the "teacher and guide" of Benjamin Schwartz,⁴ who in 1951 coined the term "Maoism" and elaborated on its meaning; that Prof. Fairbank fulfilled editorial functions in the preparation of the *Documentary History of Chinese Communism*,⁵ a collection of documents with explanatory introductions mainly written by Prof. Schwartz and Conrad Brandt⁶ and published in 1952; and that in 1958 Prof. Fairbank reasserted the "Maoist" thesis without considering recent findings that controvert his interpretation.

The "Maoist" thesis is formulated in various ways, but its semantic core is simple. It claims heretical originality for a Communist power strategy based essentially on peasant support, which Mao is said to have initiated in 1927 and which was indeed employed in China from the winter of 1927-28 to 1947.

In 1948 Prof. Fairbank pointed to "one seeming anomaly of Chinese Marxism," namely, "its use of a peasant movement as the class basis for revolution." This view, he tells us, deviated "from the early Marxist dogma" and also from Lenin and Trotsky: "The Chinese Communists were obliged . . . to build their movement on a peasant base. For fifteen years Chinese Communism has been a peasant, not a proletarian, movement. In this respect it follows the Chinese tradition of revolution more than the Marxist."⁷

Prof. Schwartz's 1951 study personalised the thesis. He argues that Mao laid the foundation for his unorthodox policy in a *Report on an Investigation of the Hunan Peasant Movement*, written in February 1927. This Report, he contends, carries "the constant implication that the

commission from The Human Relations Area Files for the United States Army, Chap. V, A (MS. hereafter cited as Short History); *ibid.*, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 442 (hereafter cited as Wittfogel 1957); *ibid.*, "Die Bauern," Chap. 11 of *Handbuch des Welt-Kommunismus* (Freiburg/München: Karl Alber—American edition to be published soon by Frederick A. Praeger), 1958, p. 456 *et seq.*

³ Owen Lattimore, *Solution in Asia* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1957), p. 108; Harold R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1938), p. 404 (hereafter cited as Isaacs 1938). Isaacs elaborated the Trotskyist view, about which see more below.

⁴ Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), Acknowledgments (hereafter cited as Schwartz 1951).

⁵ Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 27 (hereafter cited as *Documentary History*).

⁶ *Documentary History*, p. 27.

⁷ John King Fairbank, *The United States and China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 260 *et seq.*

peasantry itself will be the main force of the Chinese revolution."⁸ It "looks to the village as the key centre of revolutionary action," and in a "most remarkable statement," it ascribes to the peasants 70 per cent. of the accomplishments in the democratic revolution, while conceding only 30 per cent. to "the urban dwellers and the military."⁹ For these reasons the Report is "an implicit attack on the whole Comintern line."¹⁰ The "Maoist" strategy constituted "a heresy in act," which although it was "never made explicit in theory,"¹¹ was in reality a heresy against one of the "vital core presuppositions of Marxism-Leninism."¹²

In a similar vein the *Documentary History* presents the Hunan Report as reflecting the gist of the "Maoist" policy: it is "one of the clearest portraits of 'Maoism' in its formative stage."¹³ On the basis of the Hunan Report Maoism can be reduced "to a simple syllogism. The 'revolutionary vanguard' in Marxist-Leninist parlance invariably stands for the urban proletariat. The 'revolutionary vanguard' in Mao's Report stands, on the other hand, for the poor peasantry. By implication, the urban proletariat is thus equated to the poor peasantry. Precisely this equation constitutes the theoretical basis of Mao's rise to power. Having lost control of the urban workers (the proletariat in the orthodox sense of the word), the Chinese Communists, under Mao, eventually found a new 'proletariat' in the poor peasantry as organised and led by themselves."¹⁴

Schwartz maintains that Mao's heretic political trend appears in the Hunan Report in a significant terminological deviation. The suggestion that in a revolution such as the Chinese the peasants may be "the main force" supposedly disregards the strictures which Marxism-Leninism puts on the independent revolutionary role of the peasants.¹⁵ Indeed, "there is a huge abyss between the proposition that the agrarian revolution is the *main content* of the revolution and Mao's proposition that the peasantry is the *main force* of the revolution."¹⁶

Supposedly Marx, Engels and the early Lenin assigned no "creative" revolutionary role to the peasants. And Lenin, who in 1905 modified the original Marxist position, gave them only a limited role—as an "auxiliary" to the revolutionary proletariat of the cities.¹⁷

⁸ Schwartz 1951: 76.

⁹ *Op. cit.* p. 75.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.* p. 77 *et seq.*

¹¹ *Op. cit.* p. 191.

¹² *Op. cit.* p. 199.

¹³ *Documentary History*, p. 77.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.* p. 79.

¹⁵ Schwartz 1951, p. 76.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.* p. 78. Italics in original.

¹⁷ Schwartz 1951, p. 118; *Documentary History*, p. 79.

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The student of the Marxism-Leninism will be puzzled by these statements. In particular he will be puzzled by an appraisal of Mao's orthodoxy, which stresses Lenin's 1905 position without noting the changes he made in 1906 and without explaining the new peasant strategy which he devised after 1917 in response to the new historical situation: the rise of a Communist dictatorship in the Soviet Union and the rapid growth of Communist movements, not only in the classical areas of industrial capitalism, but also in the "colonial and semi-colonial" countries of the East.

By voicing these objections, I do not imply that the work of the Maoist group is without merit. In his 1951 monograph Prof. Schwartz assembles many important facts on the history of Chinese Communism; and he draws attention to significant problems. The *Documentary History*, through its translations, provides the non-sinological reader with certain texts that are not otherwise available in any Western language.

Unfortunately these assets are in large part vitiated by an inadequate understanding of the doctrinal and political Marxist-Leninist background, a deficiency that results in an inadequate selection of texts in the *History* and an inadequate interpretation of events in both publications. I am thinking particularly of the *History's* treatment of the First United Front (1923-27), the Chinese Communist attitude toward the first phase of the Japanese invasion (1931-35), the initiation of a second United Front policy in 1935, the Chinese Communist attitude after Munich and during the Hitler-Stalin Pact.¹⁸ Here, however, I shall concentrate on the doctrinal background of the "Maoist" issue, the Communist peasant policy that was initiated by Marx and Engels and developed—and radically altered—by Lenin in 1906 and 1920.

3

Even an elliptical presentation of the original Marxist peasant policy must report its significant socio-historical differentiations. Marx and Engels certainly considered the peasants incapable of organising or leading their political struggle¹⁹; and, under the conditions of the Socialist revolution, they deemed them Conservative and even reactionary.²⁰ But they believed that the peasants had an essential revolutionary role in the anti-feudal bourgeois revolutions of the West

¹⁸ See Short History, *passim*.

¹⁹ Karl Marx, *Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte* (Stuttgart: J. H. Dietz, 1920), p. 102.

²⁰ Communist Manifesto, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Werke-Schriften-Briefe* (Moscow: Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, 1927 *et seq.*) I, 6, p. 535 (hereafter cited as MEJA).

and in the anti-despotic (Orientially despotic) bourgeois revolution of a semi-Asiatic country in transition, such as Tsarist Russia.

Marx briefly hinted at the first point,²¹ and Engels made both points in 1875 and 1892 respectively. In 1875 Engels described the Russian peasants as the main *socio*-revolutionary element in the struggle against Tsarist despotism.²² And in 1892 he spoke of the crucial function the peasants had performed in three great European bourgeois revolutions, the German in the sixteenth century, the English in the seventeenth century, and the French in the eighteenth century: "In all the three great bourgeois risings, the peasantry furnishes the army that has to do the fighting." It was the peasantry—usually aided by the urban plebeians—that assured the success of these bourgeois revolutions by pushing them to "the bitter end." "This seems, in fact, to be one of the laws of evolution of bourgeois society."²³ Marx even suggested that peasant participation might decide the victory in a combined anti-capitalist and anti-feudal revolution. In 1856 he wrote to Engels that the revolutionary prospects in Germany "will depend on the possibility to *back the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasants war*."²⁴

Thus, contrary to the opinion of the "Maoist" group, the fathers of "scientific socialism" were convinced that the peasants could be a fighting force of crucial importance in "bourgeois revolutions" and even in revolutions that were led by the proletariat, but that still had to fulfil certain tasks of a "bourgeois" revolution. Hence, Lenin eagerly cited both of them after he had proclaimed a revolutionary strategy that depended for its success on peasant support.²⁵ But while developing his new policy, he introduced a new operational idea, which sharply deviated from the original Marxist position. Since the members of the "Maoist" group have referred to this idea as an element of the "Maoist" policy without recognising its heretic character (heretic from the standpoint of original Marxism), we shall identify it briefly.

Marx and Engels considered the desire of the peasants and other lower middle class elements to perpetuate their economic existence as

²¹ See, e.g., his letter to Engels of July 27, 1854 (MEGA III, 2, p. 47).

²² As the main *national*-revolutionary element he mentioned the Poles. See Friedrich Engels, "IV: Soziales aus Russland (Volksstaat, 1875)," in *Internationales aus dem Volksstaat* (1871-75) (Berlin, 1894), p. 48.

²³ Frederick Engels, *Socialism. Utopian and Scientific*, translated by Edward Aveling (New York: International Publishers, 1935), p. 18.

²⁴ MEGA III, 2, p. 131 *et seq.* Marx wrote the italicised words in English in the otherwise German letter.

²⁵ In 1908 Lenin approvingly and at length cited Engels' idea that in the three great bourgeois revolutions the peasants had provided the fighting army (W. I. Lenin, *Sämtliche Werke* (Wien-Berlin, Moscow-Leningrad), Vol. XII, p. 254 (hereafter cited as Lenin, SWG)). In 1914, he reproduced Marx' 1856 notion about the dependence of a successful German proletarian revolution on a second edition of the peasant war (V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, 12 vols. [New York: International Publishers], 1943 *et seq.*, Vol. XI, p. 40 [hereafter cited as Lenin, SWJ]).

conservative and even reactionary; and they maintained this view to the end of their lives. In 1894 Engels expressly warned the revolutionary socialists not to appeal to the peasants by making concessions to their proprietary instincts. Such a policy was nothing but cheap demagoguery, worthy only of the "anti-Semites."²⁶

4

Lenin shared this orthodox Marxian position during the first part of his career.²⁷ He still upheld it in 1905 when he began outlining the idea of a new type of bourgeois-democratic revolution, which, headed by a small proletariat, would receive its mass support from the peasants. Despite his desire to win the peasants to his cause in 1905, he still continued to reject the policy of safeguarding the small peasant holdings as "a reactionary petty bourgeois Utopia."²⁸ He urged the Socialists to co-operate with the peasants in the anti-landlord revolution "without . . . betraying our scientific conscience, without striving after cheap popularity."²⁹ And he branded the policy that promised the peasants economic improvements without explaining the political prerequisites for a genuine improvement as the method of "political swindlers."³⁰

However, at the close of 1905 he became aware of how little attraction his new programme (confiscation of the landed estates, but not redistribution) had for the peasants.³¹ And in 1906 he made a fateful turnabout. He now announced that after the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution the newly established government—a "revolutionary democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants"—would distribute the land to the peasants and thus initiate a rural development American style, that is, with flourishing small farmers' economy.³² The lengths to which he was ready to go in this new demagogic appeal are indicated by his willingness to call the to-be-created revolutionary bourgeois-democratic government "a farmers' republic,"³³ a "peasant (farmer) republic."³⁴

In the spring of 1917 Lenin scrapped his programme to redistribute

²⁶ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951), Vol. II, p. 392 *et seq.*

²⁷ See his reference to Engels' "anti-Semite" formula in the discussion of the first agrarian programme of the Russian Social-Democrats in 1902 (Lenin, SWG V, p. 40; *cf.* p. 125 and IV, 1, p. 115).

²⁸ Lenin, SWG VIII, p. 349.

²⁹ Lenin, SW III, p. 146.

³⁰ Lenin, SWG VII, p. 379.

³¹ See Lenin, SWG VIII, pp. 516 *et seq.*, 559, 657; *ibid.*, *Werke* (Berlin: J. H. Dietz), (Vol. X: November 1905–June 1906), 1958. Vol. X, p. 76 (hereafter cited as Lenin, *Werke*).

³² Lenin, *Werke* X, pp. 161 *et seq.*, 169, 188.

³³ Lenin, SW III, p. 258.

³⁴ Lenin, SWG XII, p. 361.

the land because he then considered the forces of the proletarian revolution so strong³⁵ that they could convert the confiscated estates directly into "model farms."³⁶ But when the "July demonstrations" revealed how weak these forces actually were, he reverted to the policy which he had been advocating in the preceding decade.³⁷ Lenin's pledge to maintain and augment the small peasant economy decisively aided the Bolsheviks in their struggle for dictatorial power, first in European Russia (which had a substantial industrial development) and also in such Central Asian areas as Turkestan which, according to his appraisal, maintained a predominantly pre-capitalist ("Oriental") way of life until 1917.³⁸

This double experience led Lenin to conclude that the slogan of land distribution could be widely used as a weapon in the Communist struggle for power.³⁹ It also led him to proclaim the crucial importance of the peasants for the Communist strategy in the colonial and semi-colonial "pre-capitalist" countries of the East. These concepts which Lenin presented sketchily before the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East on November 22, 1919,⁴⁰ and fully before the Second World Congress of the Comintern (July 19–August 7, 1920), were elaborated at two congresses of Eastern peoples, one held in Baku in September 1920, the other in Moscow in January 1922.

The new Leninist policy brought together the original Marxian idea of the peasantry as the main fighting force in bourgeois revolutions (especially: Engels, 1892), the appeal to the proprietary instincts of the peasants (Lenin, 1906) and the concept of a proletarian vanguard party whose "professional" members were characterised, not by their social origin—proletarian, bourgeois or petty-bourgeois—but by their Marxistically correct political consciousness, which enabled them to give proper guidance to the workers and other groups of toilers (Lenin, 1902).⁴¹

Lenin formulated the core ideas of his peasant strategy to meet the conditions of Tsarist Russia, where the Marxist party interacted with, and could rely on, the proletariat of a concentrated, if regionally limited, modern industry. His strategy was broadened and modified when the Communists in Inner Asia established dictatorial power (soviet governments) over populations composed in the main of peasants and other non-proletarian toilers.

³⁵ Lenin, SWG XX, 1, pp. 4, 25 and *passim*.

³⁶ Lenin, SWG XX, 1, pp. 108, 117, 527; XX, 2, pp. 9, 11 *et seq.*, 24 *et seq.*, 29 *et seq.*

³⁷ Lenin, SWG XXI, pp. 140 *et seq.*, 146, 175 and *passim*; XXII, p. 20 *et seq.*

³⁸ See below.

³⁹ Lenin, SWG XXV, p. 336 *et seq.*

⁴⁰ V. I. Lenin, *The National Liberation Movement in the East* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), p. 234 (hereafter cited as Lenin 1957).

⁴¹ Lenin, SWG IV, 2, pp. 159 *et seq.*, 169 *et seq.*, 251, 254, 276.

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On one occasion Lenin left it open whether "proletarian parties" could arise under "backward" Eastern conditions.⁴² But he was sure that "the *elements* of future proletarian [Communist] parties" existed "in *all* backward countries"; and these rudimentary groups could be "not merely Communist in name."⁴³ With proper direction they could "pursue Communist tactics and a Communist policy." But this could be done only if they had "definite relations with the peasant movement."⁴⁴

Developing his ideas at the Second Congress of the Communist International Lenin demanded that Comintern policy in "colonial and backward countries" involve three steps:

(1) We must . . . form *independent cadres of fighters, of Party organisations*, in all colonies and backward countries;

(2) We must . . . carry on propaganda in favour of organising *Peasant Soviets* and strive to adapt them to pre-capitalist conditions;

(3) The Communist International must lay down, and give the theoretical grounds for, the proposition that, with the aid of the proletariat of the most advanced countries, the backward countries may pass to the soviet system and, after passing through a definite stage of development, to Communism, without passing through the capitalist stage of development.⁴⁵

Remembering these directives, the reader will find it difficult to understand how Prof. Schwartz could have written that "nowhere in the whole body of Lenin's writings do we find a hint that the Communist Party can exist as an entity apart from its proletarian base."⁴⁶ Nor will he be satisfied with Schwartz's lame corrective in the last chapter of his book, that Lenin "speculated on the possibility of applying the form of soviets to 'backward' lands of Asia where the proletariat was presumed not to exist at all."⁴⁷ Lenin did not *speculate* on the possibility of peasant soviets in backward Eastern countries. He insisted that the Communist International "must" establish such soviets "in all colonies and backward countries," because Bolshevik experience *had shown* that this had been done successfully in former Tsarist colonies. In fact, the question was not whether, but "how to apply Communist tactics and policy amidst pre-capitalist conditions." Moreover, he tells us that under such conditions "we [the Communists] have undertaken and had to undertake the role of leader." And although this task was beset with "colossal difficulties," "the practical

⁴² Lenin, SW X, p. 240 *et seq.*

⁴³ Lenin, SW X, p. 237. *Italics mine.*

⁴⁴ Lenin, SW X, p. 241.

⁴⁵ Lenin, SW X, p. 243.

⁴⁶ Schwartz 1951, p. 192; *cf.* p. 119 *et seq.*

⁴⁷ Schwartz 1951, p. 196.

results of our work also revealed to us that, notwithstanding these difficulties, it is possible to rouse among the masses a striving for independent political thought and independent political activity,⁴⁸ even where there is almost no proletariat."⁴⁹

Shifting to the political aim, Lenin finds it "quite understandable that peasants who are in a state of semi-feudal dependence⁵⁰ can fully appreciate the idea of Soviet organisation and put it into practice. . . . The idea of Soviet organisation is a simple one and can be applied, not only to proletarian, but also to peasant, feudal and semi-feudal relations." In fact, the Comintern theses must indicate that "*Peasant Soviets*, soviets of the exploited, are a useful weapon, not only for capitalist countries, but also for countries in which pre-capitalist relations exist; and we must say that it is the *bounden duty* of the Communist Parties, and of those elements which are associated with them, to carry on propaganda in favour of the idea of Peasants' Soviets, of Toilers' Soviets everywhere, in backward countries and in colonies."⁵¹

Lenin kept stressing that the Comintern had as yet little experience in these matters. More data had to be collected.⁵² For reasons that need not be examined here he was eager to meet certain suggestions made by the Indian Communist, M. N. Roy, regarding the anti-imperialist struggle in the colonies. Roy's supplementary theses ("written mainly from the point of view of the situation in India")⁵³ placed greater emphasis on the native proletariat⁵⁴ and spoke of the to-be-established revolutionary governments as "soviets of *workers* and *peasants*."⁵⁵

But while Lenin accepted Roy's suggestions, including the proposal that the "bourgeois-democratic" movements be called "nationalist-revolutionary" movements,⁵⁶ he preferred the formula "Peasant Soviets" for colonial and backward countries. He used this formula on July 17 in his major speech on the International Situation and the Fundamental Tasks of the Communist International, inserting it in a paragraph that mentions only British and French colonies and that specifies only one colonial country, India.⁵⁷ And he used it again on July 26 when he announced that the commission dealing with the national and colonial question had unanimously adopted Roy's amendments.⁵⁸ It was Lenin's, and not Roy's, concept that the Comintern

⁴⁸ In this context, obviously: Communist-led thought and activity.

⁴⁹ Lenin, SW X, p. 242. *Italics mine.*

⁵⁰ For the doctrinal problems connected with the Communist use of the term "feudal," see Wittfogel 1957, p. 379 *et seq.*

⁵¹ Lenin, SW X, p. 242. *Italics mine.*

⁵² Lenin, SW X, p. 242 *et seq.*

⁵³ Lenin, SW X, p. 240.

⁵⁴ Lenin, SWG XXV, p. 691.

⁵⁵ Lenin, SWG XXV, p. 692. *Italics mine.*

⁵⁷ Lenin, SW X, p. 198.

⁵⁶ Lenin, SW X, p. 240.

⁵⁸ Lenin, SW X, pp. 239, 241-243.

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elaborated at the Comintern-convoked "Eastern" congresses in Baku and Moscow.

5

The Baku Congress (the First Congress of the Peoples of the East), though concerned in the main with the Near and Middle East, including India,⁵⁰ addressed itself to the toiling peoples of the whole East, who were viewed as being essentially peasants.⁵¹ The Moscow Congress (the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East) took a similar position with regard to all countries of the Far East—with the exception of Japan.

Starting from this premise, the Baku Congress proclaimed the following strategic points:

The main fighting force. The peasants will be "the heavy mass," the "infantry" in the global revolutionary struggle.⁵²

The political aim. The aim will be soviets—peasant soviets.⁵³

The leadership in the fight for this aim. In some frank statements the leadership was identified as the Comintern and the Communist Party.⁵⁴ At times, and ambiguously, it was referred to as the "organised vanguard of the Western European and American proletariat."⁵⁵ At times, and with unrestrained demagoguery, the peasants were called the political leaders. In phrases recalling the 1920 Lenin remark that the peasants had put "the idea of Soviet organisation . . . into practice," Skachko, the speaker on the agrarian question, declared that the revolutionary peasants could establish peasant soviets.⁵⁶ The Theses on Soviet Power in the East asserted that the peasants can "administer their own affairs."⁵⁷ And Bela Kun, who presented these theses, argued that while "in the West the Soviet power is indeed a form and expression of the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . in the East, where the exploited element is not the industrial workers, but the poorest peasantry, this peasantry must become the leading element of the Soviets."⁵⁸ In fact, "in the East, in those countries where there is no working class, it [the Soviet power] will be the expression of the dictatorship of the poorest peasantry."⁵⁹

⁵⁰ (Pervyi) S'ezd narodov Vostoka, Baku, September 1-8, 1920 (1st Congress of the Peoples of the East, Baku, 1920). Stenographic reports (Petrograd: Communist International Publishers, 1920), 2nd ed., p. 191.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* p. 15 (Zinoviev), p. 178 (Bela Kun), p. 186 (Skachko).

⁵² *Ibid.* p. 13 (Zinoviev).

⁵³ *Ibid.* pp. 178, 184, 194.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 13, 184.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* p. 13. Meaning obviously: the Communist Parties of these areas.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 195, 198. Cf. Lenin, SW X, p. 242.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* p. 185.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* p. 179.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p. 178. Italics mine.

Encouraging precedents. Soviet Russia, Siberia, the Bashkir-Kirghiz Republic and Turkestan.⁶⁹

On September 20, 1920, Zinoviev, the chairman of the Comintern, in a report on the Baku Congress before the Executive Committee of the Communist International expressly mentioned Bela Kun's statement that in the pre-capitalist East, soviets could be a "dictatorship of the poor peasantry."⁷⁰ A few weeks later Lenin hailed the Baku Congress—and the Second World Congress of the Comintern—as having demonstrated that the Communists are the saviours not only of "the workers of all civilised [capitalist] countries," but also of "the peasants of all backward colonial countries."⁷¹ And on December 22 of the same year he described the (Communist-controlled)⁷² Soviet republics of Bukhara, Azerbaijan and Armenia as "proof and confirmation that the ideas and principles of Soviet government are accessible to, and immediately realisable by, countries with a peasant social base, and not only by industrially developed countries with a proletarian social base. *The idea of peasant soviets has triumphed.* . . . Friendly relations between the *peasant soviet republics* and the Russian Socialist Republic have already been consolidated by the practical results of our policy."⁷³

Lenin's new ideas on Communist peasant strategy were restated in 1922 at the Moscow Congress of the Toilers of the Far East by the chairman of the Comintern, Zinoviev, and by the head of the Comintern's Far Eastern section, Safarov. Again the Comintern speakers pointed to the Bolshevik experiences "in the Near East and in Central Asia" to support their claim that soviets could be established in agrarian as well as in industrial countries.⁷⁴ While noting that the countries of the Far East, with the exception of Japan, had "hardly any proletariat," Zinoviev insisted that the slogan of soviets could nevertheless be raised in all of them. The four hundred million Chinese, together with the hundreds of millions of other Far Eastern peoples, "in historical perspective represent the *main force* that will overthrow imperialism. The better elements of the European workers [read: the Communists] will take the lead in this struggle, but the *masses of infantry* which will finally destroy imperialism, are you, the oppressed nations of the Far East."⁷⁵

⁶⁹ Baku Congress reports, p. 185.

⁷⁰ Jane Degras, *The Communist International 1919-1943. Documents, selected and edited by Jane Degras*, Vol. I: 1919-1922 (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 105.

⁷¹ Lenin, SWG XXV, p. 524 *et seq.*

⁷² Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union. Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 184, 238 *et seq.*, 232 *et seq.*

⁷³ Lenin, 1957, p. 273. *Italics mine.*

⁷⁴ *The First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East* (Petrograd, 1922), p. 167 (Safarov) (hereafter cited as TFE).

⁷⁵ TFE (Zinoviev), p. 153. *Italics mine.*

Commenting on the Second World Congress of the Comintern, the members of the "Maoist" group record two aspects of the new "Eastern" policy: Lenin's insistence on the independence of the Communist parties and the desirability of temporary alliances with the native bourgeoisie.⁷⁶ But they pay virtually no attention⁷⁷ to his new concept of Communist power centres in pre-industrial areas based on peasant support. Failing to recognise this concept (the "Maoist" concept, if you please) in its basic form, they also fail to recognise its subsequent development.

The events of 1922-23 and 1925-26 convinced the Moscow strategists that there existed in some regions of China a modern industrial proletariat capable of being organised by radical leaders. Hence, in the winter of 1926-27 when the Comintern began seriously to discuss the possibility of establishing soviets in China, Stalin, like his Trotskyist opponents, spoke of soviets of *workers* and peasants. Some of Stalin's associates, such as Bukharin⁷⁸ and Mif,⁷⁹ raised the issue of peasant soviets. But Stalin insisted that when the revolution reached the soviet stage, the soviets would include "the industrial centres of China."⁸⁰ Stalin may have taken this stand in part because the Trotskyist opposition strongly emphasised the proletarian aspect of the Chinese revolution, but in part also because he viewed the revolution as a nation-wide process that would include major industrial centres.⁸¹

After the collapse of the United Front with the Kuomintang (K.M.T.), when the Communists were able to maintain power bases only in the countryside, the Comintern leaders under Stalin's direction accepted this development as legitimate—which, according to Lenin's ideas of 1920, it certainly was. But perhaps in order to counter the Trotskyist criticism they still emphasised the derivative proletarian root of these bases, calling them soviets of "workers and peasants" and

⁷⁶ Schwartz, 1951, p. 30; *Documentary History*, p. 67.

⁷⁷ Schwartz's remark about Lenin's alleged "speculation" appears to be an afterthought that has not affected the substance of his and his colleagues' argument.

⁷⁸ In November 1926, Bukharin referred to China as a peasant country in Lenin's sense of the term; and he cited Lenin's argument of the three steps of Communist policy in such countries, the organisation of peasant soviets being the second step (*International Press Correspondence*, English ed. [Vienna/London, 1921-38] 1926, p. 1471 [hereafter cited as *Inprecor*]).

⁷⁹ Mif, one of the authors of the draft resolution on the Chinese situation, seems to have proposed that the slogan of peasant soviets in the countryside be proclaimed immediately and without waiting for a corresponding development in the industrial centres. Mif's idea was rejected by Stalin in his speech on November 30, 1926 (*Inprecor* 1926, p. 1583).

⁸⁰ J. Stalin, *Works*, 13 vols. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952-55), Vol. VIII, p. 384.

⁸¹ *Inprecor* 1926, p. 1583.

viewing them as manifestations of the "hegemony of the proletariat."⁸² In 1930 Manuilsky, Stalin's top lieutenant in the Comintern, explained the application of this formula to the Chinese rural soviets with an argument that was dramatised by Trotsky's subsequent attack on it.

Said Manuilsky: "The revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and of the peasantry in China will differ essentially from the democratic dictatorship which the Bolsheviki planned during the revolution of 1905-06."

Why?

"In the first place the development of the Chinese revolution collides with the whole system of world imperialism. A victorious revolution of the Chinese workers and peasants would shake the world system of imperialism to its very foundations. That is why the difficulties of the Chinese revolution are so great. This is the reason why [in the summer of 1930] the victorious advance of the Chinese Red Army against the industrial centres of China has been held up near Changsha." (Implication: For the time being the Communists cannot seize power in the industrial centres.)

"Secondly, the Chinese revolution is developing at the time of the existence of the Soviet Union, the land of the proletarian dictatorship and of the successful building up of Socialism." (Implication: There exists in the U.S.S.R. a mighty "proletarian"—Communist—régime capable and in duty bound to direct and aid the Communist power struggle in China.)

"The third peculiarity is that the Chinese revolution, even before the final victory of the workers and peasants in the whole of China, has a Red Army at its disposal, holds possession of a considerable district in which it has set up a soviet system of the workers and peasants power, in the government of which the Communists form the majority. This circumstance enables the proletariat to realise not only the ideological but also the State hegemony of the peasantry."⁸³ (Implication: In the soviet areas the Communists exercise "proletarian" leadership over the peasants because they are directed by the world centre of "proletarian" power and because they control the army, the ideology and the government.)

Of course, in addition to the supreme "proletarian" centre, Moscow, there were the headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai, which, according to Lenin's concept of the party, represented the Chinese workers (whatever their weakness) and which transmitted Moscow's directives to the rural soviets.

Under these conditions and in this way the Comintern formulated

⁸² Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies, Sixth World Congress of the Comintern (*Inprecor* 1928, p. 1666).

⁸³ *Inprecor* 1930, p. 1065. Italics in original. Manuilsky wrote this in an article "On the Threshold of the Fourteenth Year," published in *Pravda* on November 7, 1930.

THE LEGEND OF "MAOISM"

Lenin's concept of Communist-controlled peasant soviets in non-industrial areas of the East. Quite consistently, Manuilsky in a speech before the Central Committee of the Comintern explained the policy of "proletarian" (Communist) leadership over the peasant masses in China and other "colonial" countries by invoking the authority of Lenin.⁸⁴

7

Professor Schwartz draws attention to an important controversy over Communist doctrine when he cites Trotsky's 1930 rejection of Stalin's and Manuilsky's appraisal of the Chinese soviets. But he errs when he claims that Trotsky's critique is based on "the solid ground of orthodoxy."⁸⁵

Trotsky did indeed express his profound disagreement with Stalin on Chinese soviet policy. But behind this lies a long and serious disagreement with Lenin. In 1904 Trotsky rejected Lenin's concept of a party that would "substitute itself for the working classes" by virtue of its socialist consciousness,⁸⁶ that is, he rejected the very concept on which Lenin rested his 1920 thesis that Communist parties can carry out a genuine Communist policy in the pre-capitalist areas of the East. Moreover, Trotsky opposed Lenin's 1905 idea of an enduring bourgeois-democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants, because he was convinced that after a combined worker and peasant victory the proletariat must by necessity turn against the peasants and either establish a dictatorship of the proletariat or succumb to the "petty bourgeois" peasantry.⁸⁷ As far as I know, in 1920 Trotsky did not criticise Lenin's concept of peasant soviets; but in 1922 in a new edition of his history of the 1905 revolution he reproduced an article written in 1909 in which he attacked Lenin's view of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. And in 1930 he used the same arguments (actually his theory of the permanent revolution) to condemn as unfeasible and treacherous the application of the concept of the bourgeois-democratic revolution to China.⁸⁸ "To speak of a Soviet government without speaking of the dictatorship of the proletariat means to deceive the workers."⁸⁹

But although Trotsky openly criticised Lenin's "hypothesis" of the

⁸⁴ *Inprecor* 1930, p. 439.

⁸⁵ Schwartz 1951, p. 193.

⁸⁶ Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed. Trotsky: 1879-1921* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 90. Italics in original.

⁸⁷ L. Trotzki, *Die Russische Revolution 1905* (Berlin: Vereinigung Internationaler Verlagsanstalten, 1923), p. 230 *et seq.*

⁸⁸ Leon Trotsky, *Permanent Revolution* (Calcutta: Gupta Rahman & Gupta, 1947), p. 32 *et seq.*, 141 *et seq.* (hereafter cited as Trotsky 1947).

⁸⁹ Leon Trotsky, *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*, translated by Max Shachtman (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1932), p. 303 (hereafter cited as Trotsky 1932).

bourgeois-democratic revolution,⁹⁰ he did not state that Lenin paved the way for the application of this strategy to China at the Second World Congress of the Comintern in 1920. Referring to Lenin's 1920 Thesis on the National and Colonial Question, Trotsky mentioned the idea of a temporary alliance with the bourgeois-democratic movement and the need to keep the proletarian movement independent.⁹¹ But he did not mention Lenin's concept of the peasant soviets, which in fact became the cornerstone of the Comintern's "Eastern" policy during the last years of Lenin's life.

Trotsky's critique of the Chinese policy of the Comintern provides valuable insights into the peculiarities and consequences of his theory of the permanent revolution. This, however, has nothing to do with the question of Communist orthodoxy. The doctrinal standards of the Moscow-rooted Communist movement were those of Marxism-Leninism. In their substance, they were determined not by Trotsky but by Lenin.

New York.

December 1959.

(The second part of Professor Wittfogel's article will be published in our next issue together with Professor Schwartz's reply.)

⁹⁰ Trotsky 1947, p. 19 *et seq.*

⁹¹ Trotsky 1932, p. 273.

China and Tibet : Background to the Revolt

By GEORGE N. PATTERSON

*"What is Tibet? Do we mean the lands controlled by the Tibetan Government and the Tibetan tribal authorities, or the lands inhabited by people of the Tibetan race? . . . While attempting to define the former, let us not neglect the latter, for national sentiment in Tibet, so long in abeyance, is now a growing force."*¹

THE awakening Tibetan national sentiment foreseen by Sir Charles Bell has exploded into a major revolt against China. It has brought the Sino-Indian "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence" policy into disrepute, has altered the balance of power in Asia and may yet in its continuing repercussions be the prime cause, in the solemn words of Prime Minister Nehru, of the Third World War. In 1960 it is imperative that Sir Charles Bell's warning concerning the importance of not overlooking ethnographic Tibet should be heeded. The cartographic manipulation which has taken place in the past has been possible because of the peculiar isolation of Tibet and can be partly ascribed to foreign ignorance. It will no longer be possible now that the Dalai Lama and his government is in India and the new generation of leaders is educated. It must be remembered that those responsible for the success of the revolt themselves come from what has been casually referred to as "ethnographic Tibet," "*de facto* Tibet," "Inner Tibet," Sikang-Chinghai, Kham-Amdo and Szechuan, according to preference. Not only did the revolt begin in this area, it was carried on with increasing success until this year, and it is not unlikely that it will explode again at any time.

THE HISTORICAL RECORD

It was in the seventh century that Tibet as a nation, and a powerful one at that, emerged from the realm of legend and entered history. A Tibetan king, Srong-tsen Gampo, conquered regions in north Burma and western China and exacted tribute from the Emperor of China, including the marriage of the Emperor's daughter. The same king was equally successful in his attacks on the Indian border, subjugating large parts of

¹ Sir Charles Bell, *Tibet Past and Present* (Oxford University Press, 1924), Introduction Part 2, p. 5.

Nepal and taking a princess from that country also as tribute. These two queens were Buddhists and converted the king to their faith, and in the years that followed he extended the Buddhist religion throughout the whole of Tibet. Until this time Tibet had only had an oral language, derived from the same linguistic family as the Burmese; but Buddhist scriptures were now brought from India and a written character adapted from the Sanskrit to fit the Tibetan language.²

From the time of Srong-tsen Gampo to that of Ralpa-chan, Tibet and China were constantly at war, with varying fortune. Following the death of Srong-tsen Gampo in A.D. 650 the Chinese attacked and captured Lhasa. But during the reign of Ti-song De-tsen, in the eighth century, Tibet became one of the great military powers of Asia, reaching from the Chinese capital of Changan, which its armies had captured, to near the River Ganges in India, and from Turkestan to Burma. Inscribed stone pillars were raised in Lhasa to commemorate an agreement in the eighth century between Ti-song De-tsen, King of Tibet, and Hwang-ti, Emperor of China, "the nephew and the maternal uncle," when they "agreed to hold as sacred the respect of the old relationship and the happiness of the neighbours."³ Towards the end of the eighth century Tibetan armies again overran western China and another treaty was concluded by which the Kokonor Lake was fixed as the north-eastern boundary of Tibet. The Tibetan king abandoned his conquests in China but retained all the mountainous lands as his territory.

In the ninth century there was considerable contact between Tibet and China when about one hundred missions passed between the two countries,⁴ and a peace treaty was concluded on a footing of equality. Ethnographically, the boundary at this time extended from, in the north, the Kuenlun mountains at roughly 35°30' north latitude and 80°30' east longitude to the Kokonor at roughly 100° east, then almost straight southward to near the 28th parallel, through Kansu, Szechuan and Yunnan on a line just to the inside of Sining, Chengtu and Kiating, before turning due west along Upper Burma and Assam at 29°20' north and the general Himalayan range.⁵ (See end-paper Map.)

In the thirteenth century Tibet became a vassal state of the Mongols under Ghengis Khan, but in 1253 when a Tibetan priest, Phagspa, visited Kublai Khan he became so popular that he was made Kublai's spiritual guide and later appointed by him to the rank of priest-king of Tibet and constituted ruler of (1) Tibet Proper, comprising the thirteen

² Bell, *op. cit.* pp. 22-23.

³ Quoted in Bell, *op. cit.* p. 27.

⁴ Tieh-tseng Li, *The Historical Status of Tibet* (New York: Columbia University, 1956), p. 6.

⁵ Bell, *op. cit.* pp. 6-7.

states of U-Tsang Province; (2) Kham, and (3) Amdo.⁶ In the seventeenth century when the Great Fifth Dalai Lama visited Peking at the invitation of the Emperor of the new Manchu dynasty, the Emperor met him one day's journey from the capital. Tibetan records of the event maintain that the Great Fifth was treated as an independent sovereign, the Emperor hoping to secure his alliance in order to establish Manchu rule over Mongolia.⁷

After the death of the Sixth Dalai Lama there was a period of considerable intrigue. At one point the Chinese Emperor sent three armies into Tibet which were eventually successful in defeating the Mongols who were in possession, and he installed a Seventh Dalai Lama of his own choice. China's claim to suzerainty over Tibet appears to date from this invasion. Following it, a Manchu resident and a garrison force of three thousand Chinese troops were left behind and communication with China was kept open by stationing small detachments of troops along the Lhasa-Chamdo-Batang-Tachienlu "road." The new boundary between China and Tibet was demarcated by a pillar, erected in 1727 on the Bum La south-west of Batang. The country to the west of this point was handed over to the rule of the Dalai Lama under the suzerainty of the Manchu Emperor, while the Tibetan chiefs of the states and tribes in the provinces of Kham and Amdo to the east of it were given the status of semi-independent feudatories of China, with Batang and Litang being placed under the administration of Szechuan. This loose arrangement lasted for nearly two centuries, until the Chinese conquest of Tibet under General Chao Erh-feng in 1905.⁸

The absolute rule claimed by the Chinese residents in Lhasa was not maintained for long, however, and after the Opium War and the Taiping Rebellion Chinese influence deteriorated considerably. When an inter-tribal war broke out in Kham in 1860, rapidly involving the whole of East Tibet, the inhabitants appealed to both the Chinese and Tibetan Governments for help. The former were in no position to help because of their involvement with foreign Powers, but the Dalai Lama responded by sending a Tibetan army which suppressed the fighting in 1863. The Tibetan claim to the reconquered territory dates from this time, when the Chinese Imperial Court confirmed the claim.⁹ It was the Younghusband expedition which marched on Lhasa in 1904 and forced the Tibetan Government and the Chinese Amban to sign an agreement that startled the Chinese Government into taking action. Although they signed the Adhesion Agreement to the Anglo-Tibetan Convention in 1906 they took steps to safeguard their interests in Tibet

⁶ Li, *op. cit.* p. 20.

⁸ Eric Teichman, *Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet* (Cambridge University, 1922), pp. 133-134 and footnote 51.

⁷ Bell, *op. cit.* p. 20.

⁹ *Ibid.*; also Li, *op. cit.* pp. 5 and 62.

by appointing an "Imperial Resident" in Chamdo, in East Tibet. When the Khambas revolted against Chinese interference a Chinese army under the command of General Chao Erh-feng was dispatched to bring the country under the direct control of the Chinese Government.¹⁰ When Chao finally left Tibet, in 1911, the work begun in 1905 was outwardly completed and there was not a Tibetan ruler left in East Tibet. From Tachienlu up to the Mekong the country was administered by Chinese magistrates, while north of the Mekong several districts had been planned but not actually established. When Chao was killed that same year his assistant took over, and his first act was a proposal that East Tibet should be converted into a new Chinese province to be called "(H) Si-kang" or "Western Kham."¹¹

However, Chinese control over the rebellious Tibetans had not been sufficiently established to withstand much pressure and the greater part of it disappeared following the revolution in China in 1911. By the end of 1912 Chinese authority had ceased to exist in Tibet, and the Dalai Lama having returned from his exile in India, the country became once more an autonomous state.

In 1913 a conference was held at Simla between Britain, China and Tibet. The conference divided Tibet into two zones, "Outer Tibet" nearer India, including Lhasa, Shigatse and Chamdo; and "Inner Tibet" nearer China, including Batang, Litang, Tachienlu and a large portion of East Tibet. Chinese suzerainty over the whole of Tibet was recognised but China engaged not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province. The autonomy of Outer Tibet was recognised and China agreed to abstain from interference in its internal administration which was to rest with the Tibetans themselves. In Inner Tibet the central Tibetan Government at Lhasa was to retain its existing rights, which included among other things the control of most of the monasteries and the appointment of local chiefs. But China was not forbidden to send troops or to plant colonies there.¹²

The discussion lasted for six months and in April, 1914, a Convention was agreed upon and initialled by all three plenipotentiaries. Two days after the draft had been initialled the Chinese Government telegraphed repudiating it, but Tibet and Britain recognised it as binding upon themselves, with China, having repudiated the Convention, entitled to none of the advantages which the Convention would have conferred upon her.

Little of major historical importance occurred in Sino-Tibetan relations between the Simla Convention and the Chinese Communist

¹⁰ Teichman, *op. cit.* p. 20

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

¹² Bell, *loc. cit.* pp. 154-155.

invasion in 1950. In the intrigue following on the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's death in 1933 a small Khamba army recruited by two brothers, Topgyay and Rapga Pangdatshang, was engaged by the official Tibetan Army near Chamdo, then defeated, with the help of the Chinese Army, at Batang. Later, when the Chinese thought that they might require help from the Tibetan tribesmen of East Tibet in their war with Japan, the younger brother, Topgyay, was made an honorary colonel responsible for the Kham tribesmen; a leading Amdo Tibetan, Lobsang Tsewong, was made the same for Amdo. When the Second World War finished, these two Tibetans, with Topgyay's brother, Rapga, and Geshi Sherab Gyaltso (both political intellectuals and rebels) formed the recognised leadership of the great fighting tribes in East Tibet, together with several able Sino-Tibetans who had had an education in China and experience in administration.

Following the war and the deteriorating political situation in China, arms and ammunition on a large scale became available to these East Tibetan leaders and brought the possibility of successful revolt against the Lhasa Government—a long-cherished ambition of the East Tibetans—within reach. The extremists among them were all for overthrow of the central government in Lhasa and the establishment of a new government centre in Chamdo in Kham, from which to administer Tibet through Kham and Amdo officials. They wanted a new trade route from Chamdo and Batang to Sadiya, in Upper Assam, to cut out the ancient but long caravan trail through Lhasa. The moderates were for using political pressure by threats and, failing this, going ahead with setting up their own government in Kham, and gradually eliminating the Lhasa Government through boycott, starvation and attrition.

THE COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER

While some measure of secrecy was attempted, the plans were known to many in East Tibet, and, as events were shortly to show, to the Chinese Communists as well. In August 1949, before they had established their authority over parts of China, the Communists, in a broadcast from Peking, announced that the above-mentioned four leaders had expressed their sympathy with the Chinese and wanted to associate themselves with them in liberating their own people in Tibet. This was a very shrewd political manoeuvre on China's part for at one blow it effectively isolated the most powerful, most populous and greatest area in Tibet from the central government in Lhasa, and gave them time to enter into negotiations with the East Tibetan leaders while at the same time bringing military pressure on them to agree to collaborate with China.

A written ultimatum was delivered to the Khamba leader, Topgyay

Pangdatshang, in January 1950, by the Batang magistrate, who rode into the mountains personally to deliver it. It stated Communist China's intentions of taking over the whole of Tibet, and after that, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, and the necessity for the Kham Tibetans to co-operate in this or be annihilated. The Kham leaders made an attempt to get help from Lhasa and the outside Powers, in March 1950, to fight against the Chinese, but this was refused.¹³

RIGHTS OF NATIONAL MINORITIES

"The Soviet Government of China recognises the right of self determination of the national minorities in China, their right to complete separation from China and to the formation of an independent state for each national minority. All Mongolians, Tibetans, Miao, Yao, Koreans and others living on the territory of China shall enjoy the full right to self determination, *i.e.*, they may either join the Union of Chinese Soviets or secede from it and form their own state as they may prefer."

—*From the Constitution of the Kiangsi Soviet Republic*
(Chairman: Mao Tse-tung), drawn up in 1931.

On August 5, 1950, the official Chinese Communist News Agency quoted General (subsequently Marshal) Liu Po-ch'eng, Chairman of the South-West China Military Affairs Commission, as saying that "the People's Army would soon enter Tibet with the object of wiping out British and American influence there. When the country had been liberated Tibetans would be given regional autonomy and religious freedom. Lamas would be protected. The Communists would respect existing customs. Tibetan Government officials would not be removed from their present posts. But the Tibetan Army would be reorganised as part of the Chinese People's Army."¹⁴

On October 25, 1950, Peking radio broadcast that the process of "liberating" Tibet had begun. However, it was still not publicly admitted to be a military action. When the Indian ambassador in Peking lodged a strong protest from his government, "the Chinese reply was equally strong. It practically accused India of having been influenced by the imperialists, and claimed that the Chinese had not taken any military action but were determined to liberate Tibet by

¹³ George N. Patterson, *Tragic Destiny* (London: Faber, 1959), p. 31.

¹⁴ Reported in *The Statesman*, Calcutta, August 6, 1950.

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peaceful means . . ."; and later, "the Tibetan question had also settled itself, for the Chinese after the first military display were content to keep their armies on the frontier and await the arrival of the Tibetan delegation for settlement by negotiations. . . ." ¹⁵

At this time the Chinese were almost certainly sincere in their desire for a "peaceful liberation," although not wholly for altruistic reasons. As the historical record indicates, while there was some ground for Chinese claims to Tibet based on their conquests of the country at various times, there was an equally sound basis for Tibet's claim to independence through having ultimately expelled the Chinese from the country. It was this doubt as to Tibet's actual historical status in relationship to China which caused the Chinese to tread softly in their "liberation" action, while at the same time loudly insisting on their "right" to liberate.

2. Thus the Chinese People's Army, having entered Chamdo on October 29, 1950, remained there for several months before marching on Lhasa in September 1951. Behind this hesitation may well have been a desire to test Indian and United Nations reactions to the Tibetan appeal against the Chinese claims and action. Had firm action been taken by India or the United Nations at that point, to uphold the *status quo* at least, it is arguable that China would have proceeded no further.

It must be pointed out that from a Chinese point of view there was a certain amount of justification for suspicions regarding American intentions *vis-à-vis* Tibet in 1951. There was Lowell Thomas's much-publicised visit in 1949; the following year a copy of a booklet on top-secret military briefing for American troops on Tibet was circulating in certain quarters in Kalimpong and its existence was undoubtedly known to Chinese agents there.¹⁶ Finally the escape of the Dalai Lama's brother, Taktser Rimpoche, to America in July 1951 was clearly a major factor in the alteration of China's policy in Tibet. Taktser Rimpoche had pretended to go along with China's plans to take over Tibet which included the deposing of the Dalai Lama (this was before his official installation) and with Taktser Rimpoche as president, the altering of the Tibetan administration to suit Chinese demands.¹⁷ With Taktser Rimpoche in America, the possibility of American intervention may well have seemed imminent; with the Dalai Lama already installed in power in November 1950 by the Tibetan Government, the Chinese must have decided that long-term "peaceful measures" were no longer practicable. It was necessary to make preparations to forestall intervention, discourage possibilities of "counter-revolution" engineered by Tibetan

¹⁵ K. M. Pannikar, *In Two Chinas* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1955), pp. 112-114.

¹⁶ The present writer saw this copy.

¹⁷ The writer was told this by Taktser Rimpoche personally.

FREEDOM OF WORSHIP

... (7) The policy of freedom of religious belief ... shall be carried out. The religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected and lama monasteries shall be protected. The central authorities will not effect a change in the income of the monasteries.

—From the 17-point agreement of May 23, 1951.

"There are 390 monasteries in the Karzey District which are engaged in lawlessness and sabotage. All the monasteries are reactionaries under religious guise. They are all instruments of exploitation, the stronghold of autocratic feudal lords who stand in the way of progressive socialistic production and they are the centre of rebellion against the reform. If they are completely destroyed then the autocratic feudal oppression and exploitation can be destroyed."

Nov. 18, 1958.

"The God and Gods are all false invention for deceiving people. The reactionary Lamas and the leaders of the monasteries use them as their instrument and carry on their objective of exploitation of the masses."

Nov. 19, 1958.

"To believe in religion is fruitless. Religion is the instrument of autocratic feudal lords and religious works have no benefits whatsoever to the people. To explain this we trace the historical background of the origin of Buddhism. The founder of Buddhism was Sakya Muni—son of King Sudhodhana of India. His kingdom was very aggressive among all the Indian kingdoms of his time. It always used to invade the small kingdoms. It was during the reign of Sakya Muni that his subjects revolted against him and later other small kingdoms also rose against him spontaneously. As they attacked Sakya Muni he accepted defeat, but escaped amidst the fighting. Since there was no other way out for him he wandered into the forests. Having founded Buddhism, he brought about a pessimism and idleness in the minds of the people weakening their courage and thus reached his goal of re-domination over them. This fact was clearly recorded in history."

Nov. 22, 1958.

—From Karzey Nyinrey Sargyur
(an East Tibetan newspaper).

(All quoted in *The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law*, pp. 41-43.)

exiles in India and bring Tibet quickly under complete Chinese control. The appropriate measures would serve to further what this writer considers the Chinese long-term ambition of being in a position to annex the Himalayan border states.

It was for these reasons that the Chinese ignored the terms of the 17-Point Agreement of May 1951 which had been forced on what was only a goodwill mission to Peking and stamped with a false Tibetan seal.¹⁸ What was the "Advisory Delegation" became almost immediately Peking's instrument of political control.¹⁹ Every effort was concentrated on building a major road into Tibet, the prime, almost sole, purpose of which, even in Chinese publicity, was to carry military vehicles, troops and supplies.

Such a large and unexpected influx of people in the precariously balanced food situation which obtained in Tibet forced the Chinese to make drastic "reforms" of Tibet's archaic methods of food storage, supply and distribution. As those methods were intimately connected with the rights of monasteries as granaries, landowners and tax levies it inevitably resulted in protests and scattered riots. The Chinese justified their actions by stressing the feudal character of the prevailing system, the increasing privations of the Tibetan people, and the necessity for participating in the struggle against the enemies of the motherland in Korea. But to the Tibetans, of course, it was simply an outright violation of the 17-Point Agreement, a means to eliminate Tibetan customs and, most of all, an attempt to weaken Tibetan religion.²⁰

¹⁸ Dalai Lama's press statement of June 20, 1959, at Mussoorie, quoted in *The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law* (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1959), Document 19, p. 196.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ The following two statements show the two different points of view: (a) the first is from a Mi-mang Tsong-du ("People's Party") Appeal to the Dalai Lama in 1955: "We Tibetan people make the following appeal because we oppose the Chinese Communists who are destroying all our customs and systems, and also because of the complete breach of the 17-Point Agreement signed by them. . . . Since the occupation of Tibet by the Chinese Communists all the former organisations of the Government have ceased to function and the Chinese Communists have established a large number of illegal organisations in their place to carry out the administration. . . . The Chinese Communists have not only increased administrative organisations but they have also established organisations such as the 'Patriotic Youth League,' and the 'Chinese Schools,' with the sole object of indoctrinating the youth of Tibet in Communism, and thus to destroy the civilisation and culture of the nation. Moreover, in opposition to the will of the people the Chinese Communists have destroyed the social system of Tibet in which political and religious life are joined together, and have also destroyed the religion of the Tibetan people. . . ." The author saw a copy of this in Kalimpong.

(b) The second is taken from the Peking *Shih-shih Shou-ts'e* (*Current Affairs Handbook*) of April 30, 1956, giving an account of progress in Tibet: "People's Banks had been opened in Lhasa, Shigatse, Chamdo and other places and in the previous four years had issued more than 1,700,000 yuan of non-interest agricultural loans, and more than 100,000 yuan of non-interest pastoral loans, as well as various amounts of low-interest handicraft and commercial loans. One hundred thousand farm implements had been issued, and 2,000,000 yuan's worth of tea, cloth and daily necessities. Twenty-seven primary schools had been established with a total

The policy of land reform was at first, in 1952, restricted to East Tibet, presumably in order not to frighten and antagonise the Tibetan Government in Lhasa. The Chinese authorities requisitioned lands, property and goods belonging to Taktser Rimpoche at his famous monastery in Kumbum, in Amdo, as a punishment, they said, for his having gone over to the Americans. This policy was rapidly extended to take in other areas and other monasteries.

But while the remote territory in East Tibet may have lent itself admirably to facilitating a rigorous enforcement of land reforms, the policy itself, in an area that was notoriously hostile to the Chinese, was bound to be an explosive issue. In 1952-53 widespread fighting broke out in Kham and Amdo. One Tibetan who escaped, once a "People's General" in the Chinese Army from Amdo, claimed that over 80,000 rebels were involved in the fighting. Some 12,000 of them, according to him, were deserters from the Kuomintang armies who had settled down in the mountains of East Tibet.²¹ With no immediate help forthcoming from India or America, and because the Chinese, at the persuasion of East Tibetan leaders, relaxed their policy of immediate land reforms, the revolt died down—except in areas where local Chinese commanders made tentative attempts to introduce other reforms; as, for example, veterinary dispensaries which the touchy Tibetans now suspected as centres for calculating their wealth in order to impose heavier taxes.

In Lhasa itself the Chinese proceeded much more cautiously, but even in the capital there were anti-Chinese demonstrations from as early as 1952. Leading priests had been persuaded to co-operate with the Chinese through assurances that there would be no interfering with Tibetan customs or religion, but they were now disturbed by the reports coming from East Tibet. Many of the nobles and high officials, particularly the younger ones, had enthusiastically joined in the earlier programmes of reconstruction and reform but now began to have second thoughts as Chinese pressures and demands on them increased.²² A powerful underground anti-Chinese group known as the *Mi-mang Tsong-du* ("People's Party") came into public prominence with demonstrations, placarding of walls, denunciations of Chinese interference with the Dalai Lama's powers and the customs and religion of Tibet.²³

enrolment of 2,000 Tibetan students. Books and stationery were supplied to students free of charge, and subsidies and living expenses were given to the really poor. Broadcasting stations were set up in various cities and towns. 4,000 Chinese medical workers had been sent to Tibet with 5,000,000 yuan for hygienic enterprises. Hospitals were built in Lhasa, Shigatse, Chamdo, etc. . . ."

²¹ Patterson, *op. cit.* p. 109.

²² The writer was told this by Khamba officials. See also note 20 (a).

²³ *Ibid.*, also *Tibet Mirror*, periodical published in Kalimpong, June 1954, by a Tibetan long resident there. It appears sporadically but is generally accurate.

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Many of the issues raised by the anti-Chinese groups were apparently inspired by feudal officials, who wanted little or no change at all and were only using popular sentiment to oppose reforms of any kind. But at the same time popular anti-Chinese sentiment was very much in evidence. This, to a great extent, was due to the irritating presence of tens of thousands of Chinese troops in Lhasa and in other major towns. Some reports placed the total number of Chinese troops in Tibet at 200,000. Then there was the growing shortage of food—accelerated by the unprecedented 1953 floods and subsequent famine which the superstitious Tibetans attributed to the displeasure of the gods with the Chinese occupation. Finally the Tibetans resented the policy of imposing the Chinese language, dress and customs in the schools, and the Communist Party cadres.²⁴

In 1954 two major events occurred which were to have wide repercussions in Tibet. One was the signing of the Sino-Indian Trade Agreement—which included the delineation of “The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence”—recognising Tibet as “the Tibet region of China”; and the second, the Dalai Lama’s visit to China. The former convinced Tibetans that India and China were prepared to dispose of Tibet “in private arrangements in favour of aggression so as to serve their own inter-Asian imperialist policies”²⁵; while the latter convinced the Dalai Lama that China was prepared to go to any length to sinicise Tibet. In addition to the deliberate favouring of the Panchen Lama throughout the visit, and the pressures put upon the Dalai Lama to make favourable pro-Chinese speeches, there was also a crude attempt on his life coming through East Tibet which the Chinese attributed to “Khamba bandits.”²⁶

It was during this same visit to China that some leading officials of the Dalai Lama’s entourage made contact with rebel Khamba leaders and planned a revolt against the Chinese in Tibet.²⁷ This was of necessity only a loose arrangement but it served its purpose. In March 1955, Peking announced the nomination of a committee to prepare for regional autonomy for Tibet, and in September administrative offices for the committee were set up in Lhasa. This was clearly the start of an attempt to end even the limited special privileges that Tibet enjoyed and bring the country under the tighter control experienced by China’s other national minorities in their “national autonomous” areas. This move was accompanied in the east by ruthless plundering of

²⁴ See note 20 (a) and (b).

²⁵ *Tibet Mirror*, June 1954.

²⁶ The author was told this by another brother of the Dalai Lama, Gyalu Thondup.

²⁷ *Concerning the Question of Tibet* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959), p. 230.

monasteries and the levying of crippling taxes.²⁸ Late in 1955, the Khambas finally revolted and the plans made earlier meant that even the East Tibetan leaders could no longer contain their people and the whole of Kham and Amdo became involved. Marshall Ch'en Yi, a Deputy Premier (now also Foreign Minister), just escaped assassination when he went to Tibet to attend the inaugural meeting of the Preparatory Committee in April 1956.²⁹

From November 1956 to March 1957, the Dalai Lama was on a visit to India. He asked Premier Nehru for sanctuary³⁰ and would not accept Premier Chou En-lai's guarantee of new Chinese policies. But Mr. Nehru persuaded him to return, promising to use his good offices in Peking. Later Mao Tse-tung in his secret speech on "contradictions" among the people on February 27, 1957 (published on June 18), declared that conditions in Tibet were "not ripe" for "democratic reforms." The reforms were to be postponed until at least 1962. Peking then announced that 91.6 per cent. of her officials would be withdrawn from Tibet in view of the postponement. In fact they were only transferred from Western Tibet, where they could be observed by Indian officials, to Kham and Amdo where they could assist a reinforced Chinese army in disciplining the recalcitrant Khambas and Amdowas.

The Dalai Lama had also been promised a visit by Mr. Nehru. The Indian Premier finally announced on April 8, 1958, that he would be visiting Lhasa, though he did not specify when; it was understood that he would go in September. But by the spring of 1958, the increasing Chinese military pressure in East Tibet against "rebel elements" had convinced the Kham and Amdo Tibetans that they were facing extermination. In desperation they took to the mountains, sabotaging roads, destroying their houses and crops and leaving only their very old and very young behind. The situation was clearly too critical for Mr. Nehru to be allowed to visit Tibet and at the end of July 1958 at the suggestion of the Chinese he announced the cancellation of his proposed visit.

By mid-1958 20,000 East Tibetans, short of food and ammunition,

²⁸ The Dalai Lama, at his Press Conference in Mussoorie on June 20, 1959, was asked: "Is it true that a deliberate and precise campaign has been conducted by the Chinese in Tibet against the Tibetan religion?" He replied: "The report is correct in stating that, until 1958, over 1,000 monasteries were destroyed, countless lamas and monks killed and imprisoned, and the extermination of religion actively attempted. From 1955 onwards a full-scale campaign was attempted in the provinces of U and Tsang for the full-scale extermination of religion. We have documentary proof of these actions, and also of actions against the Buddha himself, who had been named as a reactionary element." From *The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law*, Document 20, pp. 200-201.

²⁹ The writer was told of this by Khamba officials.

³⁰ Dalai Lama's press statement, June 20, 1959, *The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law*, Document 19, pp. 197-198.

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had fallen back on Central Tibet, and through the earlier contacts made in 1954 were able to gain access to secret stocks of arms, ammunition and food from highly placed officials in Lhasa. These groups then took to the mountains south and south-west of Lhasa and the local revolts became a national uprising. For some time the Chinese authorities were able to keep Lhasa itself quiet by threatening to turn the heavy guns surrounding the city on the capital, including the Potala where the Dalai Lama lived. But with conditions throughout the country at explosion point even this threat no longer served to hold the citizens of Lhasa in check. On March 10 the issue was forced when the people of Lhasa refused to let the Dalai Lama accept a suspect Chinese "invitation"; on March 17 the Chinese fired mortar shells at the Norbulingka Palace and the Dalai Lama and most of his government fled, and on March 19 the city and large monasteries erupted into armed revolt.³¹

AFTERMATH OF THE REVOLT

It can be seen that the Chinese were partly right in classifying the revolt as a "tribal affair"; its location was primarily in East Tibet and most of the rebels hailed from there. What was not admitted, nor appreciated by the outside world, was that the "tribal" area involved two-thirds of Tibet and almost 80 per cent. of its population. In any case, a certain amount of anti-Chinese feeling had been in evidence in Central and West Tibet from 1952; this flared up into widespread opposition in 1958 and then armed revolt in 1959, making the uprising definitely national.

News of this at the time was hard to come by, for in addition to the formidable geographical isolation of Tibet, the Tibetans themselves felt that India and the outside world were not only unsympathetic to Tibet's cause (*vide* the cavalier treatment accorded the appeal and Manifesto of August 4, 1958, issued by leading Tibetan exiles, by India and the United Nations, who were among the recipients) but also unable or unwilling to take any action which would bring them into opposition to China.

But it seems the revolt ceased with dramatic suddenness, due not so much to successful repressive measures by the Chinese as to the breaking off of the struggle by the rebels for purposes of regrouping and recouping following on the escape of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government and 13,000 refugees to India. Intense fighting had taken place in Lhasa for three days before the better equipped Chinese troops were able to bring order into the city. In a communiqué on the Rebellion in Tibet the Chinese authorities admitted that:

³¹ Dalai Lama's statement in Tezpur, India, April 18, 1959, *ibid.*, Document 17, pp. 192-193; Dalai Lama's Press conference, June 20, 1959, *ibid.*, Document 20, p. 201.

The Tibetan traitors have carried on their rebellious activities for quite a long time. . . . Since the Chinese People's Liberation Army entered Tibet and the Central People's Government and the Tibetan local government concluded the [17-Point] Agreement in 1951, they have been plotting to tear up this agreement and preparing for armed rebellion. . . . Beginning in May and June last year, on the instructions of the Tibetan local government and the reactionary clique of the upper social strata, the rebel bandits attacked the Chamdo, Dinching, Nagchuka and Loka areas; they disrupted communications; plundered the people and engaged in rape, arson and murder; they attacked agencies and army units of the Central People's Government in those places. In the spirit of national unity the Central People's Government repeatedly enjoined the local government of Tibet to punish the rebels and maintain social order. But the local government of Tibet and the reactionary clique of the upper social strata took the magnanimity of the Central People's Government for a sign of weakness. . . . They therefore refused to do their duty to check the ravages of the rebel bandits, but instead actively stepped up their treacherous intrigues. After concentrating considerable counter-revolutionary armed forces in Lhasa they started their armed rebellion on March 10, openly scrapping the 17-Article Agreement. . . . At 10 a.m. on March 20 the troops of the Tibet Military Area Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army were ordered to take punitive action against the clique of traitors who had committed these monstrous crimes. With the aid of patriotic Tibetan lamas and laymen the People's Liberation Army completely crushed the rebellion in the city of Lhasa in just over two days of fighting. Preliminary statistics show that by March 23 more than 4,000 rebel troops were taken prisoner. . . .³²

The Dalai Lama, on his arrival in India, claimed that over 10,000 Tibetans had been killed in the fighting in Lhasa (and about 90,000 throughout the whole revolt), and this slaughter, combined with the fact that Lhasa Tibetans are not as martial as the Khambas, probably accounted for the sudden termination of hostilities in the capital. It was an entirely different matter to stamp it out in the remote valleys and mountains of East and South-East Tibet. With the Dalai Lama, the members of his Government and many leading lamas and officials in India, and the increased military concentration on the main highway through Tibet and all open spaces, the rebels were forced to withdraw into those areas once again. Even accepting the Chinese figures of 4,000 prisoners at face value, and making a disproportionately large allowance for another 6,000 rebels having escaped to India (out of the 13,000 following the Dalai Lama to India only 3,000 were under thirty years of age and the majority of them were lamas and harmless refugees), and accepting, too, the Chinese figure of 20,000 rebels³³ (although there

³² "Communiqué on Rebellion in Tibet," New China News Agency, March 28, 1959, quoted in *Concerning the Question of Tibet*, pp. 4-9.

³³ *Ibid.* p. 10.

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were more than that in the Loka area, south of Lhasa, alone) it means that 10,000 rebels are still at large inside Tibet.

In a private interview which I had with the Dalai Lama in Mussoorie, on August 20, 1959, he said that he had information of rebel groups fighting in the Litang area, in south-east Tibet, and in the Chamdo-Jyekundo area in north-east Tibet, numbering several thousands, although their activities were necessarily on a smaller scale because of lack of ammunition and because they could no longer replenish supplies from captured Chinese troops due "to a change in the types of Chinese arms and ammunition."

At his Press Conference, on June 20, the Dalai Lama also said, regarding conditions in Tibet:

Ever since my arrival in India I have been receiving almost every day sad and distressing news of the suffering and inhuman treatment of my people. I have heard almost daily, with a heavy heart, of their increasing agony and affliction, their harassment and persecution and of the terrible deportations and execution of innocent men. These have made me realise forcibly that the time has manifestly arrived when in the interests of my people and religion and to save them from the danger of near-annihilation, I must not keep silent any longer. . . .³⁴

Whether the staggering record of atrocities in Tibet is true or not it is still too early to state with assurance. The International Commission of Jurists is still collecting first-hand evidence in New Delhi through its Legal Inquiry Committee On Tibet; but in its preliminary report, the committee said it was satisfied that "with a full appreciation of the gravity of this accusation, that the evidence points at least to a *prima facie* case of genocide against the People's Republic of China." It added that: "The issue on the evidence submitted in this report is, to a large extent, who is telling the truth. On this issue, this proposal by the Dalai Lama [the committee was referring to his proposal to China to allow an impartial investigation] is of the utmost importance."³⁵

The Chairman of the International Commission of Jurists, Purshottam Trikamdass, personally informed me that he was satisfied with the evidence for eight cases of enforced sterilisation. But the widespread reports of mass sterilisation are puzzling and difficult to reconcile with the more easily established reports of mass deportations: if the Tibetans are being removed *en masse* to China, or remote parts of Tibet, why bother with enforced sterilisation? Certainly, there is sufficient evidence of this obtainable from Tibetans in India who, with their own means of access to information from inside Tibet through trusted family messengers, cannot get any details regarding members of their families.

³⁴ Dalai Lama's Press statement June 20, 1959: *The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law*, Document 19, p. 196.

³⁵ *The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law*, Introduction, Part II, pp. 18-19.

When they do get news it is to be told (as in the case of 70-year old Tsarong Shape, elder statesman of Tibet) that they are dead, after being forced to participate in forced labour.

Whether sufficient evidence will ever be gathered to satisfy unprejudiced observers it is difficult to say. The Chinese authorities have not yet given permission to the International Commission of Jurists to visit Tibet, and, after all, the evidence from Hungary is still being disputed in some quarters. But what is important in assessing the Tibetan situation is that the Tibetans themselves—and there are almost 50,000 of them in the borderlands of India, in touch with many others from all over Tibet—are convinced that their country and people are facing what the Dalai Lama termed "near-annihilation." With that conviction, and the recent near-success of the revolt (the failure of which is attributed, by the Tibetans, to lack of arms rather than the superiority of the Chinese who were reduced to less than equal terms in the rarified 15,000 feet altitudes, by the destruction of roads, disrupted communications, food shortages and intense cold), the Tibetans are determined to do all in their power to oppose and, if the opportunity occurs, overthrow the Chinese.

The Chinese, for their part, state:

Tibet is an inalienable part of China. It belongs to the big family of the Chinese people, not to the handful of reactionaries, much less to the imperialists and foreign interventionists. The rebellion of the handful of Tibetan reactionaries and its suppression are wholly internal affairs of China which do not permit of any interference by foreigners. It is the firm and unalterable policy of the People's Republic of China to implement national regional autonomy in the Tibet area under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government and with the broad masses and patriotic people of all walks of life as the masters, to carry through democratic reforms under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government and to build a prosperous, Socialist new Tibet by relying on the fraternal unity and mutual assistance of the working people of all nationalities. . . .³⁶

It is the clash between these two unalterable convictions which has precipitated the recent series of border incidents with India, for as long as there are racial, religious and political sympathisers along the 2,000-mile frontier, so long will there be the possibility of help in some form, physical and otherwise, getting through to those Tibetans still in Tibet whose fighting spirit is high and whose conviction is that if only they can get arms they can do the same—and better—again.

Aberdeen.

December 1959.

³⁶ Resolution on the Question of Tibet, adopted on April 28, 1959, by the First Session of the Second National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, *Concerning the Question of Tibet*, p. 179.

Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation

This feature is designed to provide a narrative, backed by documentation, of the major events of the preceding three months. In preparing it, the editorial board has as far as possible avoided comment.

SECTION 1. INTERNAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

The campaign against "right opportunism"

China's future internal political situation is more likely to be shaped by the events of August and September than by the less striking developments of the final quarter of 1959; therefore this chronicle will concentrate on the earlier months.

The first hint of renewed doubt among officials about the pace of China's economic progress appeared in an editorial in the *People's Daily* on August 6. It stated that some cadres had begun to fear obstacles; they were slackening their efforts, exaggerating difficulties, underestimating successes and the favourable conditions for combating problems. Communist Party provincial organisations and national bodies like the Communist Youth League immediately ordered intensive study of the editorial. But not until after the publication by the New China News Agency on August 26 of the communique of the central committee's meeting August 2-16 at Lushan in Kiangsi did the campaign against "right opportunism" start in earnest. This communique contained an admission that the major claims for the "great leap forward" of 1958 were considerably inflated. (See article on Economic Development by Choh-ming Li, p. 44.) The communique also called for an attack on a pessimism among "unstable elements" which it described as "right opportunist sentiment" and on the disruptive activities of "anti-Socialist elements." It revealed that such people had described the whole leap forward and the commune movement as "petty bourgeois fanaticism." On the same day, Chou En-lai, addressing the standing committee of the National People's Congress, explained the major points at issue between those maintaining the official line and the "very small number of people who remain apathetic to our country's great achievements in Socialist construction." (See documentary annex.) These doubters had stated that the making of steel by back-yard methods had resulted in "more loss than gain"; they had described the communes as "premature" and in an "awful mess"; and they had criticised the excessive strain put upon

the domestic market by economic policies. Chou En-lai characterised them as "right opportunists."

Now the *People's Daily* took up the task of refuting the "right opportunist" criticisms. An editorial on the communique on August 27 admitted that the "right opportunists" were Party members. On August 29, the first anniversary of the commune movement, the *People's Daily*, while praising the communes on the same lines as Chou En-lai, disclosed that the "right opportunists" had said that the commune form of organisation "lacked an objective material basis," that it was "the fruit of the wishful thinking of a few who have cooked it up out of thin air."

On September 1 the paper dealt with "right opportunist" allegations against the 1958 mass campaign for iron and steel. An attack on the excessive cost of the enterprise was confuted by the argument that the small furnaces permitted a far quicker increase in output and the utilisation of scattered local deposits of ore; the inferior nature of the product did not matter because it was primarily intended for rural use; the abandonment of the original back-yard furnaces using "native" methods in favour of more modern techniques was asserted to be a process of logical development and not a confession of failure; the charge that the iron and steel campaign had squeezed out everything else was said to be a gross exaggeration of partial difficulties.

Further revelations of "right opportunist" criticisms were provided by *Red Flag* when on September 16 it editorially rejected accusations that the great leap had resulted in disproportions in the national economy leading to a "state of tension." In the October 1 issue, K'ang Sheng, an alternate member of the Politburo, disclosed that Mao Tse-tung gave a personal lead to the attack on the "right opportunists" at the Lushan meeting, describing them as "fellow travellers" who had never been proletarian revolutionaries.

But although some provincial party organisations were now criticising at meetings the "right opportunist" thinking of their officials, there was still no indication of who the "right opportunists" were. Two possibilities within the Politburo are Deputy Premier Marshal P'eng Teh-huai (full member) who was dismissed as Defence Minister on September 17 and Chang Wen-t'ien (alternate member) whose dismissal as first-ranking Deputy Foreign Minister was revealed on the same day. Neither man appeared at the tenth anniversary celebrations, nor has either been seen since. Deputy Premier Ch'en Yun, who ranks fifth in the Party hierarchy, did attend the celebrations but in Shanghai, not in the capital. Since then, he also has disappeared. There has been no announcement that he or Marshal P'eng have lost their posts as Deputy Premiers.

Li Ching-ch'üan (full member) the Party secretary in Szechuan was not reported as attending the celebrations or any major functions since;

he has contributed an article on the communes to *Red Flag* (No. 20, October 16) but it carried a distinct hint of self-criticism.

The fate of the "right opportunists" is not yet clear. In his article, K'ang Sheng stated that since they were patriotic, opposed imperialism and had a rather muddled inclination towards Socialism, the Party could treat them leniently. More recently, Ch'en Po-ta, editor of *Red Flag*, accused the "right opportunists" of making a bourgeois demand for liberty, equality, fraternity and warned that it was "about time for them to realise that they should turn back immediately" to the correct road (*Red Flag*, No. 22, November 16). Meanwhile, refutations of the views of the "right opportunists" continue to appear in the Press.

Documentation: Chou En-lai's rebuttal of the "right opportunists"

... On the basis of the great leap forward in 1958, we gained the victory of a continued leap forward in the national economy in the first half of 1959. ... But unlike the overwhelming majority of the people, who are full of confidence and energy, there is a very small number of people who remain apathetic to our country's great achievements in Socialist construction; they are pessimistic about the current economic situation and even try hard to spread their extremely erroneous ideas. This would undoubtedly dampen the enthusiasm of the masses and blunt their initiative. In the interests of Socialism, we must thoroughly repudiate these erroneous and harmful views. Here I will only refute their arguments on three questions around which they have concentrated most of their talk.

FIRST, THE MASS CAMPAIGN TO MAKE IRON AND STEEL

... Some people hold that during last year's mass campaign to make iron and steel much manpower was used, much money was spent and part of the total products was iron and steel made by indigenous methods, as a result, it was "more loss than gain" or at most "loss and gain was a 50-50 affair." We consider this view utterly wrong. ... In iron and steel production, the mass campaign to build small enterprises, use light equipment and employ indigenous methods gave impetus to a further mass campaign in the big enterprises using heavy equipment and modern methods and to further mass campaigns covering the entire industrial front. With steel as the key lever, there was brought about the big leap forward in industry. ...

Considerable progress has been made in the past few months in raising the quality of products from the small blast furnaces and in reducing their consumption of coal. By July, the proportion of pig iron produced up to standard by small blast furnaces had risen to about 75 per cent.; ... Facts prove that the simultaneous development of large, small and medium-sized industrial enterprises and the use of integrated modern and indigenous methods have the following advantages: The enterprises are widely distributed; it takes less time to build them; they are less demanding in the quality of raw and other materials used; and it is easier to keep them supplied. ...

SECOND, PEOPLE'S COMMUNES AND COMMUNITY DINING-ROOMS

... Since the people's commune movement was a mass movement on a massive scale and the commune was something entirely new it is impossible that they should be perfect at the very start and that no defects or difficulties at all should be met with. Such phenomena as over-centralisation of some administrative powers, equalitarianism in distribution and extravagance did appear in some degree during the initial period of the people's commune movement because both cadres and masses lacked experience. But these defects were rapidly discovered and rectified by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. . . .

Those who assert that the people's communes are in "an awful mess" are none other than the imperialists who are violently hostile to our country's Socialist cause, as well as some rightists and other reactionaries who are against the people and against Socialism. Apart from these, there are some people who pay lip-service to Socialism but find fault with this and that in the people's commune movement, which has the active support of hundreds of millions of people, and maintain that the people's communes have been set up prematurely and have gone wrong. We would ask: Aren't you afraid of being thrown over to the borderline of the bourgeois rightists?

Here, I would also like to say something about the community dining-rooms. . . . In the initial period of their establishment, owing to lack of experience in management and to the influence of the bumper harvest and the mass campaigns for making iron and steel and for developing industry, some dining-rooms failed to manage their grain and non-staple foods well, so that a little too much was consumed. This is understandable. This defect has now been corrected. . . . So it is obviously very wrong to exaggerate certain shortcomings of the community dining-rooms in their initial stage, and find fault with and oppose them, or even close them down forcibly in contravention of the desire of the masses.

THIRD, THE QUESTION OF THE MARKET

... Only in the case of about a dozen commodities did supplies drop in the first half of this year; these included pork, beef, mutton, egg products, aquatic products, sugar, cotton wadding for domestic use, leather shoes, electric bulbs and wrist watches. The reduction in the supply of these goods was not due in all cases to a fall in production. The supply of such commodities as meat, egg products, aquatic products and cotton wadding for domestic use decreased because the consumption of these goods in the rural areas which produced them greatly increased. . . .

Moreover, the supply of a number of goods for daily use and non-staple foods which were in short supply in the first half of this year, began to improve in June and July. Some people have alleged that the market was strained all round. This is a deliberate distortion of the facts. A handful of people even said that before liberation one could get anything in the market but now nothing was available. Everyone knows that this is not true at all, but a vicious distortion. . . .

We should also see that the temporary and relative strain on the supply of certain commodities was due to the particularly rapid increase in the purchasing power in the cities arising from the rapid expansion of employment and the big increase in the number of workers and staff, as a result

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of the swift development of production, capital construction and other work last year. . . .

Some people suspect that the strain on the supply of certain commodities was due to excessive exports. This conforms still less to the facts. The total volume of exports this year is only 17.8 per cent. higher than it was last year. Furthermore, there is no increase or very little increase, compared with last year, in the exports of grain and various non-staple foods which are needed at home. . . .

For a very short period in the spring of this year, grain was in short supply in areas amounting to less than 5 per cent. of the total area of the country. This was because last year there were natural calamities; there was lack of proper budgeting; the grain crops were harvested in a somewhat hurried way; there was lack of planning in consumption so that a little too much grain was used up, and because, on top of these, there were new natural calamities in the spring of this year. But this was merely a local and temporary situation. . . .

From the above analysis, we can definitely conclude that: the big leap forward and the people's commune have registered great achievements, the present economic situation is favourable to us and our prospects are bright. . . .

[Speech before Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, August 26—Peking Review, No. 35, September 1.]

* * *

New agricultural policy

Two pronouncements by top economic planners during the last quarter of 1959 suggest that Peking will lay much greater stress on agricultural development in 1960 and in particular will now make efforts to introduce mechanisation.

Deputy Premier Po I-po, Chairman of the State Economic Commission, stated in *Red Flag* (No. 20, October 16) that the improved co-ordination of industry and agriculture meant that:

Our present task is to bring about the technical transformation, mechanisation and electrification of agriculture in a vigorous way while pressing ahead energetically with Socialist industrialisation. This is the new content under new circumstances of the Party's policy of the simultaneous development of industry and agriculture while giving priority to the development of heavy industry.

Po I-po cited a developing contradiction in the national economy as the justification for the new policy. Despite the "leap forward" it was still necessary to more than double grain production and treble cotton production to satisfy consumer demand; but at the same time, the new reliance on massed labour power to achieve the "leap forward" had led to a shortage of labour even with the release of women from household duties.

The transformation must be vigorous but gradual, Po I-po said. A rough set of stages has apparently been worked out:

At the present stage, the use of new-type machines and improved farm tools, of modern and indigenous farm tools must go hand in hand. For the next four years, mechanisation should in the main be carried out by stages and in groups where conditions permit; in the majority of rural areas, improved and semi-mechanised farm tools will be used on a large scale. In seven years' time modern machines will be widely used, while improved and semi-mechanised tools will still play a part.

This new line was later re-emphasised by Deputy Premier Li Fu-ch'un, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, when writing of the economic tasks for 1960. He stated that the new content of the 1960 plan was to take agriculture as the foundation to stimulate the advance of other sectors of the economy. To facilitate the technical transformation of agriculture the state should greatly increase the supply of machinery, iron and steel, chemical fertilizer and other means of production to the rural areas.¹

A step toward the goal of mechanisation was taken on November 1 when China's first tractor plant, built with Soviet aid, was officially opened in Loyang. The plant is said to have an annual capacity of 15,000 54 h.p. caterpillar tractors.

Natural disasters. The background to the new emphasis on agriculture was a year of very serious droughts, floods and incursions by insect pests, the total impact of which has recently been officially estimated. More than 40 million hectares, over a third of the cultivated acreage, were affected.² Drought alone damaged 33.3 million hectares in twenty provinces. In many areas along the Yangtse and Yellow River valleys, it was described as the worst in seventy years.³

To try to prevent a recurrence, the Communist Party launched a new mass water conservancy campaign on October 24.

Plan fulfilment. Despite the natural disasters, Peking has claimed that the total value of agricultural output in 1959 was far in excess of the target.⁴ On particular agricultural products it has so far been more cautious: total grain output is said to have been "even greater" than in 1958, while the cotton harvest was "rich."⁵

In the industrial sector, steel output has been put at 13 million tons

¹ A summary of Li Fu-ch'un's article for the January 1, 1960, issue of *Red Flag* was released by the New China News Agency (NCNA) on December 30.

² Li Fu-ch'un, *loc. cit.*

³ NCNA, December 22.

⁴ Li Fu-ch'un, *loc. cit.*

⁵ NCNA quoted in *The Daily Telegraph*, London, December 24.

(target—12 million tons) and coal output is said to have been "markedly" over the target of 335 million tons.⁶

Tibet

Little news of developments in Tibet filtered across the Indian border during the last quarter of 1959. But the Dalai Lama's brother declared in London on October 1 that resistance to the Chinese continued.⁷ The Dalai Lama himself appeared before the investigating committee of the International Commission of Jurists in Mussoorie on November 14 and repeated his charge that the Chinese were guilty of genocide in his country. He said there had been mass killings, deportations (including 10,000 children), sterilisation of Tibetan men and women, and Chinese immigration.⁸

Chinese Communist sources stated that a "democratic reform movement" was progressing "quickly and healthily." The movement is in two stages: (1) organisation of the masses in the "three-antis (anti-rebellion, anti-corvée labour, anti-slavery) and two reductions (of rent and interest)" movement; (2) distribution of land.⁹ (In the case of (2) land belonging to rebels is confiscated, that belonging to other nobles is bought out.) Stage one is reported as nearing completion in fifty-one counties with a farming population of 450,000. About 100,000 people have been organised into 500 peasant associations.¹⁰ A land reform committee was set up on November 28 and some land has been distributed.¹¹

In livestock-rearing areas, greater caution is apparent. Only the "three-antis" are being stressed, presumably in an effort to promote the declared aim of developing animal husbandry.¹²

"The feudal special privileges and the feudal exploitation of the monasteries are, of course, being firmly abolished. But this means no interference in purely religious activities. . . ." ¹³

The Panchen Lama has not returned to Tibet since leaving Lhasa on September 22 for the tenth anniversary celebrations in Peking. Lately he has been touring north-east, east and south China.

The amnesty for "reformed" political prisoners and criminals decreed on September 17 as part of the tenth anniversary celebrations is said to have resulted in the release of 11,693 "counter-revolutionaries"

⁶ Li Fu-ch'un, *loc. cit.*

⁷ Reported in *The Daily Telegraph*, London, October 2.

⁸ Reported in *The Times*, London, November 16.

⁹ From a speech by Chang Kuo-hua broadcast by Peking radio on December 7 (hereafter cited as Chang). See B.B.C. Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), Part 3, FE/203 and FE/W36.

¹⁰ Report on Chinese Communist Party's Tibet Committee meeting (September 24–October 18) by Tibet regional broadcasting service (hereafter cited as Meeting). See B.B.C., SWB, Part 3, FE/165.

¹¹ Chang, *loc. cit.*

¹² Meeting, *loc. cit.*

¹³ Chang, *loc. cit.*

and common criminals, and changes in the sentences of 389 others facing sentences of death or life-imprisonment.¹⁴ Among a group of thirty-three "war criminals" also released was Henry Pu-yi who was Emperor of the Japanese puppet kingdom of Manchukuo.¹⁵ Some 26,000 "rightists" have been relieved of that designation which they got during the anti-"rightist" campaign of 1957 for responding too forthrightly to Mao Tse-tung's call for criticisms that would help solve China's internal "contradictions."¹⁶ Among the 26,000 is the noted sociologist Fei Hsiao-t'ung.¹⁷

Communist Party Membership is now 13.96 million according to Liuhan-t'ao's article in the *People's Daily* on September 28.

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SECTION 2. FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Sino-Indian Border dispute

Frontier disputes have been going on between India and China since 1954 but they received no publicity until last summer. Then conflicting territorial claims brought an armed clash on August 25 when an Indian garrison was forced to withdraw from the outpost at Longju to the south of the McMahon Line in the North-East Frontier Agency (see end-paper Map). The news created much indignation against China in India. India protested about this and other Chinese border moves.

Relations were considerably worsened during the last quarter of 1959 by a further armed clash on October 21 in the Kongka Pass area of Ladakh. Nine Indian soldiers lost their lives. China, which protested first on October 22, accused Indian troops of intruding into Chinese territory, twice unwarrantedly opening fire and finally launching "armed attack." The following day, the Indian Government rejected the Chinese protest. Its note described the incident as a "deliberate and unprovoked attack by Chinese forces" on a police search patrol looking for two men who had disappeared the previous day. (They had been captured by the Chinese.) At this point Indian information put Indian dead at seventeen. The Indian note placed the site of the clash forty to fifty miles west of the traditional frontier (*i.e.*, in India) and asked for the Chinese forces to be withdrawn.

China described this Indian version as "completely contrary to the facts." The Kongka Pass was "indisputably Chinese territory," according to its note of October 25. Over seventy Indians had attacked a smaller number of Chinese forcing the latter to fire back in self-defence.

¹⁴ NCNA, December 8.
¹⁶ NCNA, January 3, 1960.

¹⁵ NCNA, December 4.
¹⁷ NCNA, December 4.

The note offered the release of ten captured policemen and the handing over of the bodies of nine others. The Indian Government described this version in a note of November 4 as a "travesty of the truth," and said that this and previous frontier incidents were "reminiscent of the activities of the old imperialist powers."

On November 7, the Chinese Premier, Mr. Chou En-lai, proposed a mutual withdrawal of 12½ miles from the McMahon Line in the east and the line up to which each country exercised actual control in Ladakh and suggested an immediate meeting between himself and Mr. Nehru. Replying to this letter of November 16, Mr. Nehru declared that a meeting at Prime Minister level should be preceded by preliminary negotiations because of the complicated frontier issues involved. Instead of a 12½ mile withdrawal he proposed that (1) in the North-East Frontier Agency, both sides should stop sending out patrols and the Chinese should withdraw from Longju with the guarantee that India would not reoccupy it, and (2) in Ladakh each side should withdraw behind what the other considered its rightful frontier.

The following day, the Indian Government, which by this time had been able to hear the story of the returned prisoners, accused the Chinese of having continuously interrogated the Indian policemen and of putting them "under pressure and threats to make statements desired by their captors." A second protest against this "deplorable and inhuman treatment" was delivered on December 13, backed by a statement by the captured patrol leader.

Meanwhile, Mr. Nehru in a number of speeches attempted to calm the more violent Indian reactions while affirming his determination not to yield to threats. On November 27, replying to a parliamentary debate, he announced that aggression against Nepal would be regarded as aggression against India. This was presumably a reaction to reports of Chinese troops massing on the Tibetan frontier and Chinese officials in Tibet boasting they would soon be "liberating" Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladakh and other parts of India.

In China, cartographers and jurists issued statements in support of their country's case. People's Congress deputies spoke up and there were letters to the papers. Over a short period, Peking organised nationwide anti-Indian demonstrations like those staged earlier in the year in protest at Indian opinion on Tibet.

On December 16, Mr. Chou En-lai replied to Mr. Nehru's letter of the previous month, proposing talks between them on December 26 either in Rangoon or anywhere in China. He accepted the proposal for Longju and suggested it should be applied to a number of other places which he claimed were in Chinese territory but were occupied by India. He agreed to ban patrolling. But he rejected Mr. Nehru's "unfair" proposal for Ladakh which would mean, he said, the loss of 33,000

sq. km. (about 13,000 sq. miles) and the key road which the Chinese had built across the disputed area to join Sinkiang and west Tibet. Mr. Nehru told Parliament on December 21 that he had refused the suggestion for an immediate meeting and revealed that the Indian Ambassador in Peking had been recalled for consultations. He described Chou En-lai's letter as a mere reiteration of previous frontier claims.

During all this time, the Chinese Government had given no full statement of its position on the various frontier issues at stake though partial explanations had emerged from its notes and Premier Chou En-lai's letters. This was remedied with a very lengthy note of December 26 published on January 2. By comparing it with Mr. Nehru's letter of September 26, it is now possible to set out the rival positions on major issues.

(1) GENERAL POSITION: *China* considers that no part of the Sino-Indian frontier has been delimited and that any settlement must take into account British imperialist annexations. *India* agrees that it has not been entirely formally delimited but maintains that the entire length has been "either defined by treaty or recognised by custom" and rejects the argument from imperialist aggression.

(2) LADAKH: *India* states that while the treaty merely referred to "old established frontiers" this was because they were well known and did not require formal delimitation. The claim is backed by reference to Ladakhi chronicles of the seventeenth century. *China* states that the customary frontier referred to is the one to which she adheres. The claim to an area of about 13,000 square miles is backed by reference to the establishment of Manchu forts in the area in the eighteenth century and to the fact that many place names are in the Uighur language of Sinkiang.

India backs her claim with various British and one Chinese map. *China* cites other British maps and Chinese maps and pleads ignorance of the particular Chinese map mentioned by *India*.

(3) THE McMAHON LINE: *China* says this was the product of British aggression. *India* says *China* acted at the time as a free agent. *India* says the Chinese of the time were fully aware of the settlement of the McMahon Line at the 1914 Simla Conference and accepted it. *China* says her representative was ignorant of the McMahon Line discussions and did not protest about this frontier demarcation because of his ignorance of it.

India says the area claimed by *China* south of the McMahon Line, about 40,000 square miles, is culturally and politically distinct from Tibet. *China* claims that Tibetan jurisdiction was exercised over these areas until recently and that *India* is a very new arrival. *Both sides* cite foreign and native maps to back their claims.

QUARTERLY CHRONICLE AND DOCUMENTATION

Documentation

(i) *The Chinese position*

"... The Sino-Indian boundary question is a complicated question left over by history. In tackling this question one cannot but, first of all, take into account the historical background of British aggression on China when India was under British rule... using India as a base, Britain conducted extensive territorial expansion into China's Tibet region, and even the Sinkiang region... China and India are both countries which were long subjected to imperialist aggression. This common experience should have naturally caused China and India to hold an identical view of the above-said historical background... Unexpectedly, however, the Indian Government demanded that the Chinese Government give formal recognition to the situation created by the application of the British policy of aggression against China's Tibet region as the foundation for the settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question..."

[Extract from Mr. Chou En-lai's letter to Mr. Nehru, September 8, 1959.]

(ii) *The Indian position*

"I have received your letter of September 8. I must say that I was greatly surprised and distressed to read it... [You] even suggested that the independent Government of India are seeking to reap a benefit from the British aggression against China. Our Parliament and people deeply resent this allegation. The struggle of the Indian people against any form of imperialism both at home and abroad is known and recognised all over the world... It is true that the British occupied and ruled the Indian sub-continent against the wishes of the Indian people. The boundaries of India were, however, settled for centuries by history, geography, custom and tradition..."

[Extract from Mr. Nehru's letter to Mr. Chou En-lai, September 26, 1959.]

Both quoted in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs' White Paper No. II on exchanges between the two governments, published in New Delhi, November 4, 1959, pp. 27, 34.

The dispute with Indonesia

The Indonesian Government announced in May and later in September that all foreign-owned retail shops in rural areas would have to be closed down. This led the Chinese to invite Dr. Subandrio, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, to visit Peking in October, for almost the only foreigners affected were some hundred thousands of the 2½ million overseas Chinese minority. Marshal Ch'en Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, and Dr. Subandrio signed a vague communique on October 11; it recognised that Indonesian economic development would possibly affect the economic position of the Chinese minority and called for appropriate measures to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests. On the surface everything appeared amicable, but foreign observers reported that Chinese leaders had been arrogantly sharp with Dr. Subandrio.

On November 16 the proposed ban was formalised in a Presidential

Decree; it was to take effect from January 1, 1960. Subsequent Indonesian attempts to help resettle Chinese traders met with resistance, inspired, according to Indonesia, by Chinese embassy officials. Some violent incidents occurred though no life was lost.

In a letter of December 9, Marshal Ch'en Yi protested against the subjection of the Chinese to "most crude treatment." He proposed the immediate exchange of instruments of ratification of the dual nationality treaty signed in 1955 and an immediate conference to discuss the safeguard of the rights of Chinese. (Under this treaty overseas Chinese had to choose either Chinese or Indonesian citizenship. The citizenship of anyone who had not informed either government of a choice within two years of the treaty taking effect was to be decided by reference to the racial origins of the father.)

The dispatch of the letter was followed by meetings of returned overseas Chinese in China to denounce Indonesian discrimination. The Chinese Press printed accounts of maltreatment and "bloody affairs" and sought to show the beneficial role played by the Chinese in the Indonesian economy. There were accusations that Indonesia was taking it out on the overseas Chinese because it could not handle the far more serious problem of Western capitalist infiltration.

In his reply to Marshal Ch'en dated December 15, Dr. Subandrio accused the New China News Agency of "slandorous reporting" and alleged that the overseas Chinese had come to dominate the Indonesian economy "by utterly discarding all canons of justice and humanitarian principles, and through every sort of manipulation." He rejected China's protest and "false accusations." While agreeing to an exchange of instruments of ratification for the dual nationality treaty, he indicated that this would not affect the ban.

Marshal Ch'en replied on December 24 regretting the indefiniteness of Dr. Subandrio's acceptance of his proposal for an immediate conference and again pressed this suggestion. After a two-hour meeting with the Chinese ambassador on New Year's eve, Dr. Subandrio announced that he would not reply to this letter until after his January tour of West Java where the worst incidents between Chinese and the authorities had taken place.


A China-U.A.R. dispute arose when Khalid Bakdash, secretary of the banned Syrian Communist Party, was allowed to describe the U.A.R. Government as a "terroristic dictatorial" and Fascist régime at a tenth anniversary rally in Peking on September 28. The U.A.R. representatives walked out and refused to attend further celebrations. The subsequent attacks of Cairo newspapers included a comparison of China with Hitler Germany. On October 8 the NCNA officially rejected their accusations of violation of the diplomatic privileges of the U.A.R. mission. The quarrel appears to have been patched over.

QUARTERLY CHRONICLE AND DOCUMENTATION

The Chinese and Japanese Communist Parties met for talks at the highest level in Peking during the course of the tenth anniversary celebrations. (The Chinese side was led by Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai, the Japanese by Sanzo Nozaka and Satomi Ikamada.) A joint communique of October 20 stressed that the immediate objective of the Japanese was to prevent a revision of the Japan-American Security Treaty against which eventuality there has been constant propaganda in the Chinese Press over the past three months.

Liu Shao-ch'i, China's head of state, has accepted invitations extended during the tenth anniversary celebrations to visit Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary. If and when Liu goes, it will be the first visit ever paid by a Chinese head of state to countries west of Russia. (Mao Tse-tung never made good his acceptance of an invitation to visit Poland.)





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